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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 559.—JANUARY 1944.

Art. 1.—FRANCE, THE FUTURE, AND HER ALLIES.

It is proposed to consider here part of the problem represented by the future of France in relation to ourselves.

The importance of France to Great Britain is one of the simplest things to demonstrate. Because France lost Indo-China, handed over by Marshal Pétain to Japan, we lost Singapore. Only because we could, and did, retake Madagascar for France, from hands which General de Gaulle well described as 'des gouvernants de rencontre' acting in the interest of our common enemy Germany, the Indian Ocean was rendered relatively safe from German or Japanese action. So long as French North and West Africa was under those same governors, known to history as the Vichy Government, there was no hope of security, still less victory, in the Mediterranean. If Vichy had been left master in Africa, the war was in all likelihood lost; Vichy turned out of Africa, it has been won unless we throw victory away. To this list one more item may be added, to which Lord Swinton made allusion, though without drawing its full moral, in a broadcast last summer. But for the action of General de Gaulle in 1940 and of his clear-sighted adherents in French Equatorial Africa and the Chad, our life-line from the Gulf of Guinea to the Sudan and Egypt would have been severed, and in the dark days of 1941, of which Mr A. V. Alexander's broadcast last September first revealed to the public the full gravity, all our communications with the Middle East would have had to pass by the Cape of Good Hope. Had this line been cut or never existed, it is conceivable that we might have lost the war on that account alone.

For strategic reasons, then, France is essential to Great Britain. Commercially, it should not be forgotten, she was our best customer, while in turn she supplied us with many of the amenities of life difficult or impracticable for our own country to produce. We are thus forced to

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
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consider the future of France with great care, seeing that our interest, no less than our security, is involved therein. That France should be strong and on lasting good terms with Great Britain, must be a basic principle in our national policy. All our dealings with France now and to come must be coordinated with a condition which is imposed by sheer geography.

But what is the France with which we shall deal after the war? That will be not a geographical expression merely, but a political entity with a will of its own and independent sovereign activities. Here is a point that demands reflection and much will depend on our right understanding of it. Obviously political France is not and never has been 'Vichy.' That is a regime and a government imposed on a nation rendered momentarily impotent through military disaster by a clique of ambitious defeatists who in 1940 wrongly foretold the prompt and final victory of Germany. Had these false prophets been justified by the event, while they would personally have been left secure in a position of selfish profit and influence, France herself would have been reduced to be a second-rate satellite of German power, inferior even to the equally miscalculating Italy, that very treacherous 'Latin Sister' who had stabbed her in the back and would have torn from her a rich part of her historic organism. France would have lost her sovereign freedom, if not for ever, at least for a century or more.

One only answer can be made to the question put. Our France, the France of the future, is the France that in 1940 resisted the German onslaught with a full, furious spirit and has never since ceased to resist German tyranny and oppression. At the blackest moment her trumpet was sounded by General de Gaulle in that ringing appeal: 'To all Frenchmen! France has lost a battle. But France has not lost the war.' Because a man was found to say so, it was true. That band of brothers who joined General de Gaulle in England, who answered his call at notable points in the French empire, became, first, the Free French and then Fighting France. They had earned the name with their blood. On sea, on land, in the air, they fought by our side from the outset, without faltering, through the Battle of Britain, through the Battles of Egypt and of the Desert. Their ships joined in the Battle



of the Atlantic. Their camel corps raided Italian key-posts in the southern sands. With British and Indian troops they scaled the mountains of the once Italian empire; they held Bir Hakeim with a fame like that of Rorke's Drift to give time for our grip on El Alamein to harden; in one of the most astonishing of recorded marches they crossed the Sahara to fall on our united enemies in Tunisia and share our triumph there. They have furnished the eyes of our ceaseless reconnaissance in France itself; they have taught us how to find and how thence to free men valuable in our joint fight for liberty; they are the liaison between France without and France within. Apart from actual military services of the highest worth, they have done still more in the sphere of the spirit, by holding aloft the banner of France as champions of the Right, a flaming, bloody encouragement to all the oppressed peoples of Europe. Not Greeks, nor Poles, nor Czechs, nor Serbs, nor Norwegians, nor any in like case will forget the part played by the Fighting French. And now, linked with the Committee of Resistance organised by underground France, transformed by the adhesion of the best elements in liberated French Africa into the French Committee of National Liberation, and backed by a consultative assembly, they have become the representatives, as they were always the emblem of France herself. They are France, France of to-day and of to-morrow. That is simple fact.

Fighting France has been a cheap investment for us. With 600,000 tons of shipping in the Allied pool, and the supplies and taxes derived from the French Colonies, Fighting France is now indebted to Great Britain for a bare one day's cost of the war. All the other supplies and payments advanced by us are repaid.

The question is often asked: What will be the government of France after the war, when her soil shall have been cleansed from the brute German beast and from the not less despicable native vermin, few in proportion to the French nation but active and vilely potent under the protection of German bullet, rope, and whip? This is for Frenchmen themselves to answer. Few who can claim to know France well doubt that the answer will be inspired by the democratic faith instinct in the great mass of French men and French women. The stir caused

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by Charles Maurras and his coterie used to make many English people coquet with the notion of a royalist restoration in France; but hardly any who had lived among the French saw a serious likelihood of that. Royalist views had a certain currency among army officers, and among middle-class youth in a number of towns. In the latter case certainly, and perhaps in the former too, they were less part of a political creed than the expression of dissatisfaction felt with the growing slackness of France's government from 1924 onwards. When Maurras began to support Germany, he lost heavily. Royalism never had any hold on the masses of the French people. It is conceivable that, had a Pretender stood forth resolutely in 1940, or at the moment when the Allies moved into Algeria and Morocco, as champion of the nation against Germany and germanised Vichy, a genuine monarchist movement might have been launched. But, just as the Comte de Chambord played his cards with fatal obtuseness in 1873, so now has his successor the Comte de Paris failed to seize the last, fleeting chance. Politically the House of Bourbon is as dead as any doornail. It is a good wager that we shall see France again with a republican constitution, although modifications will surely be made in that which Pétain and Laval overthrew, for faults in it and its over-rigidity were directly responsible for at least part of the weakness that led France towards collapse. In Algeria and Corsica, the French National Committee have declared the laws of the Third Republic to be once more in force; and the first actions of the Corsican population, while still engaged in harrying retreating Huns, were to hold local, spontaneous elections and to welcome a Prefect sent by the French National Committee. These, however, are matters to be decided by the French nation itself in an assembly of its representatives, when the time can come for one to be convened, and for no one else.

Mr Winston Churchill in his speech to the Commons of September 21 last made, for the first time, official mention of the differences that have disturbed the harmony presumably aimed at between the Allies and, first, the Free French, then, the French National Committee. It is well known that differences existed almost from the beginning and at moments have been acute. Allusion to

them has been frequent in our own press, while in the United States they have been debated with ferocious frankness. Though it is true that their continuing existence and exacerbation has been due chiefly to American influences, it is also true that we have had a part in their nourishment which was avoidable and is to be deplored.

Our share in the matter seems to have arisen from three main causes. First, there was for long active the inveterate vice of the Foreign Office to suppose it the duty of foreign statesmen to please Great Britain. In the present instance it was perhaps natural for British officials to see in General de Gaulle and the Free French useful helpers merely but by no means partners, and the discovery of their error, although it was in time discovered and the error corrected and under the wise impulsion of Mr Eden its effects wiped away, was not without pain. Secondly, we had to take into consideration the United States attitude towards France, a factor that must be discussed separately. Thirdly, we did not succeed until very late in cultivating a healthy reaction to what Mr Oliver Stanley once described as the greatest test of statesmanship—the temptation to appease one's foes at the expense of one's friends.

From the outset General de Gaulle's position and action were attacked from divers angles. He had enemies among the French themselves. There were Vichyites here, some open, some concealed. There were those who sat on the fence. There were uncompromising supporters of the old Palais Bourbon parliamentary system of the loaves and fishes that had done France incalculable harm and were alarmed at Free French talk of a national 'renovation,' which has now become a fixed plank in the French platform. There were disgruntled place hunters who became dangerous intriguers. On our side many irreproachable persons were taken in by Marshal Pétain's fraudulent window-dressing. There was jealousy at the War Office of a mere Brigadier-General, military reformer too, claiming to talk on equal terms. Even at the Admiralty, where keener vision might have been expected, there was criticism of so junior an officer as Admiral Auboyneau for daring to flout Darlan, his superior in rank. There were personal misunderstandings between General de Gaulle who spoke English little, if

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at all, and English people who thought they spoke French well and did not. It is related that once the General talking with a highly placed person about the Vichyites in North Africa, said : ' Ils se fichent bien des Alliés.' His interlocutor thought that the General had said : ' Je me fiche bien des Alliés.' *Hinc multæ lacrymæ.* General de Gaulle was assailed on the one hand as a would-be dictator, on the other, as an instrument of Jews and Communists, legends of which he made effective fun in one of the finest of those speeches that placed him among the leading broadcasters of the day. He was said to be 'difficult.' Would any man in his senses expect or wish a national leader to be 'easy'? Cavour may have been, Dr Salazar may be, a perfect diplomatist, but military action was not their rôle. Was Mustapha Kemal or William III or Louis XI, are Marshal Stalin and Mr Churchill 'easy' men? Destiny cast General de Gaulle for the part of leader of his fellow countrymen at the hardest crisis of their nation; he could not afford, even had he wished, to do other than stand firmly on the principle of national interest. At the end of a stormy interview on the subject of Syria, General de Gaulle's interlocutor is said to have shouted : ' I say you shall have a general election in Syria.' To which the General retorted : ' Why don't you have one in England?' On questions of Syria, of Madagascar, of purging French Africa of tainted and treacherous elements, General de Gaulle would not budge. The simplicity of his attitude and the support it commanded from every class of Frenchman opposed to German domination show that he is in fact the national leader demanded by these big times. Never has he wavered from his original cry : ' Il faut que la France soit présente à la victoire. Alors, elle retrouvera sa liberté et sa grandeur. Tel est mon but ; mon seul but.'

General de Gaulle has stated and reiterated his policy that at the first moment possible a general election shall be held in France at which the nation shall freely declare for the form of government which it desires should be set up. Every step he has taken is in the direction of this policy's fulfillment. Even if it could be assumed that a double-dealer bent on the acquisition of personal power were at the head of this movement of men, and women too, who have sacrificed much and risked every-

thing to free their country, it would be beyond his power to achieve it. The France of to-morrow will be the France moulded by millions of Frenchmen who have suffered the German occupation and known its every form of humiliation, suffering, and misery. We have been spared their fate. We can rest assured that their experience will not go for nothing. Once the invader is driven out, no one, neither foreigner nor yet any Frenchmen now beyond the confines of France, will have the chance to impose on the French nation a will which is not theirs. The strength of General de Gaulle's position is that, having stood forth in 1940 as the focus of French resistance to the invader, he kept touch, and broadened and deepened touch as time went on, with the elements of resistance within France; and these, growing stronger and better organised, came to have a preponderant part in the counsels of Fighting France and now of the French National Committee, until its chiefs could not, even if they would, oppose the will of those yet nameless heroes known to the world simply as 'the Resistance.'

The British Government has been at pains to insist that it accepts the French Committee only as a provisional organ of French opinion and action. Of course it is. This is what the Fighting French leaders, from General de Gaulle downwards and outwards, have proclaimed from the first. They know and said before anyone else that their specific work will be done when France is freed and the French nation, of whose interests they have been the trustees, takes over. But until that moment they are its trustees. They are so regarded by the French people. The evidence of this is overwhelming. Not only that of the triumphant welcome spontaneously offered to General de Gaulle by the population of Tunis and Algiers, not only that of the men, non-commissioned officers or officers in Algiers who before the fusion of the French forces in North Africa elected to serve under the Cross of Lorraine, but also that of every voice that has been able to make itself heard from within France itself. Here is no question of politics. All who have come out of France during the last three years—and there have been hundreds, men of the former Right and the former Left, men of no interest at all in politics, professors, students, journalists, women, fishermen, some

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British subjects too—tell the same tale. In the Resistance socialists and individualists, priests and communists, bourgeois and artisans, work together. There is only one touchstone: to be for or against Germany. To be for Germany is to be for Vichy, to be against Germany is to be for England. In that terrible struggle one Frenchman alone is recognised as national leader, and that man is General de Gaulle. The chiefs of the Resistance in Corsica, barely liberated, told the world they had '15,000 organised Corsican patriots—15,000 Gaullistes.' Not only is the name of de Gaulle the symbol of resistance, but he is the only man in whom trust is reposed to bridge over the difficult gap between the defeat of the Germans in France, their final ousting from France, and the moment when the nation can make its free choice for the future. This is why General de Gaulle has been uncompromising on questions of national prestige: he is the nation's man. In the end we are coming to recognise this. When last August in the course of his visit to Morocco General de Gaulle intimated that France would not submit to be treated by her Allies as an outsider in the peace settlement of Europe, an important British Minister concluded that General de Gaulle's alleged 'difficulty' amounted to no more than this: that he was intractable on one point alone, namely, the rights of French sovereignty.

That the collapse of France in 1940 and the growth of the Resistance should lead to social changes in France was only to be expected. According to the best evidence obtained directly from France last autumn the peasants, the workmen, and the *petite bourgeoisie* are solid as a rock against Germany and Vichy; in the *grande bourgeoisie*, the industrialists and the squirearchy, who had for long been preponderantly pro-Vichy, there was still considerable wobbling, and, in a phrase just coined in France, many were 'greasing their weathercocks,' while waiting anxiously to see from which quarter the wind would blow. This meant a cleavage more than that of classes; as an industrialist himself put it, 'the struggle between employers and workmen is no longer social but national.' Collaborators, though many such among industrialists come to heel unwillingly, so as to keep their works open and their men employed, none the less work for Germany: the workman, held rigidly in subjection by the food

ration card, without which he must starve, knows that he stands for France. This, it is thought, will certainly influence the reorganisation of industry in France hereafter. The peasants are no longer afraid of Communism. Communists have ransomed themselves by their share in the fight against Germany, and the peasants feel towards Communism as the socialist whom M. André Siegfried once asked: 'How can you, a peasant farmer who own so much property, be in favour of socialism?' To which the fellow answered with a grin: 'Ah, Monsieur, puisque le socialisme n'arrivera jamais!' The higher French clergy too has come almost wholly to adopt a national attitude in the struggle. Among the *curés de campagne* and protestant pastors the influence of the squire and of the local boss in a small town, or of the *légionnaires* in villages, compels many against their will to pro-Vichy professions. The hated *légion* is, together with the food ration card, Vichy's strongest weapon in maintaining its hold on the country. All other classes detest the great industrialists who, they believe, betrayed the nation for selfish ends to Germany. The industrialists will try to find a way out, but a resumption of national life on the same terms as before must not be expected.

For the last two summers an unusual drought in France has sadly sharpened the food difficulties arising from German rapine. Much stock and many fowls are being killed owing to want of fodder and grain. Nevertheless it is expected by good observers that French agriculture will recover quickly when the Hun has been driven out. If it proves so, industry in turn will profit, since there must be an immense demand on the farms, which still account for over forty per cent. of the population, for machinery and implements of every sort, besides that of the railways for locomotives and rolling stock. The home market will provide an immediate outlet for French production. Therefore France's post-war economy seems likely to develop on fairly regular and prosperous lines. Politically, her future will offer far greater trouble. When the unifying impress given by enemy occupation ceases and the traitors have been liquidated, party struggles are almost certain to come again to life. Even while the Resistance is active and unity indispensable, there are signs of this stirring.

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If Great Britain has been overlong in recognising the force of facts in the French situation which should have been obvious, a process not yet indeed complete, comprehension by the United States has by no means reached the same degree. From the first marked hostility to General de Gaulle was shown by the State Department, the American opposite number of the Foreign Office. The main source of this hostility was evidently that the United States was still at peace with Germany and therefore had no cause of quarrel with Vichy which had yielded to Germany, while General de Gaulle and the Free French were bent on winning the war. Washington was full of Vichy French under the busy leadership of M. Henry Haye, known before the war as one of the protagonists of German influence in France; and M. Henry Haye had unlimited champagne and hardly less cash for pro-Vichy propaganda in America. He was supported both by open Vichyites and by a crowd of craven French spirits waiting to see which way the cat would jump, some of whom had climbed to fame on the back of British friends and now proceeded, as the saying goes, to kick them in the pants. But there was more to it than this. General de Gaulle's centre of activity was in England. Therefore to many American eyes he appeared to be an English puppet. How wrong this view was has already been shown; there was a sorry deal of bickering between Carlton Gardens and Whitehall. But the mere appearance, however baseless, was proof positive to the anti-British components in the U.S.A., and to active twisters of the British lion's tail positive manna. Chief among them is the old Irish element, by no means without influence at Washington. For the sake then of Great Britain, General de Gaulle's stock fell to a still lower price in America. Not all Americans, it goes without saying, fell into what was at bottom a pro-German trap. To name but one of the healthiest influences, the 'New York Herald Tribune,' for long the best informed American newspaper on foreign affairs, has waged a ceaseless war against General de Gaulle's detractors, who did not shrink from such tricks as breaches of official confidence, and even semi-official, if verbal, forgery of documents.

In the course of this struggle strange bedfellows can be found in the capacious Vichy fourposter. Notwith-

standing the glorious example of Princes of the Church like Cardinal Hinsley, the policy of the Vatican has in the main, and despite Pius XI's magnificent encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*, been, in its practical tendencies, at least negatively, in favour of a compromise peace. The Vatican feared the growth of Bolshevism. American big industry was obsessed with the same fear as the Vatican, and their attitude received further support from the Poles in America who, while detesting Germany, feared a peace which should give predominance to Russia. On American policy towards France these tendencies had the effect of causing it to support Marshal Pétain as a presumed bulwark against Bolshevism. Tension between Washington and the Free French was increased by General de Gaulle's liberating from Vichy the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon which, although off the Canadian coast, the State Department claimed as being within the United States sphere of influence. Admiral Leahy at Vichy and Mr Murphy in North Africa, its representatives, pursued a strong pro-Vichy policy. It appears to have been imagined that Marshal Pétain would at the crucial moment declare for the Allies and Vichy be accepted by them as the true government of France. In the spring of 1942 a leading functionary of the State Department declared to an amazed French lady that the United States would be perfectly ready to negotiate with Laval as French prime minister.

That this statement went no jot beyond literal truth is proved by the attempt of the American government to set up Darlan in North Africa as the legitimate French authority. It is unnecessary to discuss this lamentable story in detail. Enough to point out that Darlan was as guilty towards the French nation and its Allies as Laval: towards the latter indeed more so, for Darlan had handed over to the Germans the secret of British anti-submarine devices learnt by the French Naval Mission in England at the beginning of the war, thereby causing the death of thousands of British seamen and of a substantial number of Americans besides. To say that our European Allies were aghast at Washington's attitude is to put it mildly. They were supported by a sturdy reaction from the British working classes and from Russia. In Cardinal Hinsley's robust view, Hitler was Antichrist. There

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could be no truck with his servitors, among whom were ranked Pétain, Laval, and Darlan. If Darlan were countenanced as a negotiator for and ruler of his country, not Hacha, nor Degrelle, nor Quisling himself could be counted out as pawns in the American game. Our basic war aim, the defence of liberty and justice, would have gone by the board. Happily, Darlan disappeared from the scene before the worst harm to be apprehended from his choice had been accomplished.

Hardly, however, had Darlan vanished than Washington was trying to construct another inverted pyramid for General Giraud as leader of the French in opposition to General de Gaulle. General Giraud may not have realised the implications of the opposition thus thrust on him. He had made a daring escape from Koenigstein, where he was kept as a prisoner of war since May 1940, and had been whisked out of France and to Algiers on a British submarine in November 1942. His reputation as a soldier was high. He was strongly anti-German. But by his long imprisonment he was out of touch with French sentiment. He had not experienced the weeks of the catastrophe, or seen the shameful conduct of affairs by Pétain and Laval at the armistice and after. He could not assess at its true value the stand made by General de Gaulle or the share of the Fighting French in the combat, nor yet the strength of reactionary or unpatriotic elements working under Vichy in North Africa. Therefore, when he was offered supreme command there by the Americans, his acceptance was doubtless in good faith. It was almost immediately found that the Americans had offered more than they could deliver. The discovery followed that General Giraud could count on no substantial following in Africa.

General Giraud has always said that politics were not his line; he was a soldier, nothing else. Those who saw him in London during his visit here last summer got the impression that this was sincere and true. But the State Department had put him into the centre of a political situation and insisted on keeping him there. While every attempt was made to block or to delay General de Gaulle's removal from London to Algiers and, although in the end vainly, to keep in power in Africa dyed-in-the-wool Vichy men like Peyrouton, Noguès, Chatel, and Boisson,

General Giraud was, with a singular want of tact *vis-à-vis* of French opinion, invited alone to the United States. His visit was not a success. Mr Raymond Gram Swing cabled from Washington on July 10, 1943: 'General Giraud is not touching American emotions. Instead, some Americans are showing signs of deep disquiet over official preference for Giraud and are apprehensive that in having set up their own French leader they may forfeit the devotion of the French. . . . Giraud cannot be maintained against the majority of the French desires. It should be added that there is no indication that the State Department is ready to transfer its allegiance from Giraud to the French Committee.' In fact, General Giraud's following in Africa consisted solely of officers devoted to Marshal Pétain's regime who kept Pétain's portrait in their mess, toasted him after dinner, and openly bragged that if the Marshal ordered they would shoot down anyone, British and Americans included. The British and American officers present on one such occasion probably thought this was meant as a screaming joke: it was deadly, if slightly intoxicated, earnest. One French officer of the highest rank, to whom a civilian colleague urged that the French army of liberation could not run counter to united French public opinion, replied: 'Public opinion, my dear fellow? Give me my Senegalese and a few machine guns in the street, and you'll see what I shall make of public opinion.'

There followed a squalid squabble over the question of recognising the French National Committee, which moved 'The Times' in leading articles, notably on July 19 and 31, to depart from its accustomed suavity towards United States policy and to say: 'It is hard to discern any valid reason for this anomaly [i.e. of non-recognition], the perpetuation of which must be a certain check to French confidence.' It was still harder in view of the fact that our European Allies and China into the bargain recognised the Committee without hesitation. Even when American recognition did come at the beginning of September it was in so maimed and grudging a form as to mollify French feelings but little. One purpose of this particular bit of sulkiness, it was suspected, was to elude any French demand for handing over the gold of the Banque de France, more than 60,000,000*l.* sterling,

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held in Martinique. Happily we are exposed to less odium on the question of recognition. Ours was larger, and has been followed by further beneficial steps. Now the chief representative of the French National Committee in Britain is accepted as the Ambassador of the French Republic and the Fighting French soldiers are described as Visiting Troops of the French Republic.

Not even then did the painful series end. While in Africa the National Committee has got rid of the leading minions of the Vichy dictatorship, and reaffirmed French Republican law and custom, Amgot, the Allied instrument of administration for territory taken from the enemy such as Sicily, has fallen under grave suspicion from all the European Allies, and not merely from the French, as being designed to set up in countries liberated from the Germans governments that those countries themselves do not want and will not stomach. The influential American weekly 'Look' last summer printed an elaborate article entitled 'When the Yanks take Over,' and containing a description of an Amgot organisation and its functions as applicable to 'any city in once Axis-held territory,' while 'major political problems,' said 'Look,' would be settled in Washington. To those aware that in the Allied landing in Africa only thirty per cent. of the military and virtually none of the naval strength was American, the rest being British, and that none the less the expedition was represented to the American public as purely American, the similar innuendo about Amgot need cause no surprise. The American attitude however does cause lively alarm to our European Allies who see a prospect of Washington, on the pretext of keeping order, trying to foist on them mayors, councillors and prefects tarred with the quisling brush. 'The order to be kept,' said one European, 'will have a strong taste of another order—the New Order.' Another in a paper read at an unofficial meeting of Allied representatives said: 'One of the Allies—not that in whose country I am speaking—appears to be adopting definitely Hitlerian methods.' In New York Professor Gaetano Salvemini publicly asked the United States government to 'state once for all in clear terms whether they will carry out in Europe the ideals of Marshal Pétain and the Standard Oil Company or . . . those of Jefferson and Lincoln.'

Mr Raymond Gram Swing's apprehension that the American nation may 'forfeit the devotion of the French' is more than warranted. The legend of the United States of America as the apostle of liberty current in France for a hundred and fifty years has received a blow from which it may never recover. Only the clearest statement that the principles of Amgot, excellently contrived for territory conquered from the enemy, shall not be applied to Allied countries liberated from the enemy, can retrieve the situation; and so far, despite vague unofficial hints, no such statement is forthcoming. To take a specific case, the French ask whether on the Allied occupation of Bordeaux, Marquet, the notorious fascist mayor of that city, guilty in the highest degree of collaboration with Germany, would be retained in office to 'keep order.' Already a bogus 'democratic' government to take the place of Pétain and Laval is being prepared by Piétri, Vichy's ambassador in Spain, de Monzie, one of the authors of the capitulation, and the renegade socialist leader Paul Faure. If such manoeuvres are to be endorsed in France, and if the French African army is to be used to bolster up the Pétain or any similar regime, that, to all serious observers whether French or British, means instant, grave, widespread trouble, a violent revolt against Anglo-American interference, and probably civil war in France. Any attempt to prevent the execution of French traitors who at the behest of Germany have shot or hanged 60,000 French patriots, tortured many others, and have aided in the deportation of at least four times that number, would be disastrous to Allied influence in France. It would also mean that instead of the 3,000 or so most guilty collaborators who will in any case be put under the sod, probably ten or twenty times as many less guilty would lose their lives to avengers who could be restrained by a representative French administration but not by one imposed from without. American policy towards France, as it is seen at the present juncture, tends towards a dictatorship in that country and the rule, not of the people, but of force, whether autocratic or anarchic.

It must be our business to prevent this from happening. We must convince the American people of the dangers they are encouraging. Above all, we must keep out of

them ourselves. Great Britain is a European country, and without a good understanding between us and France there can never be equilibrium in Europe. Without our constant support, France is not strong enough to contain Germany and must be thrown to seek safety in a continental bloc that in the end cannot avoid being dominated by Russia or by a renascent Germany. In urging the claims of true democracy in France against a view which advocates, at best, a bastard distortion and, at worst, a deliberate abnegation of it, we merely ask that this war shall not, like the last, have been fought in vain.

That, and no less, is the issue before us in our dealings with France. If it be objected that plain speaking is unpalatable, we have General Eisenhower's authority for saying that 'Public opinion is a powerful factor in winning wars and it must be kept well informed.' He might have added no less truly, in winning a peace.

JOHN POLLOCK.

[For Supplementary paragraphs to this Article, see p. 112]

Art. 2. —SOME PROBLEMS OF THE EMPIRE.

1. *The British Commonwealth.* By Sir Edward Grigg. Hutchinson, 1943.
2. *The British Empire, 1815-1939.* By Paul Knaplund. H. Hamilton, 1942.
3. *Wealth for Welfare.* By H. W. Forster and E. V. Bacon. Macmillan, 1943.
4. *An African Survey.* By Lord Hailey. Oxford University Press, 1938.
5. *Responsible Government in the Dominions.* By A. B. Keith. 2 vols. Clarendon Press, 1928.
6. Various official publications.

HISTORY records the rise, decline, and fall of many Empires, from the great Empires of the ancient world down to the German Empire of yesterday, and contrasts with them the still vigorous British Empire of to-day. But those Empires have so far defied the definition and classification which, as H. G. Wells once pointed out, if

Politics and History is ever to become a Science, are essential. Yet even in the absence of classification we can say with assurance that the British Empire is *sui generis*; there has been nothing like it in the world before; were it to disappear there could never be anything like it again. From this it results that there exist no precedents to help towards a solution of the problems with which the Empire confronts British statesmanship.

How numerous those problems are, the list of works—merely selective as it is—prefixed to this article suffices to indicate. The problems may, however, be divided into three groups: (i) problems relating to the whole Empire, both Self-Governing and 'Dependent'; (ii) problems relating to the Self-Governing Dominions, to which alone the recent appellation of British Commonwealth properly applies; and (iii) problems which arise in connection with the still more or less Dependent Empire. The degree of 'Dependence' (it must be said in passing) varies greatly, extending from Possessions which like Newfoundland and Malta have, in the past, enjoyed 'Responsible Government' and may soon be endowed with 'Responsibility', again, to Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia which are on the verge of attaining that status, down to the most backward of communities like those on the African continent or the islands of the Pacific.

Sir Edward Grigg, in his recent and masterly survey of 'The British Commonwealth,' entered a strong protest against the above bifurcation. 'This division of the Empire into two water-tight compartments constitutes,' he insisted, 'a flaw in its coherence as a Commonwealth.'

... The time has assuredly come to arrest and reverse the process of historical development which has drawn this hard though artificial line between the Colonial Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations.' Interesting as this contention is, it is enough for the moment that the bifurcation (if regrettably) exists, and that the problems arising in connection with one category differ widely from those which press for solution in the other. Convenience, therefore, no less than logic, demands that they should be considered separately.

But in both categories a condition precedent must be fulfilled; without a guarantee of security for the Empire as a whole it is futile to consider matters of administration.

The priority of the problem of Imperial Defence has, during the present war, been brought home as never before to every citizen of the Empire. It has been raised in an acute form by the attack of Japan upon the Oceanic Empires of Great Britain and the United States. But it goes back, in that region, at least as far as 1885 and was the most important subject of debate—occasionally heated—at the first Colonial Conference held coincidentally with Queen Victoria's 'Golden' Jubilee in 1887.

Previously to the eighties of the last century Imperial Defence had shared the fate of the Empire as a whole. It had been neglected if not ignored. The 'Manchester School' had carried the *laissez-faire* policy to its logical conclusion. If the greater Colonies were to have the privileges of Self-Government they must accept the obligation of defending themselves. Imperial troops were, consequently, withdrawn from the self-governing Colonies. Colonial militias, paid by the Colonies, took their place.

The supremacy of the Manchester School ended with the defeat of Mr Gladstone in 1874 and Disraeli's accession for the first time to power as well as to office. Disraeli had already proclaimed—in 1872—his views on the Imperial problem. 'Self-Government . . . when it was conceded ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied with an Imperial staff . . . and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and responsibilities by which the Colonies should be defended and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the Colonies themselves.'

Science, Politics, and Geography soon reinforced the argument of the Neo-Imperialists. The cardinal fact of Geography was, in General Smuts's famous aphorism, the 'shrinkage of the globe.' That shrinkage was largely due to a series of remarkable scientific inventions. Bessemer's process for the production of cheap steel led to the substitution of steel for iron rails, and the cheapening of land transport throughout an Empire which may justly be said to have been built up on railway systems. Ocean transport was revolutionised between 1860 and 1870 by the invention of the compound engine and the surface

condenser. The telegraph, cable and wireless, and the telephone have annihilated distance in the matter of personal communication. Refrigeration and cold storage, dating for industrial and transport purposes only from the early eighties, have gone far to unify the Empire in respect of food.

Political development kept abreast of Science. Between 1763 and 1863 Great Britain had virtually no European rivals to consider in the colonial field. But in 1863 the French established a convict station in New Caledonia which became a nuisance if not a danger to Australia. In 1883 they occupied the New Hebrides ; in 1884 Germany established herself both in Oceania and in Africa. Evidently the world was shrinking ; the era of Welt-Politik had opened.

Australian statesmen were gravely perturbed by the action of Lord Derby, Mr Gladstone's Colonial Secretary. In 1884 Lord Derby disavowed the action of Queensland in setting up the British flag in New Guinea, the northern parts of which, together with the Bismarck Archipelago, were promptly annexed by Germany. Accordingly, Alfred Deakin and Sir James Service, the foremost Australian Delegates at the Colonial Conference of 1887, made an outspoken and spirited attack upon the neglect by the Imperial Government of Australian interests in the Pacific, and insisted that the Colonies were entitled to share in shaping policy so vitally important to them. ' We hope,' said Service with some heat, ' that from this time forward Colonial policy will be considered Imperial policy ; that Colonial interests will be considered and felt to be Imperial interests.'

To the Australian protest additional point was given in 1896 by the dispatch of an Australian contingent to assist in the reconquest of the Soudan. Not that this was the first indication that the military resources of the Empire were not confined to the United Kingdom. At a critical stage in the Near East crisis of 1878 Lord Beaconsfield had ordered the dispatch of 7,000 Indian troops to Malta. This sensational stroke of policy was declared by the critics of the Government to smack of transpontine melodrama. But, undeniably, it impressed Europe ; it made for peace ; and, as in flashlight, it revealed the military unity of the Empire.

Even more strikingly, if less dramatically, was this revealed during the South African War (1899-1902). During that war Australia contributed no fewer than 15,502 men, New Zealand 5,129, and Canada 5,762, and in the final victory they played an important, perhaps a decisive part.

Meanwhile, the whole question of Imperial Defence had been discussed at the Conference of 1887. The only positive outcome was, however, an agreement concluded with Australia. The Imperial Government undertook to maintain a strong squadron of cruisers and gunboats in the Western Pacific; Australia agreed to contribute 126,000*l.* (increased in 1902 to 240,000*l.*) a year towards the expense of maintaining it.

At the Colonial Conference of 1902 Mr Chamberlain 'got down to brass tacks.' He showed that while in the United Kingdom expenditure on defence worked out at 1*l.* 9*s.* 3*d.* per head per annum, it did not amount in any Colony to as much as 3*s.* 6*d.*, while in Canada it was only 2*s.* The Australasian Colonies, Cape Colony, and Natal then agreed to increase their contributions, but Canada declined on the ground that the value of their Militia had been demonstrated (as indeed it had) in South Africa, and that a contribution to Imperial Defence would infringe the principle of Self-Government.

Before the next Conference an important step had been taken in Great Britain. The Committee of Imperial Defence, after existing in a nebulous form for ten years, was in 1904 completely reorganised, with a small but permanent secretariat and staff. From 1911 onwards Dominion Ministers were periodically invited to attend this Committee. In 1909 a special Conference had met to consider exclusively the problem of Defence. It met in private, but the House of Commons was officially informed that the members of the Conference had agreed to recommend to their respective Governments a plan 'for so organising the forces of the Crown, wherever they are, that while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial Army.'

The immediate outcome of this Conference was that

Canada decided to establish an auxiliary fleet, and undertook the maintenance of the naval dockyards at Halifax and Esquimault. Australia also preferred to lay the foundations of a fleet of her own, and purchased for that purpose from English firms three cruisers and three destroyers. New Zealand, on the contrary, agreed to contribute a subsidy of 100,000*l.* a year and a cruiser to a squadron of the new Pacific fleet. A wise provision ensured that the personnel of the Dominion fleets should be trained under regulations similar to those laid down in the Royal Navy, in order to facilitate interchange of personnel between the British and Dominion services; and also that the standard of vessels and armaments should be uniform.

Nothing could have been more timely than this Defence Conference of 1909. Hardly had it separated before the international situation rapidly deteriorated, and in 1914 the 'real emergency' contemplated in 1909 actually arose. It remained, however, to be seen whether, despite a machinery of cooperation which was still grotesquely rudimentary, the 'ties light as air' preferred by the school of Burke would prove strong enough to hold the Commonwealth together under the severe and protracted strain of a great war.

The ties held. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand promptly ranged themselves by the side of the mother-country and made superb contributions to victory in a cause which from the first they recognised as their own. South Africa's position was more hesitating; but that Dominion ultimately resolved to 'take all measures necessary for defending the Union and for cooperating with His Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire.' General Botha, with splendid moral courage, himself took the field against 'men who in the past have been our honoured leaders' and having suppressed a domestic rebellion, conquered for the Empire German South-West Africa. General Smuts was in 1916 appointed to command the Imperial forces, which finally expelled the Germans from East Africa. But these great services to the Empire were, be it observed, all rendered on African soil.

The contingents from the other Dominions went much farther afield, with the result that (to reckon their

sacrifices only through the cold medium of statistics) of the total of nearly 10,000,000 men who fought under the British flag, 3,284,743 came from the Overseas Empire. Australia and Canada each contributed over 13 per cent. of their male population to the Imperial Forces; New Zealand contributed over 19 per cent. of such superb fighting material that only 341 out of 50,000 casualties were counted among the prisoners. Not less splendid fighters were the Indian contingent of 600,000 combatants who, with nearly 500,000 non-combatants, were sent from India to all the chief theatres of war.

The record of the present war will doubtless prove equally imposing; equal zeal has been displayed; not less sacrifices have been made.

But despite the splendid spontaneity with which the Overseas Empire has taken upon its shoulders its share of the common burden, the question still persists whether, in face of the dangers by which it may again be exposed, the existing machinery can permanently suffice to maintain the cohesion of an Empire which has no parallel among political formations.

Not all the dangers can here be envisaged. But there is one which, though the discussion of it must needs be delicate, cannot honestly be avoided. Ever since the Washington Treaties of 1922, many close students of world-politics have been convinced that the Pacific would provide the stage of the next world-war. Lord Northcliffe, invited to give his views on the great country he was visiting (Australia) in 1922, gave them very frankly. He declared himself to be profoundly impressed by the magnitude of Australia; its profuse wealth, its emptiness—and its defencelessness. He was 'staggered,' he said, 'by the indifference of the Australian people to the vital question of population. . . . The key to your white Australian ideal is population, you must increase your slender garrison by the multiplication of your people. The world will not tolerate an empty Australia. This continent must carry its full quota of people . . . you have no option. Tens of millions of people will come to you whether you like it or not. You cannot hold up the human flood by a restriction clause in an Act of Parliament.'

Lord Northcliffe's blunt words were resented by

Australians at the time, but his warning was substantially confirmed in 1931 by the Director-General of Health and Medical Services in Australia, Sir Raphael Cilento. He reminded his fellow-countrymen that the birth rate of Australia is one of the lowest in the world, and was rapidly falling. Nor, looking northward across the Pacific, did Sir Raphael hesitate to point the moral. He regarded the period of increased pressure from that quarter as imminent and inevitable. Japan has a population of close on 100,000,000, and it increases at the rate of 75,000 a year. The population of Australia is almost stationary at $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions. The Japanese are confined to an area (including dependencies) of some 262,000 square miles, and each square mile carries a population of not much short of 300, while the soil of Australia (2,974,581 in extent) carries only two. It is true that the Astor Committee on Migration reporting in 1933 (Cmd. 4075) pertinently pointed out that physiographical conditions rendered areas in Australia unsuitable for permanent white settlement. That correction raises the figure of Australian population from 2 per square mile to 3.75. Even so the figures contrasted with those of Japan are sufficiently ominous. They confirm the conclusion reached by Sir Raphael Cilento that the alternatives before Australia in 1931 were 'immigration or ultimate invasion.'

Immigration from Asia and Africa had long ago been virtually prohibited; it was severely restricted from Europe, and jealously controlled even from England. Then suddenly in 1942 the alternative had to be faced.

A question at this point obtrudes itself, which, however painful, it were uncandid to ignore. Can England and the U.S.A. disclaim all responsibility for the Japanese assault upon Australia? Mainly under pressure from Washington, England had in 1922 determined the alliance with Japan which, deeply gratifying to Japan when concluded in 1902, had proved its great value to us during the War.* Japan bitterly resented its determination, and regarded the conclusion of the Washington Treaties of 1922 as not merely failing to provide a substitute, but in themselves almost an affront to her *amour propre*.

* Cf. Mr Lloyd George's tribute to its value. 'Parliamentary Debates' (August 18, 1921).

If the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been renewed would it have diverted the course of events in 1941-42?

The temptation to Japan 'cabined and confined' to force the gates of Australia 'empty as a drum' must have been well-nigh irresistible. Her fleet was English trained; her army was organised on lines which in May 1940 had proved the German model to be the finest ever invented by man; the British Empire was fighting for existence; alone, unaided. What circumstances could ever again be more favourable to the ambition of Japan?

Japan had made long and precise preparations: by December 1941 they were complete; the blow was suddenly and most treacherously delivered; the British, American, and Dutch Empires in the Pacific reeled under the blow and to the consternation of all three peoples collapsed. Australia itself was threatened with immediate invasion. Lord Northcliffe's unheeded warning was only too quickly and too painfully justified. Procrastination and hesitation in solving the interlocked problems of defence and migration had, indeed, incurred the appropriate penalty.

The problem of migration concerns primarily the Commonwealth, the Dependent Empire hardly at all.

Take Africa. In Southern Rhodesia there is a considerable English settlement (57,000 Europeans out of a total of 1,310,000 inhabitants), which we hope may be largely increased after the war. In Kenya there are only 18,000 out of $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and the hope that the highlands might afford homes for a considerable number of English settlers has been but partially fulfilled. Apart from these two Colonies (and, of course, the Union of South Africa and the ex-German South-West) there are probably less than 100,000 Europeans living in the whole of Africa,* and few of these are permanent settlers. They go to Africa as for two centuries Britons have gone to India, to govern, to trade, to teach and preach, and so forth—not to live. Consequently, neither in the African nor in the Caribbean colonies does the question of immigration arise. Yet it is typical of the complexity and interrelation of Imperial problems, that a question at this

* Africa is here (as it always should be) understood as excluding the Mediterranean littoral which has always been European or Asiatic.

point obtrudes itself. What about the immigration of Indians into Africa and other possessions of the Crown mostly inhabited by non-white populations? In 1884 a petition was presented to the Government of the Transvaal Republic; it stated categorically: 'Our Constitution recognised only two races of men, white and coloured.' *Voilà tout*. That was all very well for the burghers of the Transvaal in 1884; but Indians are to-day fellow subjects with Dutchmen of a King who is also Emperor of India and is bound to maintain the privilege of his Indian subjects not less faithfully than those of Whites and Blacks in Africa or Polynesia. Many attempts have been made, e.g. in the 'Capetown Agreement' of 1927, to reach a solution of this most baffling problem; but no radical solution is even in sight, and the discussion of it cannot be carried further within the necessary limits of this article.

Nor, indeed, regarding the Colonial Empire as a whole, is the subject of more than secondary importance. To matters of primary importance the clue will be found in the title and provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, with which may be usefully read: (i) 'Statement of Policy on Colonial Development' (Cmd. 6175, 1940) which sets out the position previous to the passing of the Act and lays down the principles on which the Act itself is framed; (ii) 'Report on the Operation of the Act to 31st October, 1942' (Cmd. 6442, 1943); and (iii) Sir Frank Stockdale's comprehensive Report in 'Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 1940-42' (Colonial, 184, 1943). Sir Frank's Report admirably illustrates the amazing variety and multiplicity of the schemes already approved. Among these, schemes for the prevention of endemic diseases 'prevalent but preventable' and for the improvement of public health (including housing, water supply, sanitation, swamp reclamation, etc.) claim (in terms of expenditure) first place; agriculture (including forestry, fisheries, irrigation, etc.) is a good second; and communications, including air services, roads, and rivers, is not far behind. Among other heads of expenditure are education and social welfare.

All this is highly significant of the problems we have to face throughout the Colonial Empire, and indicates

the spirit which inspires the fulfilment of our 'Trust.' 'His Majesty's Government are trustees for the well-being of the Colonial Empire.' With these words the 'Statement of Policy' opens. Holy Writ prefers the word 'Stewards.' 'It is required of stewards that they be faithful.' No one who reads the two great speeches recently delivered in Parliament by the late and present Secretaries of State—speeches equally remarkable for sympathy, imagination, and foresight—can doubt that the Colonial Office, as now administered, abundantly realises the obligations of stewardship and is determined to fulfil them.*

In neither of those speeches is there a trace of self-satisfied complacency, still less of vulgar flag-wagging; both reveal that spirit of finely-tempered enthusiasm, combined with business-like attention to the details of administration, that marks true statesmanship.

The average Englishman is, however, apt to employ one conventional yard stick to measure 'progress.' What advance has there been in the direction of Self-Government? In this respect there is the utmost diversity in the Colonial Empire. Ceylon and Malta, for example, are on the verge of Responsible government. For Jamaica the heads of a new Constitution, only just short of 'Responsibility' have, after prolonged consideration and consultation on the spot, been drafted by the Secretary of State (cf. Cmd. 6427, 1943), and will, it is hope, close a controversy which for years past has disturbed and divided the Colony. One point, however, Colonel Stanley has rightly emphasised. Full Self-Government is now the universally accepted goal of our Colonial policy. But the pace of the advance towards it must vary in each Colony, and in all must be conditioned by economic and social developments. Constitutional issues must be deferred until we have been able to establish new standards in respect of the necessities and amenities of daily life; until we have made definite progress towards the solution of problems of public health, endemic and epidemic diseases, sanitation, housing, water supply and the like; and, above all, of education. 'Educational advance and

* Cf. Lord Cranborne (Lord's Report, Dec. 3, 1942), and Colonel Stanley (Common's Report, July 13, 1943).

economic development are,' said Colonel Stanley, 'the twin pillars upon which any sound scheme of political responsibility must be based.' 'Education' is a term used, throughout the Dependent Empire, in the most comprehensive sense, embracing not only children but adults, and aiming at nothing less than a complete transformation in the daily lives of the people.* An Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies was set up at the Colonial Office in 1924 and has ever since functioned with admirable effect. As regards primary education, the problem (as Lord Hailey has shown in his monumental 'Survey') is one of 'mass illiteracy,' and upon that nothing short of 'Community effort' can, in Colonel Stanley's judgment, make much impression. Only a crusade preached by native preachers could stir masses so great and so inert. Perhaps such preachers may be found among those whom Colonel Stanley hopes to reach by Higher Education. To this end he has set up a Special Commission of Inquiry into Higher Education in West Africa under the highly competent Chairmanship of an ex-Minister, Lieut.-Colonel Walter Elliot. A third inquiry is to be conducted by a Committee under Mr Justice Asquith. The latter is to investigate the possibility of devising a sort of 'intellectual lend-lease' system between the Home Universities and the Colonial Colleges. If there could be a 'two-way traffic of teachers' between this country and Colonial Colleges, both parties might well be enriched. Anyway, the mere mention of such projects indicates the operation of the new spirit which is now sweeping like a rushing mighty wind through Downing Street, and may presently inspire a new pentecostal mission to nearly one-fourth of the human race.

The new spirit is, indeed, already operating far beyond the boundaries of the official world. One of many manifestations may be found in 'Wealth for Welfare,' just published by H. W. Foster and E. V. Bacon. 'Two ordinary men' here set forth a plan which, applied in the first instance to the British Colonial Empire, might be extended to the whole Empire and ultimately to the world. Space is lacking to describe the rather intricate

* See 'Education Policy in British Tropical Africa' (Cmd. 2374, 1925), in 'Memorandum on Education,' Colonial 103, 1935.

plan in the detail requisite for its comprehension; but it may be said with assurance that it should receive careful attention by all who are interested in the well-being of the Empire or indeed of mankind. The conception is so bold as to offer a very broad target for criticism from many quarters; agriculturists and traders, financiers and economists, publicists and politicians, may well question its practicability. Yet, grandiose as the plans may look when viewed in outline, the authors should secure fair consideration of it by the modest and conciliatory moderation with which it is set forth.

The plan of an Imperial Development Authority brings us back to the root problems from which this article started. These problems concern more particularly that part of the Empire properly designated the British Commonwealth of Nations. Both in the Commonwealth as whole and in several of its constituent States there are vital constitutional problems which must be faced as soon as the war is over if not before. One such problem I lately analysed in some detail in this 'Review.'^{*} Neither in the Dominion of Canada nor in the Australian Commonwealth has the root problem of Federation—the relations between the State (or Provinces) and the Federal Government—been solved. Has it even been shelved? Only last year the old trouble flared up again in reference to the proposal of the Commonwealth Government to make the burden of income tax, at present levied by both States and Government, uniform throughout the Commonwealth of Australia.

If we turn from the circumference to the centre we perceive at once that the Constitutional problem is not even shelved. In 1917 many of us hoped that partial solution had been found in the creation of an Imperial War Cabinet. I did indeed express at the time a fear that an Imperial Executive would not work *in vacuo* without the continuous sustenance of an Imperial Legislature.[†] It did not. Upon the Armistice there quickly followed a startling fall in the Imperial temperature. In rapid succession there came the rather blatant assertion at

^{*} 'Problems of Federalism,' 'Quarterly Review,' July 1941.

[†] See 'British Federalism: A Vanished Dream' ('Nineteenth Century,' September 1917); 'Organisation of the Empire' ('Edinburgh Review,' April 1921).

Paris and Geneva of Dominion Nationhood, the disastrous determination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the historical Conference of 1926 with Mr Balfour's Athanasian definition of Dominion Status, and the Statute of Westminster. The Balfour policy was, indeed, happily if partially vindicated by the issue to the Abdication crisis of 1936, but after that the world descended with terrifying rapidity towards Avernus.

Every man of British blood, wherever he dwelt, every man who had learnt from British teachers the meaning of liberty and of civilisation, instinctively felt in 1939 that both were in peril as never perhaps before in the history of mankind. Then came 1940. The whole British Empire stood, unified, four square, to face alone and unaided the most powerful military machine the world has ever known. The odds were overwhelmingly unequal. Splendid as was the spirit in which the Empire faced them it is difficult to believe that anything less than supernatural interposition could, in that terrible hour, have averted disaster: *Non nobis Domine*: 'O God, Thy arm was here, and not to us but to Thy arm alone, ascribe we all!' Thus the victor of Agincourt. So also those intrepid few to whom, in the victory won in the Battle of Britain, so many owed so much.

And of the future? The final victory will be won by the combined efforts of the United Nations. But let the world never forget that if in 1940 the British Empire had not stood firm the Axis Powers would have been free to deal piece-meal with a series of disunited nations. No wonder that Mr Churchill disdains to stand in a white sheet on behalf of the British Empire, and resolutely refuses to be the instrument of its dissolution. 'We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.' So said Mr Churchill in November 1942. 'Of one thing I am sure,' said Lord Cranborne on December 3. 'The British Colonial Empire is not coming to an end. . . . We, the citizens of the British Empire whatever our race, religion, or colour have a mission to perform, and it is a mission which is essential to the welfare of the world.' It is regrettable that Mr Churchill's declaration should have 'distressed' Mr Wendell Willkie's sensitive soul (see 'One World,' p. 143), but it gave

unqualified satisfaction to untold millions of our own fellow-citizens. Nor will Mr Churchill ever contemplate the idea of international control. Who, indeed, has a right to suggest it? Is there a single subject of the Crown who would welcome it?

Yet smug complacency is the temper least appropriate to the rulers of our Empire, the Sovereign peoples of the Commonwealth. I should have spilt much ink in vain if I had failed to make it clear that now as always I stand with those who maintain that a drastic overhaul of the machinery of Imperial Government should be undertaken as soon as circumstances permit. Yet conviction that reform is overdue need not blind us to the achievement of British Imperial Rule in the past or present. As this article goes to press there comes a voice which extorts the exclamation: Is Saul also among the prophets? Mr Herbert Morrison, repudiating some of his own earlier opinions and the obsolete doctrines of his teachers, has vindicated the character of British Imperialism as a cohesive not a dominating force. 'This is no time,' he said, 'to give the principle of political separation free rein. . . . What we want surely . . . is to hold fast to every fragment of cohesion and unity in the world, to build it up, to give to it a fuller meaning and fit it into a wider pattern. That is the real meaning of the British Empire to-day' (Oct. 6, 1943). Testimony to the achievement of that Empire comes, however, more fittingly from foreign critics, and it is remarkably concurrent. Frenchmen from the days of Montalembert and De Tocqueville down to M. André Thérive (1938) have been particularly generous and appreciative of the true character of British Imperialism. But the most remarkable testimony comes from a German professor, far from friendly to this country. 'England,' wrote Dr Wichelm Dibelius, 'is the single country in the world that, looking after its own interest with meticulous care . . . with a national programme, egotistic through and through, at the same time promises to the world as a whole something which the world passionately desires, order, progress, and eternal peace.' How far this tribute is deserved it is for others, not for Englishmen to say.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

Art. 3.—INDIA : JANUARY TO OCTOBER 1943.

1. *Hansard* : Lords, April 6, 1943 ; Commons, Sept. 11, 1942, March 30 and Sept. 23, 1943.
2. *Statement by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the disturbances in 1942-3.* March 1942.
3. *The Royal Central Asian Journal.* January and September 1943.
4. *The Asiatic Review.* January, April, September 1943.
5. *India (1942) and What does Gandhi want ? (1943).* By T. A. Raman. Oxford University Press.
6. *Bulletin of International News.* Vol. xx. no. 6. March 1943.
7. *Sir Louis Stuart's Indian News Sheets.* January-October 1943.
8. *The Round Table.* September 1943.

THE Debates in London and Delhi of the autumn of 1942 which I summarised in the 'Quarterly' of April, 1943, were preceded by the issue of a White Paper relating to the outbreak of the abortive rebellion initiated by Mr Gandhi and were necessarily exploratory. It was announced that the Government of India had under preparation a further statement which would fully demonstrate the Congress Party's responsibility for the risings. This Statement was published in February last, supported by detailed appendices and covering seventy-six closely printed pages. The Government of India intimated that there was another volume of evidence which as yet it was inadvisable to publish. An excellent summary of the published booklet appeared in 'The Times' of March 25, well before the Commons debate of March 30 and markedly influenced the course of that discussion. In the meantime Mr Gandhi's 'fast to capacity' which had begun on February 10 and ended on March 3 and was designed to coerce the government into ordering his unconditional release, had come and gone with no more serious incident than an emotional crisis among some Hindus and others and the resignations of three of the Viceroy's Hindu Executive Councillors who were unable to face responsibility for a possibly fatal end to the ordeal. Mr Gandhi, however, emerged from the trial

'weak but cheerful' and returned to his former way of living in a comfortable palace at Poona. But some of his friends and admirers held a 'non-party' conference at Bombay on March 9 and 10 and published a 'memorandum' to the Viceroy on April 1 asking that ten of their members should be allowed to meet and discuss matters with Gandhi. They would then visit His Excellency. After reading the published correspondence between the two they *felt* that Gandhi had already expressed his disapproval of violence and sabotage, and they did not doubt that he would cast his influence on the side of 'internal harmony and reconciliation.' They felt that Gandhi's assistance was essential for the restoration of goodwill and for a solution of problems even for the interim period. They wished to obtain his support.

The main points in Lord Linlithgow's reply were these :

Thanking them for their memorandum, he regretted that it contained no unequivocal condemnation of violence which the public and himself were entitled to expect from the representatives of the Bombay conference. He observed from the list of signatories that the Muslims and the representative Depressed Classes were unrepresented. The Leader of the Hindu Mahasabha too had dissociated himself from the Resolution. He must remind the deputation that Mr Gandhi and the Congress leaders had been under restraint *after a long campaign of incitement*. Mr Gandhi had urged open rebellion. The arrests of these leaders had not unhappily prevented 'the shocking campaign of organised violence and crime for which preparation had been previously made,' a campaign which resulted in most material damage to communications and to public and private properties, and 'in the murder of many innocent persons who had no concern with or interest in the political issues involved.' Although Mr Gandhi and the Congress had full access to reliable press accounts since August 1942, they had never condemned these activities or dissociated themselves from the resolution of August 1942 from which so many of those evils flowed.

Mr Gandhi's advice to 'do or die' still stood on record, and while order had been restored and the rebellion put down, no one could deny that the country had passed

through a period of grave danger. *While the Congress creed remained what it is we could again be exposed to that danger if Congress and its leaders were given full liberty of action.* The correspondence that had passed between himself and Gandhi showed that had the latter been willing to go back on the Congress August resolution, to condemn what had taken place and give suitable assurances for the future, he himself would be very ready to consider the matter further. *Gandhi's reply showed that this was not his wish and matters stood at that point.* During the time of his fast certain of his trusted friends had been able to be in contact with him and many of those present at the Bombay conference had an opportunity of seeing him: he could have repudiated the violence for which Congress was responsible, expressed his readiness to resile from the August resolution and given assurances for the future, but nothing whatever positive emerged as a result of these contacts any more than from his own correspondence with Gandhi, and he had no reason to believe that the latter was in any way more ready now than he was at an earlier stage to repudiate the policy as a result of which the Congress leaders were now under detention. On the Viceroy and on his Government rested the 'very definite and specific obligation of ensuring peace and good order in the country, of seeing that India was defended against the Japanese and other Axis aggression and that nothing was allowed to happen that would further the interest of the enemy, interfere with the war effort of the United Nations or create internal strife and tumult.' Neither from Gandhi nor the Congress had there been any indication of a change of mind or heart.

While these conditions continued he could not agree to give special facilities, such as were now asked for, to contact with Gandhi and the interned Congress leaders. But if Gandhi was prepared to repudiate in full the Congress resolution of August 1942, to condemn equally those incitements to violence represented by his references to open rebellion, and if he and the Congress party were prepared to give acceptable assurances for the future, then the matter could be considered further. 'But while the Congress attitude remained unchanged the Government's first duty was to the people of India, and that duty it would discharge.'

Muslim abstention from participation in this 'non-party' agitation for Gandhi's unconditional release—for this was apparently the objective then and afterwards—had been pointedly explained by a Muslim correspondent in the 'Calcutta Statesman,' quoted in 'The Times' of February 23: 'Mr Gandhi is fasting because he will not acknowledge the truth as millions of common men and women see it. That is that since the Congress under his leadership resolved that the law shall be defied and government of the country paralysed, hundreds of innocent Indians have lost their lives directly as a result of violent acts on the part of men who took upon themselves the carrying out of the Congress Resolution. Now that Mr Gandhi is fasting, resolutions and appeals fill the air urging his release, not because the reasons for which he was deprived of liberty have ceased to exist, or because now he is entitled to release according to law or those principles of ethics which give the law its sanction, but because his life is precious and must be saved. Those who urge this point of view forget that the life of no man is more precious than the truth.'

The correspondent asked why, if Mr Gandhi's friends were so anxious to save his life, did they not appeal to him instead of to the Government which Mr Gandhi had in writing absolved from the consequences of his fast? 'There is only one answer,' he continued, 'there is more anxiety to embarrass the Government and thus to earn political victory and less anxiety on the score of Mr Gandhi's life. . . . Muslims hold no brief for the Government; but in this trial the Government have the sympathy of Muslims in the fullest measure. They have gone to the farthest limits of reason in making Mr Gandhi's fast bearable. They can do no more.'

The matter was debated in the Commons on March 30, when Mr Attlee, Deputy Leader of the House, summed up the discussion as showing a greater knowledge on the part of all members of the difficulties of the Indian problem, a greater appreciation of the need for satisfying the aspirations of the people of India for self-government, a more practical approach, and fourthly a far greater unity on the part of Members in all parts of the House. Everyone, he thought, realised that confronted by the Congress conspiracy, the Government had to act. The

terrible thing to him in the story was not merely the acts of violence but the incredible levity with which a man of Gandhi's experience contemplated the falling of the great sub-continent of India into anarchy. He was probably thinking of the Mahatma's sentences quoted on p. 11 of the Government Statement, 'Let the British entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when real responsibility face them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that anarchy.'

Mr Ammon, Labour Member, Camberwell, N. 'welcomed the White Paper very much' and paid a hearty tribute to Mr Amery. He had recently been much impressed by the fact that one or two American friends to whom he had talked had thought that the Indian National Congress was a Parliamentary Assembly whereas it was really a Party like our Labour, Conservative, or Communist Parties. He knew that at one time even Members of their own House were confused on this point which was one of those little things which count especially among persons not well versed in such matters. Captain Gammons, Member for Hornsey, had recently visited America and the Conference in Canada of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and had returned deeply impressed with American misunderstanding of the facts. As to India, he said, all events were personified round the antics of Mr Gandhi.

On April 6 the Lords agreed with the Commons in accepting the government policy as explained by Lord Munster, Under-Secretary of State. Lord Samuel condemned 'the totalitarian spirit of the Congress who, after proclaiming a formula which turned into a slogan, had led thousands to court arrest and imprisonment, and had in many places been attended by "the utmost violence," as the White Paper had conclusively proved. . . . British Liberals would certainly not consent, in the supposed name of liberty, to their country marching out of India in order that chaos might march in with "confusion, riots, civil war, and economic collapse."' We must await a change in the atmosphere of India which perhaps might be brought about by military victories not only in India, but everywhere.

Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, as 'father of the Indian Army,' said that for the last hundred years we had been the sole cement that had held together the very divergent peoples of India. He believed that this terrible war arose largely from the fact that Nazi Germany dethroned Christ and set up Hitler as their god, and that our repugnance to Nazi ideology and methods was entirely shared by people of other faiths who formed part of our Empire. We had been able to hold together Hindus and Muhammedans in India, and he would feel sorry for a man who was responsible for breaking the link unless he was definitely assured that peace would reign and the rights of minorities be properly recognised.

Lord Hailey said that we had to ask ourselves whether in adopting a policy of placating our opponents it was necessary to disgust our friends. *We had tried our friends greatly in India and must not press them too far.* So we had to ask ourselves that question, whether in fact during the war we could afford to invite Congress to join a National Government. He had little doubt on which side the balance of advantage lay. Mr Gandhi was never consistent, and on this occasion he had tried his last weapon and failed in its use. But we were committed beyond recall to give India self-government, for we not only had our position in that country to consider, but also our reputation in the world. It was only by moving forward that we could convince India and the world of the honesty of the intention that had prompted our declaration. Indian aspirations undoubtedly appealed to the idealism which was a very real and genuine force in the United States. It was asked why we made the stipulation that before we gave India her independence the major parties must agree over some form of Constitution that would give her a stable government. His answer to this question was certainly not one which the United States should decry at this present moment. We had given India a vision of a "partnership in liberty, in high social ideals, and a generous outlook on the affairs of others. So long as the question of India remained unsettled that vision was blurred. We must keep it in view."* It was a question of conveying the right psychological impression. He mentioned a sugges-

* 'Hansard', p. 50.

tion that either the United States or another power should be asked to intervene in this issue. Muslims said frankly that there had been so much Congress propaganda abroad that any intervention of this kind would be taken as an anti-Muslim movement.

A very debatable question was whether the Parliamentary form of Institutions would prove to be best addicted to India. In 1935 many had said that in no circumstances could it operate successfully there. Others felt it essential that India should pass through the stage of these institutions. At all events it was our duty now to explore alternatives, especially if other exploration was demanded.

Lord Hailey spoke with special experience, for in December 1941 he had led the British Delegation to the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Mount Tremblant Lodge, near Montreal, and consisting of 'Groups' from various countries, including India, Canada, and the U.S.A., as well as of 'observers' from the International Labour Office, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Indian questions were keenly discussed there, and some present 'not only saw all rule of one people by another as domination or exploitation, however it had come about, but conceived it possible to hand out independence to any people as if it were a mechanical toy.*' The cogent lesson of the Conference was that 'the ignorance which leads to uninformed criticism and in its impassioned idealism is impatient of delay can only be dispelled by spreading knowledge of the actual facts.'

'The Asiatic Review' of July last reports two lectures, one by Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar and the other by Mr H. S. L. Polak. Both were discussed by the East India Association in London, and dealt with 'America, India and the War.' Both were enlightening. Mr Polak had offered in 1940 to undertake an unofficial and personal tour in America, dealing with India in the War, but first spent some months in Canada where he lectured under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He then passed through British Columbia and toured in the United States for some fourteen months.

* 'Bulletin of International News.'

As he had been a well-known friend of Mr Gandhi from South Africa days, he might, he thought, have been spared the imputation of being 'a notorious British Imperialist' and 'a thinly disguised British official spokesman.' He said that 'the collapse of the Indian rioting and sabotage movement that followed Mr Gandhi's arrest, produced a definite muting of the interventionist organs, but emotion was again rapidly worked up by the fast only to be lulled once more by its failure. Such emotional outbursts are, however, liable to recur and to raise a storm of passion and prejudice under the influence of propagandists not all of them Indian patriots or misguided patriots, but also enemy agents seeking to exploit seemingly favourable occasions to sow dissensions between close allies.'

The 'New York Times' has recently observed: 'Whether India is internally one people or two or many peoples is perhaps of less importance than whether she is allied or not allied with the forces on this earth now fighting for civilisation. Her races, her religions have at least this motive for a temporary submergence of her differences.'

The London Debates resulted in extension for another year of the proclamations issued under section 93 of the India Act, 1935, empowering the Governors of certain major Provinces in which a Parliamentary system could not be carried on to continue in charge of the administration with the assistance of 'advisers.' Parliament, too, saw no reason for not according full support to the refusal of the Governor-General in Council to release unconditionally Mr Gandhi and his leading associates. But afterwards, in spite of the reasoned reply of the Viceroy to their memorandum of April 1, the 'non-party' leaders in India drew up a long statement asking for the setting up of an 'independent tribunal' to investigate the charges against Gandhi and the other detained Congress leaders. If this could not be done, those persons should be set at liberty 'in order that they might apply themselves to a solution of the present deadlock in consultation with other important parties.' Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his coadjutors said that they asked for 'no less than justice,' ignoring the fact that the Government had in effect offered release to the internees, including Gandhi, if they would show contrition for the mischief that they

had done and withdraw from incitements to rebellion. The non-party leaders 'felt' after reading the Mahatma's letters to the Viceroy 'that Gandhi's adherence to the doctrine of non-violence was "as strong to-day as ever."'

'The Times' correspondent justly commented from Delhi, 'What responsible Government could be convinced by such airy beliefs as these, that a systematic attempt to sabotage the country's war-effort and with it the struggle of the United Nations, has in all sincerity been abandoned? There is a comfortable assumption here that Mr Gandhi and his henchmen would be cleared of the charges against them by any impartial tribunal. Clearly it is the conviction of Government that the case against the Congress is proved to the hilt. . . . The setting up of a tribunal would amount to a Gandhi trial, with all the upheaval which would inevitably come at a moment when the offensive against Japan is what really matters.'

It is surprising that veterans like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr Srinivasa Sastri who, as Professor Coupland points out on p. 294 of his valuable 'Indian Politics 1936-1942,' when Mr Gandhi and his coadjutors were on the brink of their plunge, had emphasised that 'no one has a right to gamble with the lives and safety of 400 million people at a time when internal dissensions and bitter strife must bring joy and encouragement to the Japanese,' should, when their warnings had been amply justified, have been so anxious for the early and unconditional release of the originator of the rebellion. They surely know well the truth of the story told by the Statement of February 1943 and its striking appendices, and the straits to which wide tracts of Bihar and the eastern districts of the United Provinces were reduced. Years ago I long served in the latter. Hindus are greatly in the majority there and have always contained a strong fanatical element. I have now seen a private letter from a civil officer on the spot, which contains this vivid passage: 'The effect of all this is that the cultivator, hitherto untainted, now saw that the outward signs of government had stopped. There were no posts, no trams, no 'buses, no trains, no process-servers, and most important, no food grains. The organisers said, "Look, we have destroyed your Government; their trains are stopped, their servants no longer enter the

villages. Where are the 'buses, the post, the grains? Government has ceased. Loot and burn! Destroy the remaining outposts such as police stations, seed-stores, post-offices, and then you will be able to live on the proceeds of your loot. . . ." So it went on till we arrived with reinforcements. Directly the villager saw these he understood that the Congress had once more failed him, and that the Government was very far from dead. Now the movement is dead, or rather driven under ground and has no support among the public. Only party-men continue to work from hiding, the only manifestations of their efforts being the occasional planting of bombs, more "non-violence." These nearly always go off cock-eyed and injure innocent persons.'

Yet, in spite of all these things, Mr. Sastri was reported in August as telling students that Mr Gandhi, who had been 'preaching non-violence in every walk of life, can alone represent India at the Peace Conference.' He received a sharp rebuke from Sir Chimmanlal Sitalvad, another distinguished Liberal, who replied through the Press: 'Gandhi is now and always has been completely divorced from any realistic outlook. . . . How could any person with any realistic outlook imagine that Britain, a nation which had in its darkest hour after Dunkirk, stood up against overpowering German threats, was going to "quit India" at the bidding of unarmed crowds who, by sabotage, killed their own countrymen, and destroyed Indian property? Was it realism to imagine that if you propagate mass civil disobedience the movement will remain non-violent? No one can deny that Mr Gandhi is one of the greatest men of the present day. He has roused the masses to self-consciousness to a degree which no one before him has done, but having achieved this he has always failed by reason of his impracticable idealism to reap the harvest that these forces could easily bring in. . . . Frantic appeals are made by some people to solve the Indian political deadlock, which was created by the major political parties not coming together in a spirit of accommodation and give and take, and it is for Indians themselves primarily to solve that deadlock. It is often said that the British are encouraging divisions among Indians; but assuming that it is so, why are we so foolish and short-sighted as to fall a prey to such tactics?'

Mr. T. A. Raman, a Hindu Liberal journalist, has written two interesting booklets. He thinks that the Cripps Mission was 'torpedoed' by calculations on the part of the majority of the Congress Working Committee 'sinuous and super-clever, made when a wave of pessimism was sweeping over the country, immediately after the fall of Singapore and almost coincident with the reports of a Japanese invasion fleet in the Bay of Bengal.' The believer in 'non-violence pure and simple,' has been Gandhi, who cherishes the ideal of the world's most sincere pacifist, but has once confessed himself powerless because he 'saw the intellect of the country ranged against him.' This may happen again. To help it to happen, not to echo his impossible demands, 'motivated as they are by other than political reasons,' should be the direction of wise friends of India. Anyhow Indians must reconcile themselves 'to a final break with Gandhian perversions of their country's policies during the war.'

Sir Chimmanlal is refreshingly courageous, but 'The Times' of Sept. 14, 1942, shows that he joined in the chorus of Hindu Nationalist criticism which denounced the Prime Minister's speech of September 10 delivered when the Congress rebellion was still proceeding: 'It was,' he said, 'most unfortunate, as it missed the reality of the Indian situation.' But straws sometimes show the direction of the wind; and when on June 9 last Brigadier J. Smyth, V.C., addressed the Central Asian Society on 'The Indian Army in the present war' he showed in a few words that there was a big reality which Mr Churchill did not miss. 'This lecture,' he said, 'is of course entirely non-political, but I will make one political remark. I was in Delhi in September last when Mr Winston Churchill's speech on the Indian situation was received. It was, as you know, much criticised in all the Indian papers. I noticed, however, that some of the poorer shop-keepers, who had been for weeks afraid to open their shops, threw open their shutters with confidence and started to trade again.' There are millions in India who consider British control as their one security.

On April 24, as President of the Muslim League, Mr Jinnah spoke for three hours, but put forward no constructive proposals and informed the Government that for Muslim India 'the cup of bitterness was nearly full.'

It was dishonest to say that the Muslim League was not cooperating in the war-effort. But what would the fruits of victory be when he had given his blood and money? If we lost, Japan or Hitler would come in. If we won, he was a camp-follower who was paid 'bakshish.' The British Government should guarantee the right of self-determination and give a pledge to abide by the result of a plebiscite on the Pakistan issue. If power could not be secured by a united India it should be 'taken' by a divided India. In other words, the way to freedom for Hindus and Muslims was Pakistan. 'Unite and drive the English out.' But he had seen no sign of a change of heart in Mr Gandhi, who had only to write a few lines to him. No Government would dare to stop such a letter. Referring to the Congress rebellion, he said: 'If it had been my own government I would have put these people in gaol in order to prevent a powerful section from letting loose an active war campaign.'

Shortly afterwards the Government did refuse to forward a letter from Mr Gandhi to Mr Jinnah which suggested that the two might meet. The latter did not object to the refusal, saying, in answer to critics, that the letter indicated no change of heart in the Mahatma and could only be construed as a move to embroil the League with the British Government. The tone and temper of passages in his speech of April 24, however, account for the comment of 'The Round Table' correspondent that this reply, although consistent with previous utterances, 'surprised a good many people.' Since then Jinnah has been strengthening the Muslim League position in the Provinces. Bengal is now under a League Government who are endeavouring to grapple with very difficult famine conditions. Jinnah, to the dismay of the Congress, is aiming at League Governments elsewhere, and has further visited Baluchistan, where he made speeches and was presented with a sword of honour.

On Nov. 23, 1942, 'The Times' correspondent reported that 'swift reactions to the better war news were very apparent among all sections of Indian opinion and that references were made to the failure of the Congress movement.' Afterwards Mr Jinnah acknowledged in friendly terms attempts by Mr Rajagopalachari, ex-member of the Congress Working Committee, to build a bridge between

the Congress and the Muslim League; but added that unfortunately the would-be peacemaker was without backing. There was no chance of negotiations till Congress dropped the pistol. Since then Rajagopalachari has been persevering in his efforts to discover a line of policy on which party leaders can agree, and recently has contributed an eloquent article to the Hindu 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' in which he boldly and, as facts prove, correctly states that 'it is the Indian parties and not the British that need a change of heart.'* It was fallacious to regard the Indo-British struggle as a contest between Imperialism and uncompromising Nationalism. 'British Imperial policy has always been a mixture of national self-interest and truly noble ideals, whereas Indian Nationalism is not the irresistible longing of a homogeneous and united people ready to sacrifice their all in their thirst for freedom. The politically conscious section of the Muslims set up a rival feeling of Nationalism based on a religion which had the widest appeal among the Muslim masses.' He argues in favour of acceptance of the Cripps proposals, and his article may well have given occasion for harder thinking and more moral courage. Sir Chimmanlal Sitalrad in support wrote that the present situation had arisen because almost all the Congress leaders had completely surrendered their own judgment to Gandhi's dictatorship. If they had refused to agree to the 'quit India' resolution which he forced on them, the enormous loss of Indian life and property caused by the disturbances that followed on the resolution would have been avoided.

Sober political reflection has been further stimulated by the Bengal famine which has resulted from the war, the diminution of available shipping, and the loss of Burma rice. Food supplies have failed in parts of Bengal and Madras, particularly in Bengal with its core the vast city of Calcutta. But the lamentable mortality and the problems of relief distribution are occupying a large share of public attention here as well as in India and cannot be discussed briefly. Short-term and long-term problems are engaging the unremitting attention of central and provincial Governments in India. It seems now to be recognised that in spite of the statutory responsibility of

* See article in 'Indian Affairs' of August 31.

provincial parliamentary governments, India as regards food distribution must be regarded as a unity. Help has been offered from Australia and South Africa, and relief ships have begun to reach India. An appeal to private generosity in Britain has been launched in London by the High Commissioner for India and the Secretary of State. Lord Wavell, the new Viceroy, has visited famine-stricken areas. The Muslim paper 'Dawn' has asked that the food question be not made a hobby-horse for politics, and suggests that looking at this crisis from his retreat Mr Gandhi should consider whether the humanitarian in him cannot rise above the politician.

On June 19 it was announced that Lord Linlithgow would in October be succeeded by Lord Wavell, then Commander-in-Chief, and the transfer of office has now taken place. To the departing Viceroy 'The Times' has paid a just tribute. His term of office has been marked by 'great political advances such as the Declaration of 1940 and the Cripps proposals, which still stand, also by great political set-backs the responsibility for which is certainly not centered in the Government of India. Where firmness and personal courage were necessary he showed both. . . . It will long be remembered of him that in the stormiest times he never failed to hold the deep respect even of those against whom he was compelled to exert the full authority of his office.' These are true sayings; and it is evident that the 'Round Table' correspondent is equally correct in speaking of his judgment and foresight and the respect as well as affection which he has inspired in his Indian collaborators. The Council of Defence, about thirty strong, started in 1940 and presided over by the Viceroy, at the close of their September session expressed their 'deep gratitude for his skilful and excellent conduct of their affairs and for his anxiety to see that the fullest consideration was given to every point of importance which has won for him the admiration of us all.' Lord Wavell, speaking to the Pilgrims on September 16, said that his predecessor had carried India through a period of unequalled difficulty with wisdom and moderation. He had worked with him on the Executive Council, and having seen him frequently on all military questions could testify to the wisdom and strength which made him a pillar against which one could lean in times of stress.

'Few men can ever have carried a burden of responsibility so long and gallantly.' This, I think, will be the final verdict of History.

In his farewell address to the Central Legislature on August 2, while commending his successor, Lord Linlithgow invited all members to get together, for the problems of the future would be 'no less complex than those we have had to face.' Lord Wavell himself, in his speech to the Pilgrims already referred to, anticipated that the three main tasks which would confront him in India would be:

(1) the need to carry the war with Japan to a decisive and speedy victory;

(2) to deal with the day-to-day problems of government, economic and social, that were so vital, for it was an alarming thought that *at the present rate of increase of population there were every month an additional 300,000 to 400,000 people to be fed, educated, and cared for*;

(3) there was the political advance of India, about which he fully realised that great weight of opinion both there and here was in favour of loosening as soon as possible the present deadlock and also the difficulty of doing so.

He also referred to India's war services in these terms: 'I should like to say something of what India has already done for us in this war since I know it at first hand. Without the assistance of India both in troops and material we certainly could not have held the Middle East, which has been, I think I may claim, the keystone of our present successes. . . . For this the United Nations owe India a considerable debt which I am sure they will not forget. During all this first period of the war India was facing West and sending all her troops and material, including much railway material and river-craft, of which she is now feeling the lack severely, to help our cause in the Middle East. *When Japan came into the war at the end of 1941 India had to execute a sudden about-turn.* Not only had her troops to be trained for an entirely different foe and a very different form of warfare, but the greatest possible strain was thrown on her resources of all kinds in the effort to prepare against a danger which had been foreseen as a possibility, but against which it had not been possible to provide with the limited resources available. India is

still suffering from this strain, and we shall have to exercise some care in putting increased burdens on her lest our whole base becomes unstable or collapses.'

Mr Amery's answer to a Parliamentary question last July shows that roughly 50 per cent. of recruits for the Indian army then came from the Punjab and 8 per cent. from the Kingdom of Nepal. Bengal's contribution was 2 per cent. The very uneven distribution of the martial races militates strongly against the proposal to split up India into independent blocks of territory.

VERNEY LOVETT.

Art. 4.—EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

Diagnosis of our Time. By Karl Mannheim. Kegan Paul, 1943.

Educational Reconstruction (The White Paper).

Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools (Norwood Report).

Abolition of Tuition Fees in Grant-Aided Secondary Schools (Fleming Committee : Special Report).

Public Schools and the Future (Headmasters' Conference).

AN article on the Public Schools at the present juncture, when the final Report of the Fleming Committee is not yet to hand, may bear something of the appearance of 'Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.' But there are two considerations which may be advanced in mitigation of such judgment. One arises from the literature alluded to above, which covers a large portion of the field of educational discussion now in progress, and provides, therefore, much of the context and the atmosphere in which the problem of the Public Schools will have to be solved. When the greater part of an arch is in position, it is possible to form some judgment as to the shape to which the missing stones must conform, if they are to fit into the whole. The other consideration arises from the fact that there is much in the ethos and genius of the Public Schools which can hardly form material for a Report. This is true of

education generally, in the sense that it is a spiritual activity, depending far more on personal than on administrative factors. But it is especially true of the Public Schools, where this spiritual activity is embodied in the tradition, often the very long tradition, of an independent corporate life, and where the interaction of teachers and taught is closer and more continuous than elsewhere.* The principle that education is primarily a spiritual activity is one that cannot be too often emphasised; for what Mr T. S. Eliot has called 'the commodity view of education' is in constant competition with it. Fortunately there is every indication that the Government and their advisers are alive to the principle; and no President of the Board of Education could have done more than Mr Butler to encourage its recognition. It is one thing, however, to bring a horse to water, another to make it drink; and success will depend in large measure on those intangible movements in public opinion with which the Churches are specially concerned. In a Christian country, for example, the purpose or end of education cannot be conceived as anything less than such a development of the child's whole personality as will inspire him with the desire to 'glorify God and enjoy Him for ever'; and in that setting the teacher's work will be entered upon not simply as a profession but as a vocation.

On the whole it can hardly be disputed that the Public Schools stand well in this regard. Education has been understood not only broadly but deeply, and its spiritual issues have been kept well to the fore. They have not wanted, moreover, for a regular succession of men ready and equipped to carry on and re-interpret this tradition, and to devote their whole lives to it, without much attempt to distinguish between work-time and leisure. School life has been for them, first as boys and later as masters, a matter not only of illumination but of initiation; and many of those who make little progress in the art of knowing may yet go very far in the not less important art of living. For that is what the life of a boarding school means: it is a process of education in which masters and

* Throughout this article I have boys' schools primarily in mind, since I know them best. Much of what is said is applicable also, no doubt, to girls' schools; but it is for those most closely concerned with them to point the applications.

boys are in ceaseless contact throughout the term, teaching one another and learning from one another, as much out of school as in it. It is a question all the time of the interaction of whole personalities, and the claim of the Public Schools is that the common life which they provide constitutes in itself a distinctive contribution to education. This is not to say that those of them which are without a residential side, or whose residential side is relatively small, have not played an equally vital part in secondary education: London and Manchester and Birmingham provide abundant evidence to the contrary, and their governing bodies have been educationally among the best in the country. But the bulk of Public Schools are boarding schools, and it is as such that they must stand or fall.

Those who believe in Public School education naturally desire that its benefits should be as widely diffused as possible; and it is around the ways and means of securing such diffusion that much of the present-day discussion turns. It is often alleged that these schools are in a sad plight financially, and faced with the prospect of gradual extinction through the inability of parents to pay the necessary fees. It is true that in the years of the economic depression many Public Schools had vacant places, and boarding houses were reduced in number; but much has happened since then, and at the present moment entries to Public Schools are running at high figures, in some cases at the highest figures for ten or twenty years past. It might be argued, indeed, that the country's war economy is bringing so many citizens into the group of those who can afford a Public School education for their sons that pressure on these schools' accommodation is likely to be very soon as great as it was after 1918, and that therefore there is no special problem to be solved. The Public Schools, it can be urged, have never existed on the basis of recruiting boys from a so-called 'Public School class.' On the contrary, they have always been admitting boys whose fathers were not themselves Public School men, and this is one of the chief social services they have performed for the nation. No doubt it is a rough and ready method of recruiting; but at least the boys come from homes where the parents are ambitious for their sons, and care enough about their education and training to make great

sacrifices for it. Is not the system best left alone? After all, it has shown itself most adaptable to changing needs in the past, and has thrown up a succession of remarkable men—an Arnold, a Thring, a Sanderson—capable of meeting and re-interpreting the march of time with conspicuous success. Cannot we reckon that in our own age it will do the same again?

The thesis is a weighty one, but not wide enough, I suggest, to cover the ground. Undoubtedly many of the greatest schools can continue on that basis and some of them quite possibly will; and there is good reason to suppose that any broadening of the area of recruitment will entail an increase in the number of Public Schools available. But there are certain facts which make this broadening of the area desirable. One such we have already mentioned, namely the desire of the Public Schools themselves to be of wider service than at present. And this feeling, which received clear expression in the evidence submitted on behalf of the Headmasters' Conference to the Fleming Committee, meets, and makes common cause with, movements of public opinion which have a quite different origin. We need not take too seriously the political foam and froth to which discussion of the question of Public Schools sometimes gives rise, even in the most august assemblies; nor are the charges of snobbery and luxury in which prejudiced persons periodically indulge very formidable. At any rate, we have heard a good deal less of these things since Mr Muff's celebrated letter to 'The Times' of July 8, 1943. *Veni, vidi, victus sum* was Mr Muff's honest and candid testimony; and it has travelled far. None the less it is still true that a certain atmosphere of privilege is felt to attach to Public Schools which acts as a constant irritant in a democratic country like our own, and which the broadening of the basis of recruitment, and the loosening of its financial conditions, might be expected to remove. Moreover, there is yet a third reason for such a step which is perhaps the weightiest of all, namely the effect which the struggle to maintain boys and girls at Public Schools has upon family limitation in precisely those homes which are otherwise best placed for the up-bringing of healthy children. The evidence is too strong to be gainsaid; and for those who, like the present writer, regard the problem of population as far the most

serious problem now confronting the Western world both economically and politically, this consideration is of paramount importance.

Enough has been said to indicate the main features of the setting, sociological and religious no less than strictly educational, in which the future of the Public Schools has to be envisaged. The course of events has brought it about that their external relations are now as important, at least to the general public, as their internal. It is not their weakness, but their vitality and their strength, which has brought their problem to the fore in national discussion: they have done too well to be left out of any pattern of planning which aims at covering the future development of our country. More particularly is this the case if planning be regarded as Dr Mannheim regards it—that is to say, as planning for freedom. It is not merely that the Public Schools have actually been embodiments of that policy in microcosm: when we say that these schools have shown outstanding skill in the training of character, we are saying that they have discovered how to plan boys' lives for freedom. There is also the fact that the Public Schools are already, by their origin and history, free; and it would surely be most inconsistent for a society which is planning for freedom to leave out of the picture those institutions which have proved over and over again that they have used their freedom to the public advantage.

The social aspects of the question involve problems both of selection and of finance; and though little can usefully be said in advance of the Fleming Committee's further Report, two points may perhaps be mentioned. The first is that the problem is not fundamentally different from that which has already been successfully solved in the case of the universities. The percentage of undergraduates at Oxford and Cambridge—to name only the two most famous universities—whose expenses are met in whole or in part from public sources is now very large; and this result has been achieved without any material infringement of the educational independence either of the universities themselves or of their constituent colleges. The second point is that Government grants and State or municipal scholarships or bursaries are not the only way in which such help might be given. It could also be given by

means of a far larger abatement of income tax in respect of sons or daughters attending places of full-time education than is given at present. The proposal may seem utopian ; but at a time when the income tax is proving to be a far more flexible instrument of social policy than was realised only a few years ago, I do not believe it would be impracticable. Parents who invest their savings in school and university education for their children are making the highest of all kinds of investment ; and they may fairly claim that the State should not lag behind them in thus investing in the rising generation. The State already recognises the principle of such a partnership with the individual citizen, when it allows exemption from tax on money spent on the repair of property and plant. Is it too much to claim that it should extend the principle to an outlay on the citizen's part which is aimed at the repair of 'the years which the cankerworm has eaten' and promises a return in national advantage far richer and far more permanent than any that a house or a machine can yield ?

And there is a further reason—a political reason—for such a change. It is becoming increasingly realised that one of the great dangers troubling the country to-day is the growth of 'spoon-feeding,' which results in encouraging the citizen to look more and more to the State to assume responsibility for his own and his children's lives.* Grants and bursaries, which are inevitably eleemosynary, partake of this spirit and encourage this sense of dependence ; and it is desirable that their scope should be not extended but reduced. People value what they pay for, for it represents their own choice and their own sacrifice ; and when, as in the case of education, this choice and sacrifice represent solid advantages to the nation's future, it may be urged that the State should meet parents half-way not as of grace but as of right. Conversely, I cannot but regret the proposal in the Fleming Committee's Majority Report to abolish fees in grant-aided schools. Adminis-

* Thus, a letter to 'The Times,' of July 10, 1942, from the Master of Balliol and a number of well-known educationalists, under the title 'Educational Reforms,' claimed that 'the first essential is the establishment of the principle that the welfare of every boy and girl up to the age of eighteen, whether receiving full-time schooling or not, is the responsibility of the Board of Education.' Such a doctrine strikes at the very root of parental right and duty.

trative tidiness will indeed be dearly purchased, if the price is a weakening of the interest and loyalty which parents at present show towards these schools and their educational ideals. I am told that in Soviet Russia, where experiments are apt to be judged on their results, school fees have been restored where they had been previously abolished. It is to be hoped, at least, that the question will be looked at on all sides—not excluding the possibility of re-introducing fees, however small, in all schools—before legislative action is taken.

On the other side of the balance-sheet the White Paper and the Fleming Committee are agreed that all types of secondary school must be provided with a statutory instrument of government defining the constitution and functions of the governing body in each case—a reform which will secure to them an independence comparable in many ways to that of the Public Schools. In two other matters assimilation of the State system to the Public School tradition is much to be desired, though neither is mentioned in the Reports so far to hand. One concerns the practice which obtains in the primary and senior schools of administering corporal punishment on the hand—a mischievous practice, in that it lends itself to being administered in moments of temper and selects for its purpose one of the most delicate and sensitive parts of the bodily organism—and we may hope that the robust common-sense of the Public School tradition in this regard may be generally adopted. Secondly, there is urgent need that the State and local authorities should give serious attention to the growing tendency of teachers in the publicly maintained schools to reside elsewhere than in the place where their work lies, even though accommodation is available. The residence of teachers at or near their day-schools has hitherto secured many of the advantages which are a conspicuous feature of the Public Schools, keeping education in close touch with the life of the community to which the children belong, enabling the teachers to help them with their work after hours, and making it possible for the parents to consult them at the only time of day when many parents are free. Resident teachers have in the past gladly accepted these social obligations and welcomed these educational opportunities as part of the responsibilities of their office ; and they have been all

the more beneficial because they have been non-contractual. The abandonment of these traditional duties and opportunities cannot fail to have unfortunate reactions on education and on the esteem in which it is held ; and now is the time to see to it that the case is not allowed to go by default.

But it is time to pass to some of the more purely educational aspects of our problem ; and here it would appear that the barriers which so often seem to separate the Public Schools from the other secondary schools are already in a fair way to being down, at least in principle. There is nothing better in the Norwood Report, in my judgment, than the sections in Part III, chapter i, on Specialism, Sound Learning, and the Form Master. Here the Report is in line with demands that are widely felt in other fields. In the Church, for example, it is the good all-round parish priest who is our paramount need—the man who has never ceased to be a student of the Scriptures and to apply what he learns to the infinite variety of human nature which he meets in his pastoral work. Similarly, in the medical profession the paramount need, in the view of many of those responsible for the training of doctors no less than of the public, is for an adequate supply of good general practitioners—of men who know that people's health cannot be divorced from their life and outlook as a whole and who approach their patients not as 'cases' but as human beings. The Form Master envisaged by the Norwood Report is just such an all-rounder in the sphere of education. Undoubtedly one of the best features of the Public Schools has been the position they have given to the Form Master and the power they have shown to reproduce him ; and when to this is added the peculiar gifts of the House Master, and in certain cases, as at Eton, the continuing care and stimulus of a 'Tutor,' you have as complete a provision for the staple part of a boy's education as anyone could desire. In one respect only, perhaps, are the Public Schools in danger here. I think it is impossible to deny that on the staffs of Public Schools there are fewer men of learning than was the case a generation ago. The chief reason for this is the ever-growing encroachment of practical duties on men's time and leisure, even in the holidays. But equally potent, one may surmise, is the tyranny of com-

petitive examinations, and the increasing specialisation, especially on the scientific side, which these entail. The remedy would seem to lie partly in a renewed development of classical education * as the best all-round introduction to habits of knowledge and thought, and partly in a real reconsideration by the universities of the policy into which they have been led.

One further point should be emphasised : namely, the indispensable part of the Preparatory Schools in the maintenance of the Public Schools' standards and traditions. The whole tradition of common life and humane studies which they represent is one that requires apprenticeship ; and the preparatory school system has had to be called into being to provide this. It would, indeed, be sanguine to suppose that boys entering Public Schools without such apprenticeship would be able to do them-

* The Headmaster of Eton allows me to quote the following from a letter in reply to a question from me last July as to the number of Sixth Form boys taking Classics at Eton :

The figures are as follows :—

Colleger Sixth Form—8 Classics, 1 History, 1 Science.

Oppidan Sixth Form—1 Classics, 1 Classical General (i.e. a general course based on Classics), 4 History, 2 Modern Languages, 2 Science.

The following figures may also be of interest to you. The boys who have taken School Certificate are this half distributed as follows :—

Classics	41
Classical General	18
History	81
Mod. Languages	40
Mathematics	14
Science	46

Latterly the numbers of boys doing Greek in the lower parts of the School have increased very much. In Remove this Half there are 125 boys doing Greek as against 92 non-Greek, and in Lower Fifth 99 Greek as against 82 non-Greek. On the whole I think the proportion of Greek boys is now too high and a certain number of boys are learning Greek who cannot properly benefit by it. This is particularly due to the fact that Tutors and parents who know about Eton like their boys to do Greek because they will thereby find themselves in better intellectual company. Next Half, however, we are revising the Greek pre-Certificate course for the non-scholarly boy by dividing him off from the scholarly type and making him read more widely and with less attention to the finer points of scholarship. If this works, it may be right that about half the boys in Lower Fifth and Remove should do Greek. One has to remember that since the war the intellectual standard of the weaker candidates for the School has dropped, though the standard of the better boys has not dropped at all and may even have risen. The drop is I think due at least partially to staffing and evacuation difficulties.

selves full credit or secure the full benefits offered. This will mean making use of existing Preparatory Schools and also bringing into existence a new type of 'senior' or 'modern' schools on boarding lines to meet the need. To those who urge that this will involve delay, we may cite the wise words of Dr Mannheim. After saying that 'democratisation of culture will benefit mankind, only if the quality of culture is preserved,' he adds: 'If this fails to happen, it is not the socially lower classes that are to be blamed but those who failed to realise that sudden admission of the many to the benefits of culture has carefully to be prepared both in the educational and social field.' Such realism in the discussion of this problem is very welcome.

Finally, what of religion? In this sphere the Public Schools partly overlap with those of the State, while in part they enjoy peculiar advantages of their own. They overlap with the secondary schools generally in the emphasis laid upon knowledge of Scripture; and here we may note with great gratification the proposals in the Norwood Report that religious instruction should be the subject of Inspection and that its time-allowance in the curriculum should be not less than the equivalent of two periods a week. The Committee also agrees with the Spens Report that 'the proper approach to the study of Scripture in school is historical and objective.' But it seems to the present writer that, in endorsing the view (now growing in Public Schools also) that Scripture knowledge is not a suitable subject for examination, they are going back on the very principle they have enunciated. Historical and objective study is precisely what *can* be a suitable subject for examination; and no one who knows human nature will pretend that most boys will take half as much trouble about a subject in which they are not examined as one in which they are. The fallacy lies, I believe, in the distinction the Committee draw 'between Scripture Knowledge and Religious Education.' The second is undoubtedly larger and broader than the first; but since the Christian religion rests upon a revelation of God given through history, then the study of that history—its men and women, its events, and its interpretations of these events—is part and parcel of religious education. A living faith is caught rather than taught; but it can only

be a rich and responsible faith if it is based on facts and truths which are apprehended through teaching.

The distinctive advantage and opportunity of the Public Schools lie in their School Chapels. And yet, when we have said that, we have raised a host of questions which call for an answer. One of the first is their fruitfulness in nourishing religious conviction and fostering religious vocation; and he would be a bold man who would say that the proportion of Public School boys who continue the habit of religion after they leave, or carry away any interest in—let alone enthusiasm for—the Church or desire to enter its ministry, is a matter for satisfaction. During the past thirty years every effort has been made to make school worship more ‘popular,’ the singing more hearty, the services more sincere. How much is there to show for it in after-results? My own belief is that the problem has been insufficiently thought out. Dr Mannheim has some exceedingly valuable things to say about the two facets of religion, which he distinguishes as the ‘adjustment’ side of it concerned with behaviour, conduct, discipline, and the ‘primordial images or archetypes’—such things, in Christianity, as ‘Baptism, Absolution, Agape, the Eucharist, the Good Shepherd, the Cross, Redemption’—which provide the mainspring of right action and serve to maintain its meaning and its quality. On the first of these sides, the Public Schools answer to the test well, and their Chapel services give an æsthetic and an emotional colour to school life which are of great value. But things are less satisfactory on the other. Education in the images and archetypes which express the Christian *Weltanschauung* necessitates teaching through the eye and through action no less than through the ear; and here the school-master could learn much from the parish priest. For it is a matter of widespread experience that the choral Eucharist with its action and movement and the privilege of serving at it, if properly explained, holds young people to habits of worship and give them insights into religion which are hard to come by otherwise. Moreover, these things belong not to the local community only but to the Church universal, and religious education fails unless it cultivates that larger loyalty. Many great schools have made experiments in this direction, and with results which merit wider application.

And when all is said and done, it is this larger loyalty that is needed ; we have to train our boys and girls to take their full place in the life of the Church no less than of the State. Two features of Public School life stand out here in great strength. One is the annual Confirmation with the regular habit of Communion which in the case of most boys follow it throughout their schooldays. I do not know whether preparation for Confirmation is generally better than it used to be ; but I have no doubt at all that Bishops make the Confirmation itself mean far more, to parents as well as to their children, than when I was a boy. The other outstanding advantage of the School Chapel is the opportunity it gives for a whole community of boys or girls to hear great preaching. Great sermons, like great services, may not be frequent ; though it would be a mistake to suppose that either could have their effect except against the background of the normal routine of school's worship. But when they occur they cut deep and leave a permanent impression. No one, for example, who was at Eton when Dr Alington came there as a master can ever forget the difference he made. And most Public School men, looking back on their schooldays, remember similar occasions. It is these occasions, when scales fall from the eyes and the whole panorama of human life is lit up by the light that shines from the glory of God, that give to our School Chapels their uniquely important place in national education.

E. G. SELWYN.

Art. 5.—SPANISH NEUTRALITY.

A GLANCE at the background of Spain's international relations and sympathies on and before Sept. 3, 1939, is necessary in order to understand the history of her neutrality during the second world war. That neutrality is especially worthy of study because it proved to be of vital importance to Great Britain when she stood alone against the enemy, and subsequently to all the United Nations.

The end of the Spanish Civil War found the Nationalist Government under General Franco friendly towards Germany and Italy on account of the assistance given to them in men and materials, and filled with the fiercest animosity against Russia and the Comintern, whom they considered the chief originators of the Civil War, and because of the assistance they gave to their enemies in men, materials, and the direction of the war. The attitude towards France was also antagonistic owing to the very considerable assistance given by the French Popular Front Government to the Republicans notwithstanding the pretence of non-intervention; this antagonism was much ameliorated by the Berard-Jordana agreement and the advent of Marshal Pétain as French Ambassador to Spain early in 1939.

The Nationalist attitude to England was unfriendly, chiefly owing to the general hostility to and misunderstanding of their cause shown by the British press and public throughout the Civil War, the farce of non-intervention, and the refusal of the British Government to recognise the Franco blockade, which the Spaniards considered had operated unfairly against them and prolonged the war. It is not the intention of this article to criticise or to defend those policies, but merely to indicate their effect on Spanish opinion and to show how they appeared when looked on through Spanish eyes.

Notwithstanding the canards launched during the Civil War, such as the Italian occupation of the Balearic Islands, the German occupation of Morocco, the cession to Germany of aerodromes along the Pyrennees, and various other myths, the truth was that 'not an inch of Spanish Sovereignty had been given away nor an inch of Spanish territory.' *

It is also necessary to paint into the background certain passionate and ineradicable beliefs held by General Franco and his associates and followers, most of them the fruits of Spanish history and Spanish experiences. First and foremost was the hatred of Communism, Socialism, and everything proceeding from Karl Marx, a natural product of the Civil War, which burnt with so fierce a flame that it appeared to blind General Franco to the

* Sr. de Madariaga's 'Spain.'

evils of Communism's twin sister National Socialism and of their cousin Italian Fascism.

It is a fashion in England to talk about 'the bogey of Communism,' but the people who use that expression and accuse the foreigner of unnecessary fears about it are speaking without their book and in a manner incomprehensible to the Spaniard, who has had bitter experience of the 'bogey.' To understand the inveterate hatred and fear of Communism held by the Spaniard you would have to remember that there was scarcely an aristocratic or bourgeois family throughout Spain who did not have to mourn the death by assassination, often with the most horrible cruelties, of one or many near relations. The reader may refuse to believe that these things happened if he likes to do so, but the Spaniard and Spanish thought are motivated by the remembrance of them.

In addition to this hatred of Communism, which appeared to be an obsession blinding certain Spaniards to other evils, there was visible in the new rulers of Spain a mistrust and dislike of the Anglo-French parliamentary system, which had broken down throughout more than a century of trial in Spain, and to which they attributed many of their past misfortunes on account of its unsuitability to Spanish character. They had an increasing mistrust of nineteenth-century liberalism and materialism, on which to them those systems appeared to be based, and they looked forward with hope to a system similar to that existing in Spain for centuries prior to the nineteenth century—a system based on Monarchy, Church, Council, Cortes, and Guilds, such as had existed from the time of the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, whose emblems of the yoke and arrows significantly appear in the new Spanish arms.

Again, it is not the intention to debate these matters here, but to point to their existence as affecting the policies and actions of General Franco's government.

These are some of the features of the background, against which must be read the story of Spain's neutrality and non-belligerency, which necessitated a veritable tight-rope walking on the part of General Franco and his government and in which it can be said that his statesmanship was severely tested and that, though his sympathies were on the side of the Axis, he maintained

inflexibly his intention to keep his country out of the war. It can also be confidently asserted that in that intention he had the support of the vast majority of Spaniards of all political colours.

Throughout the second world war the bulk of the British press and many books, often written by tourists or journalists without a knowledge of Spanish history, politics, or character, have depicted Spain and General Franco as the tools of the Axis. That has never at any time been true, though the Spanish press and the words of Spanish statesmen gave colour to this idea, and its constant reiteration was a cause of irritation of Spanish feeling against England and English feeling against Spain. It was consequently of great assistance to German propaganda, whose very object was to arouse that ill-feeling between the two potentially friendly nations.

We will now proceed to chronicle the chief events of the years 1939-43 which concerned Spain's foreign affairs and her neutrality.

On the outbreak of the second world war, Spain's neutrality was proclaimed, and General Franco issued an order to all Spaniards to observe the strictest neutrality and to the press to abstain from comments.

The signature of the Hitler-Stalin pact in August 1939 temporarily threw Spanish opinion out of gear, because their feeling of hatred for Russia and Communism made it difficult to digest simultaneously the friendship for Germany, Russia's ally. However, the apparently impossible digestive process was achieved, though Spain energetically denounced Russia's attack on Finland. On the other hand the anti-communist actions taken by the French Government improved the feeling between Spain and France.

In January 1940 the signature of a French-Spanish trade agreement indicated that the rapprochement between the two countries was progressing. In February an Italian Institute was opened in Madrid and there were demonstrations of Spanish-Italian friendship. At this time Spanish Portuguese relations became increasingly close.

In March an Anglo-Spanish trade agreement was signed covering the settlement of outstanding debts and balances by Spain and granting Spain credits in London

for 4,000,000*l.* In a debate in the House of Commons Mr Butler, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated 'we have no cause to complain of the Spanish Government's attitude, which has been one of strict neutrality.'

On May 12, 1940, on the occasion of the entry into the war of Holland and Belgium, General Franco again affirmed Spain's neutrality and in that month Sir Samuel Hoare was appointed by the King as Ambassador to Spain. The appointment of such an outstanding figure in British politics was of good augury for a return to Anglo-Spanish cordiality.

On the entry of Italy into the war, General Franco changed the official attitude of Spain to one of 'non-belligerency'; the difference between this and neutrality has never been defined.

On June 14, 1940, Spanish troops under Colonel Yuste marched into the International Zone of Tangier; the Spanish Government declared that the occupation was of a temporary nature with the object of guaranteeing the neutrality of the Zone. The occupation was the occasion for the pro-German and anti-British elements in Spain to organise street demonstrations in which the crowds shouted 'Viva Tanjer Español' and 'Gibraltar para España.' It should be mentioned here that the Tangier question was one of long standing, which always aroused a feeling of injustice in Spanish breasts. At this time a decree was issued prohibiting any press propaganda by or on behalf of the belligerent nations.

The capitulation of France in June 1940 brought the war and the danger of being involved in it much nearer to Spain, whose rulers saw the causes of the French collapse in the many years of social and political corruption, which culminated in Communism and its instrument the Front Populaire. The German army was now on the Spanish frontier and there were fears that it might be allowed to march through Spain to Gibraltar. Such was not the case, but friendship with the Germans was demonstrated by a reception at the frontier of high German officers and the German Ambassador, by General Lopez Pinto who called for cheers for the German and Italian armies, the Führer and the Duce. This resulted in the almost immediate dismissal of the General from his post.

In July 1940 General Franco offered the palace of La Granja as a residence for the duration of the war to the children of King Leopold of Belgium. The opening of a British Institute in Madrid by the British Council with the object of furthering cultural relations and understanding between Spain and Britain was announced.

In July an Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese imports agreement was signed, which facilitated the purchase and payment of wheat and other foodstuffs for Spain. This was followed in September by an agreement for supplying Spain with fuel oil.

The German Ambassador, von Stöhrer, a very able man, who gradually acquired through the pro-German section of Falange complete control over the Spanish press and radio, in September 1940 presented General Franco in the name of the Führer with the Grand Cross of Gold of the Order of Merit of the Eagle. General Franco in his speech of thanks referred to the friendship between the two nations and their strife against the common enemy (Communism).

In the same month (September 1940) Señor Serrano Suñer, at that time Home Secretary and President of the Political Committee of Falange, left on a mission to Germany and Italy, where he had interviews with the Führer and the Duce and made flattering speeches about the identity of Spanish and Axis aims. His visit coincided with the Brenner meeting of Hitler and Mussolini, but it did not bring about the change in Spain's status that some people expected.

A few days later the Prime Minister in the House of Commons stated that Spain 'has for some months past seemed to hang in the balance between peace and war' and after various friendly remarks he said 'British interests and policy are based on the independence and unity of Spain.'

On October 20 the substitution of the Foreign Minister, Colonel Beigbeder, by Señor Serrano Suñer indicated a bow to Germany and the Spanish pro-Germans. Then, on Oct. 23, 1940, came the surprising news of a meeting at Hendaye between the Führer and General Franco, who had so far succeeded in not paying a visit to either Hitler or Mussolini; evidently great things were expected of the visit, for Himmler had also recently been in

Madrid, but no result ever appeared and Spain remained neutral.

In November Colonel Yuste unexpectedly assumed the governorship of Tangier in the name of the Spanish Government and abolished the existing legislative assembly and Committee of Control. As these proceedings altered the bases of the international agreements, protests were made by the British and U.S.A. Ambassadors and there were misgivings as to Spain's intentions, which were not quieted until February 1941, when a temporary agreement was made between the governments. By this agreement British rights and interests in the Zone were safeguarded, an undertaking being given that the Zone would not be fortified and both countries consented to reserve their present position with a view to a final settlement.

On Nov. 17, 1940, the Council of Hispanidad was created to strengthen the racial and cultural relations between Spain and South and Central America, through the medium of cultural and economic affairs. Hispanidad is in its essence a non-political and cultural movement, though at a later date certain political elements tried to convert it into a political instrument.

At the end of November Señor Serrano Suñer had fresh interviews with the Führer and with Count Ciano.

In the same month a new Anglo-Spanish financial agreement was signed by Sir Samuel Hoare and Señor Serrano Suñer granting facilities for certain imports into Spain and safeguards against their delivery to Germany and Italy.

In a speech in Madrid on March 14, 1941, Señor Serrano Suñer congratulated Germany on the triumph of her arms, linked together the names of Germany and Spain, and concluded 'Viva Hitler,' and on March 17 the Spanish Government reinstated the German Consulate in its pre-1914 residence in Tangier, the Mandoubia, originally the residence of the representative of the Sultan of Morocco.

In March 1941 an Anglo-Spanish agreement was signed providing a credit of 2,500,000*l.* for the purchases of raw materials and food, and in the same month there was signed a Spanish-Portuguese agreement bringing the countries into closer commercial relationship.

On June 24, 1941, a demonstration by young Falangists took place outside the British Embassy in Madrid for which an apology was demanded and received from General Franco.

The invasion of Russia by Germany gave a great impetus to German influence and propaganda in Spain, where the pro-Germans were able to forget at once the recent German-Russian alliance and re-acclaim themselves the companions of Germany in a renewed campaign against the common communist enemy. Señor Serrano Suñer made violent speeches in favour of Germany and against Great Britain and the U.S.A. One important result was the prompt recruiting and despatch to fight against Russia of the 'Blue Division,' composed of volunteers from the ex-combatants of the Civil War, under General Muñoz Grande. This was an unneutral act and was a victory for the pro-German section of Falange and their German instigators at the German Embassy. In a speech to the Council of Falange on July 17 General Franco restated the Spanish hatred of the Soviet and of Communism and stated that the Allies had already lost the war.

In July and August 1941 trade agreements were signed with Finland and Denmark and in August an agreement was made for the despatch of Spanish labour to work in Germany.

On the entry into the war of the U.S.A. and Japan in December 1941 a decree was issued announcing that Spain would maintain her attitude of non-belligerency.

In January 1942 further shipments of wheat under the Spanish-Argentine treaty brought the quantity of wheat imported from the Argentine to 500,000 tons. This could of course only have been realised by the benevolence of the British blockade and the British Ambassador announced that still further facilities were to be given to relieve the food shortage in Spain.

In February it was announced that Spain took over German, Italian, and Japanese representation in the U.S.A. and in thirteen Spanish-American countries, who had broken relations with the Axis powers and whose representation Spain simultaneously took over in Berlin and Rome.

The entry of the U.S.A. into the war and the attitude

of the Hispano-American Republics began at this time to exercise a visible effect on those Spaniards who had been convinced of a German victory. This effect was visible increasingly in the behaviour of General Franco toward the extreme pro-German Falangists led by Señor Serrano Suñer.

In February General Franco made another of his pro-German speeches which, after repeating the anti-communist credo that inspired him, concluded with the words, 'if the road were open to Berlin, it would not be one division of Spanish volunteers that would go there but a million Spaniards would offer themselves.'

In March 1942, a new U.S.A. Ambassador to Madrid was appointed in the shape of Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes. Being a Catholic and a historian, who had been a strong supporter of General Franco during the Civil War, this appointment was looked upon as evidence of a friendly disposition on the part of the U.S.A. towards Spain and a sign of satisfaction and rapprochement.

In June 1942 Señor Serrano Suñer made the last of his sensational visits to the Axis countries. He went to Rome, where he had long conversations with Mussolini and Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister; he also visited the King and was received by the Pope, who gave him a blessing for Spain and for General Franco.

Allegations having been made in the foreign press, the Foreign Office in Madrid denied that Spanish ships had provided German submarines with fuel oil or used their wireless to assist submarines to discover the position of merchant ships.

In July 1942, on the anniversary of the Nationalist rising, General Franco spoke reviewing the state of Spain and the progress of reconstruction and stated the supreme necessity of Spanish unity. In his comments on foreign affairs he made no friendly reference to the Axis powers as in former speeches, though he stated his opinion that 'In matters pertaining to war the totalitarian regime has clearly demonstrated its superiority.' He repeated and emphasised that communism was the great peril for Europe and for Spain, who had already been fighting against it for six years.

At the end of August 1942 there came the sensational

fall of Señor Serrano Suñer, who was replaced as head of the Falange by General Franco and as foreign minister by General Jordana, who had been foreign minister and Vice-President of the first Nationalist Government in 1938. Señor Serrano Suñer's fall was due partly to internal and partly to foreign politics, and it marked a decline of the power of the pro-German section of the Spanish people.

At the end of September the reorganised Government made an announcement confirming their position of non-belligerency, stating the continuation of their crusade against communism and their friendship with Spanish-American countries.

On the landing of U.S. and British troops in North Africa in November 1942, Sir Samuel Hoare notified the Spanish Government that 'the operations in no way threaten Spanish territory, metropolitan or oversea. Spanish territory will be fully respected and Spanish interests will not be compromised.' He also informed them that the existing trade agreements and the *modus vivendi* in Tangier were not affected and he concluded that it was desired that Spain should 'take her due place in the reconstructed Europe of the future.' President Roosevelt addressed a similar message to General Franco on behalf of the U.S.A.

On his fiftieth birthday (Dec. 5, 1942) General Franco received congratulatory telegrams from Hitler and Mussolini, and in his acknowledgment to Hitler he expressed his wishes for the victory in his fight to free Europe from the Bolshevik terror. This, like General Franco's and Señor Serrano Suñer's former speeches, created a bad impression in the United Nations.

General Jordana visited President Carmona of Portugal and friendly speeches were made emphasising the complete agreement between the two countries. General Jordana also reiterated Spain's determination to remain neutral.

In January von Stöhrer, the German Ambassador to Madrid, was recalled; he had shown great activity and ability in organising and working a huge propaganda machine throughout Spain, and he had made many friends in Spain. His recall was considered as a mark of Germany's discontent at the failure of his extensive

efforts to break down Spanish neutrality and to bring Spain into the Axis, and indicated a further step towards safety for Spain along the tight-rope of neutrality.

In January 1943 the Tangier question again came to the fore; the High Commissioner in Morocco, General Orgaz, made the statement that Tangier was incorporated in the Spanish Zone. This was met by a reminder from Great Britain that she refused to recognise Spain's unilateral actions in the Tangier Zone and reserved her rights as previously defined in 1925 and 1928.

On the occasion of the new German Ambassador, Herr Adolf Von Moltke, presenting his credentials to General Franco, speeches were made which again emphasised that Germany and Spain were fighting in a common European cause against Communism. In January Señor Arrese, the secretary of Falange, paid a visit to Berlin.

In February a new trade agreement was signed with Portugal.

On February 26 Mr. Hayes, the U.S. Ambassador, addressed the American Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona and referred to the part which the United States had played in the improving of Spain's economy. He stated that the supply of petrol and petroleum products had been considerable, and concluded his speech by saying, 'As long as the war lasts and is kept away from Spanish land, the United States stands ready to continue to extend any help she can to Spain, who is herself doing so much with obvious success to develop a peace economy that can and will carry this country safely into the future period of world peace. . . . No nation is self-sufficient, and the United States policy of good neighbourliness cannot be effective unless it is reciprocal.' (Quotation from 'The Times,' February 27.)

Mr Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State of the U.S.A., wrote in March to the Committee of Foreign Affairs that Spain had given adequate guarantees to the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain that petroleum imports into Spain would not leave Spanish territory. A similar assurance was given in the House of Commons.

On April 17, 1943, General Jordana, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in a speech in Barcelona that

Spain was in a position to defend her independence, and stated that she would be ready to offer her good services for the re-establishment of peace. This speech called forth declarations from the British and U.S. Foreign Secretaries to the effect that the policy of the United Nations was that of unconditional surrender by their enemies, as previously stated.

On May 12 in Almeria General Franco spoke in favour of peace, stating that it was madness to postpone making peace, because behind the scenes lay Communism, which for twenty-five years had been sowing hatred, and that neither side was strong enough to destroy the other. This speech was badly received by the press and radio of both sides (the United Nations and the Axis) and was considered in England and the U.S.A. to be a peace feeler on behalf of the Germans, a supposition for which no evidence has been produced.

The successful conclusion of the Tunisian campaign and especially the wholesale surrender there of the German army had a great effect on the pro-German section of Spanish opinion and the effect was immediately noticeable in the press and radio.

On May 19 Mr Eden in the House of Commons stated that British rights in Tangier were duly protected pending a final solution, which could not be attained until after the war.

At the end of May there was a campaign in the Spanish press and radio against aerial bombing of towns, no doubt partly inspired by the question of the bombing of Rome, and probably also by German and Falangist propaganda. This called forth violent protests in the British press and Parliament and caused considerable irritation both in England and the U.S.A. Thus there was an exact reversal of the rôles of the press and public of the three countries over the same problem during the Spanish Civil War.

On June 1, the British Consul-General in Tangier protested to the Spanish authorities against various recent steps taken to extend their authority in the Zone; satisfactory explanations and promises were received by the Consul-General. In the House of Lords, Lord Cranborne stated that by virtue of the *modus vivendi* of February 1941 the interests of Great Britain were fully

safeguarded pending a final agreement, which could only be reached after the war.

The landing in Sicily and the rapid success of Allied arms still further reduced in Spain the belief in an eventual German victory and, as the pro-Germans became less vocal, the pro-British and pro-United Nations Spaniards were able to make their voices increasingly audible and a marked change was noticeable in the press.

On the fall of Mussolini at the end of July, which created a great impression in Falange circles, General Franco emphasised the difference between Italian fascism and Spanish Falangism, which he pointed out was purely Spanish in its origin and not foreign.

On August 4 Mr Eden in the House of Commons gave a combined warning on the part of the U.S.A., Soviet, and British Governments to certain neutral countries requesting them to prevent asylum being given to Mussolini and other war criminals. In the same session Mr Eden stated that the return of the monarchy was entirely a matter for Spain to decide.

Also in August, Sir Samuel Hoare had a long conference in Corunna with General Franco and General Jordana, about which Mr Eden stated in the House of Commons that General Franco's attention was drawn to various complaints of 'discrimination against British interests,' some of which had been remedied but others had still to be remedied; that his attention was also drawn to the position of the Blue Division and 'it was made clear to General Franco that, so long as it remained in the Soviet Union, it was a serious obstacle to the development of cordial Anglo-Spanish relations.'*

In the same session of the House of Commons Mr Eden repeated previous statements about Tangier and said, 'H.M. Government in the U.K. have always made it clear that the *modus vivendi* reached between them and the Spanish government early in 1941 . . . was of a provisional nature pending the possibility of a final settlement. . . . They have always maintained their protest against the original unilateral action of the Spanish Government. Under the *modus vivendi* British rights in that Zone have been and are fully safeguarded.'* He

* 'The Times,' Sept. 23, 1943.

went on to say that the Spanish Government had been warned to put an end to abuses and to ensure the strict neutrality of the Zone.

The occupation of the Vatican and the virtual imprisonment of the Pope created a great revulsion of feeling in Spain, which was expressed in the Spanish press; it affected still further the relative sympathies of Spaniards to the belligerents.

This chronicle of events between the outbreak of the second world war and October 1943 seems to bring out certain facts clearly.

General Franco has been well disposed to the Axis powers, bitterly hostile to anything connected with Communism and Marxian Socialism, and inspired with a dislike for what he considers to be the liberal and plutocratic systems of Great Britain and the U.S.A. But he was first and last determined in the interests of his country to remain out of the war, and in that he has been successful. His speeches and those of his Foreign Minister, the sending of the Blue Division to fight with the Germans against Russia, and the pro-German attitude of the Spanish press caused disgust in this country, but without them it is very doubtful if Spain's neutrality would have been maintained, and for that we must be exceedingly thankful. Had Spain been a member of the Axis or had she been an ally of this country, in fact, had she been anything but neutral, a German invasion of Spain could hardly have been avoided, with far reaching and disastrous consequences to this country in the dark days of 1940-41 and to the whole length and trend of the war. It is necessary to visualise what would have been the effect on our Mediterranean position or on the U-boat campaign if Spanish, and perhaps Portuguese, coasts and ports had been in the hands of the enemy and the German army at the gates of Gibraltar.

The motives inspiring Spain's neutrality have been first and last the interests of Spanish patriotism, and it is futile to look for them elsewhere. It was maintained by able statesmanship on the part of General Franco and his Government which often displeased both sides. It was assisted and maintained by able diplomacy on the part of the U.S. and British Governments and their representatives in Madrid. They assisted friendly cooperation

between the countries and refused to be diverted from their course by the uninstructed clamour of the press and propaganda on either side. Results have justified them.

One of the great causes of misunderstanding has been the inability on the part of Englishmen to discriminate between friend and foe in Spain. Spain has been and is split in two, as it was in the first world war, between pro-Germans and pro-Allies. The former have been the most vocal because they controlled the press and radio, but it would have been a feeble diplomacy that overlooked the latter because it hated the former. It is certain that in the second world war the allies have more friends in Spain than they had in the first world war.

There has been a tendency in this country to look upon Falange as representative of Spain as a whole and to overlook the fact that, though officially only one party (Falange, which is a combination of all political parties) is recognised in Spain, the unity is fallacious and a failure. In reality, though not officially, the conservative elements in Spain—the Traditionalists, the Army, the Catholics, the Monarchists, etc., are all powerful representative bodies of opinion and all wholly or partially opposed to the Falange, which it must be remembered gradually absorbed much of the old left-wing elements and simultaneously became pro-German. This appears at first sight curious and contradictory and to make senseless the old classifications of 'left' and 'right,' until the close affinity of the left and right totalitarianisms is realised.

This conflict of political opinion is the great internal problem that faces Spain to-day and there has been a progressive weakening of the power and popularity of Falange. There has been an increase of the desire for the return of the Monarchy in the person of the Infante Don Juan, who now incorporates in his person all claims to the Spanish throne both Alfonsist and Carlist. Any prophecies regarding Spain are always dangerous and likely to be falsified, and even before this article can appear in print it is quite likely that important changes may have taken place in the Spanish political situation.

ARTHUR F. LOVEDAY.

Art. 6.—ALLAN RAMSAY THE YOUNGER: PUBLICIST, SCHOLAR, AND LITTERATEUR.

THERE were two Allan Ramsays, father and son. Of the elder, the good-natured but vain and loquacious author of the 'Gentle Shepherd,' a pastoral which sounds, somewhat obtrusively, the note of domesticity in Scottish verse, we have perhaps heard more than enough; of the younger, we certainly know less than we ought, for he was not only the more gifted but exhibited a range of notable achievement quite beyond the ken of his parent.

It has been acutely remarked that if a man does one thing well, he may reach fame, but if he does two very different things well, it may almost be taken for granted that his reputation will suffer. This was precisely the case with Allan Ramsay the Younger. He was early recognised as among the most talented portrait-painters of his time. Indeed, the only contemporary British painter who was a serious rival was Sir Joshua Reynolds. Yet in a sphere far removed from the artistic Ramsay acquitted himself with hardly less ability. He studied and wrote on politics with knowledge and insight; he was a first-rate authority on the art of government in general and the British Constitution in particular; he was indefatigable in expounding in the periodicals of the day and in long argumentative pamphlets problems connected with the American War of Independence; and in one of his treatises he took Edmund Burke to task.

It is the purpose of this article to expiscate this aspect of Ramsay's career which hitherto has been entirely left out of account, though almost as important as the artistic side. George the Third's portrait-painter was a highly competent and resourceful publicist. In his later years his absorption in politics became pronounced and was detrimental to his work as a limner. It is significant that those of his own vocation did not take Ramsay seriously, being, in their view, too engrossed in public affairs to sustain an artistic reputation of the highest kind. Still more eloquent perhaps is the fact that Ramsay, the Court-painter, never was a member of the Royal Academy.

While it would be hazardous to assert that Ramsay

mistook his vocation, that a seat in the House of Commons rather than an easel best accorded with his bent, it is fairly certain that he would not have complained had he learnt that his chief claim to remembrance would be his ability to read the signs of the times, to make known the trend of political thought in Britain. He loved his art, but in later life loved politics still more. The man who gave weighty reasons for questioning the validity of the cry of 'taxation without representation,' who set forth opinions which, while opposed by the older historians, approximate to the modern attitude as regards the causes of the American War, was no tyro in public affairs.

Writing in 1762 to his intimate friend, Sir Alexander Dick of Prestonfield, Ramsay says: 'I have lately reprinted two of my little essays, and have put the whole together with the general title of "Investigator".' The bibliographical history of this publication is obscure. There is no copy in the National Library of Scotland, though the various pieces comprising the work are there in separate form. The Signet Library, Edinburgh, is more fortunate, since it possesses David Hume's copy. Inside is a holograph letter by Principal John Lee, addressed to the Hon. Lord Murray, which states that 'two manuscript lines on the title page are in Hume's handwriting,' and may be taken as 'a sufficient attestation of the authorship of two of the six Pamphlets not universally known to have been written by the younger Allan Ramsay.' Further research has made it clear that all the contents of the 'Investigator' are the work of Ramsay. Moreover, there is the authority of Tytler for saying that Ramsay 'wrote some ingenious pieces on controverted topics of History, Politics and Criticism,' a description that corresponds with the main drift of the 'Investigator.' These were written at various times and published anonymously.

The 'Investigator' opens with an essay on Ridicule, which was originally published in 1753. Purporting to be 'written by a man of business for his winter evening's amusement,' it belongs to a series of tracts 'all tending to show the usefulness and necessity of experimental reasoning in philological and moral enquiries.' Ramsay's description of himself as 'a man of business' probably was meant to impart a mystifying touch. The essay

covers eighty-two octavo pages. Ridicule is defined, rather ingeniously, as belonging to the 'noblest species of eloquence.' The writer differentiates true from false ridicule, points out its use in religious controversy and in the 'critical examination of poetical images,' and describes its effects in relation to 'the manners and actions of men.' The essay testifies to the ripeness of Ramsay's understanding, his argumentative skill, and the immense range and precision of his scholarship; authors, ancient and modern, being abundantly employed to enforce the various points. It is pleasant to read of the Scots portrait-painter extolling the genius of a contemporary who was rather envious because of the huge sums Ramsay drew from the practice of his art. He writes :

'Of all those artists who have employed their pencils in representing what they thought ridiculous in the manners of men, I know of none who deserves to be mentioned upon this occasion, but the incomparable Hogarth. . . . It was reserved for our ingenious countryman to expose upon immortal canvas the fashionable follies, vices and affectations of his contemporaries. He has gone still farther, and by reproducing his representations . . . shewing the frightful tho' natural tendency of those follies, has administer'd one of the most practical incitements to virtue, and fulfilled the most material duty of a moral philosopher.'

The other non-controversial piece is the dialogue on Taste. From a reference in a letter to Hume, we know that Ramsay attached importance to it. Certainly the theme is one with which he was specially competent to deal, but it may be questioned if he did himself justice by casting it in the form of a dialogue. Lord Modish opens the discussion by asking Colonel Freeman if he prefers 'Hudibras' to Virgil (an amazing conjunction !) and, answering in the affirmative, is promptly set down as an 'absolute Goth,' an attitude that is enlightening as regards Ramsay's sympathies. The dialogue on Taste is perhaps the least satisfactory of our author's published writings. The characters are not only insipid but their stilted, long-winded speeches have little point, while the conclusions reached are not very clear.

In the handling of public questions, however, Ramsay reveals unwonted capacity. This facile delineator of the

physiognomies of distinguished personages could write both trenchantly and convincingly on the art of government. While on his travels Ramsay visited Voltaire and Rousseau, and though not an admirer of the political philosophy that emanated from that quarter, the contact led him to make a systematic study of problems affecting the welfare of nations, particularly his own. And he strengthened his position by cultivating the friendship of men whose duty it was to grapple with them. Georgian statesmen like Bute and Newcastle and Chesterfield were frequently his guests when, according to Allan Cunningham, the talk was more about politics than art. The Court-painter turned politician is assuredly a rare phenomenon. None the less, Ramsay's influence on the course of public affairs during the first two decades of the reign of George III was anything but negligible.

No one can read Ramsay's published writings without being impressed by his extensive knowledge and masterly insight. It is manifest that the writer is not only comprehensive in his outlook but has studied the whole theory of statecraft. Yet his knowledge, being divorced from practice, could not save him from pitfalls, and led him to propound fantastic schemes. A seat in the Cabinet would have disillusioned Ramsay about many things. But if it is sometimes the doctrinaire that speaks, it remains true that here is a Whig intellectual who views public questions in the light of a close study of the art of government and is seriously perturbed about the course to be pursued.

In 1769 Ramsay made the first of several weighty contributions to contemporary British politics, in a treatise entitled 'Thoughts on the Origin and Nature of Government.' The heavy burden of debt with which Great Britain was saddled consequent upon fighting the French in North America, suggested to our statesmen that the colonies might be made to contribute towards the upkeep of the army sent for their protection. But the first attempt, which was made through Grenville's Stamp Duty on legal documents in the colonies, was so strenuously opposed that it was repealed by the Rockingham Whigs. The question whether the Parliament at Westminster had a right to tax the American colonies, Ramsay regarded as 'of all questions the most important

that was ever debated in this country.' In a series of pamphlets he defines the colonial problem and expounds views that were in advance of his time. The cry of 'No taxation without representation,' he sought to show, was by no means justifiable. The American colonies being a part of the British Empire, the 'Crown in Parliament' was for all British subjects the sovereign authority. Ramsay drew no distinction between the Crown, whose authority within limits the colonists admitted, and Parliament. The trouble, however, was that the colonists, while recognising an indefinite allegiance to the Crown, stoutly maintained that they were autonomous communities. Theoretically, Ramsay was justified in viewing the Empire as a single, consolidated State; but in practice it was even then a federation of self-governing peoples, though confessedly the terms of federation remained elastic long after Ramsay's time. Be that as it may, Ramsay was in substantial agreement with the policy of Lord North.

The abstract doctrine that 'all men in their natural state are free and independent' found no favour with Ramsay. An equal right to liberty, he argues, can hardly be separated from an equal right to property (a claim that has never been put forward save by 'the very lowest class of men'), and the separation of Britain from her colonies would be destructive of the prosperity and liberty of both. 'Till such time as New England is strong enough to protect Old England, and the seat of the British Empire is transferred from London to Boston,' there is, Ramsay contends, 'an absolute necessity that the right of giving law to America should continue to be vested in Great Britain.' When, in 1775, a group of London merchants petitioned the House of Commons in favour of the colonists, Ramsay entered the fray with two letters signed 'Britannicus.' They appeared in the 'Public Advertiser' and were reprinted in the 'London Chronicle,' through which medium they circulated throughout the whole country. Ramsay expressed the view that all that the colonists had urged about taxation being conjoined with representation was inapplicable inasmuch as they were 'not in a free and independent state with respect to England.' The colonists could no more claim exemption from taxation than the people of

the home country, because as long as they were indebted to Britain they had no right to call anything they possessed their own.

But the most exhaustive account of Ramsay's attitude is contained in a volume of 210 pages entitled 'An Historical Essay on the English Constitution.' Published in 1771, this work seems to be a re-written and enlarged version of an essay issued in 1765 and included in the 'Investigator.' The expanded essay is in the National Library of Scotland, and on the title-page the words 'By Allan Ramsay' appear in quaint handwriting. Ramsay sets out to show 'the true cause of that general discontent which now distracts the British Empire, and to point out the constitutional means of reconciliation between Great Britain and her distant provinces.' The 'true cause' he finds in some modern laws that have changed 'the spirit and temper of our government.'

Whatever Bolingbroke may say about 'patriotick kings' and 'patriotick ministers,' Ramsay has no faith in them. 'Give me leave to tell the good people of England that it is all Patriotick Nonsense.' What would make the nation 'free and happy' was not 'such hyphenated ideas, but the principles of the Constitution coupled with the annual exercise of elective power by the people.' Ramsay, in short, was advocating a new form of Parliamentary representation whereby the views of the nation would be more accurately reflected in the House of Commons. He also pleaded for an extended franchise. 'Every resident inhabitant that pays his shot and bears his lot should be entitled to vote for a member of Parliament in the division to which he belongs.' This is Ramsay's panacea for 'rotten boroughs' the abolition of which would destroy 'all bribery and corruption, all riot and disturbance.' It was also in accord with the true spirit of the political reformer that Ramsay pleaded for voting by ballot which did not become a legislative enactment till Gladstone's time.

Further, Ramsay vindicates here, as elsewhere, the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonies. His main contention is, that colonisation in America was resorted to for the general good of all British subjects, and not for the sole good of the settlers. The colonists held their lands as members of the British Commonwealth,

which was one and indivisible. True, these lands were so remote as to exclude the colonists from their right of electing members of Parliament, but that was a misfortune incidental to their situation. 'It is surprising,' he concludes, 'that it could ever enter into the head of any man that these new lands are not as much subject to the taxation laws of the Parliament of Great Britain as the old lands,' seeing that they 'are equally protected by the same fleets and armies, and from the attacks of all their enemies.'

In 1776 Ramsay issued a pronouncement on the later developments of the American question. The pamphlet extends to sixty pages octavo. The title-page states that it is 'by the author of the Historical essay upon the English Constitution.' The only copy of this work known to the writer is in the Bodleian Library. It was followed up with a 'Succinct Review of the American Contest,' published in February 1778 when conciliatory measures were being considered by the House of Commons. The author represents the futility of peace hopes on the Government plan. 'Our proclaiming to our enemies that we must make peace with them because we are no longer able to carry on the war may serve to raise their laughter or contempt but will never move their compassion.' As there can be no limit to 'obedience of subjects to a supreme legislative power,' it follows 'that the war now carried on to enforce this unlimited obedience is a just and necessary war.' Whereupon Ramsay outlines a scheme for compelling the colonists 'by force to return to their duty and allegiance.' All British troops should be assembled in New York, and thereafter a proclamation addressed to each of the thirteen colonies, requesting them to disavow 'the pretended representation of their province at Congress' and to notify the commander of the British troops at New York of such repudiation, in which case the royal pardon would be granted. The recalcitrant colonies, again, would incur condign punishment, namely, the laying waste of their houses, lands, and goods by the army in New York, which would be of sufficient strength to preclude all idea of attack. If this 'amphibious mode of making war' were pursued energetically, Ramsay prophesied that Washington's army would 'immediately melt away like a snowball before a fire.'

Still Ramsay was inclined to be pessimistic, and the turn of events but increased his disappointment. An echo of his real feelings is to be found in a letter written to his friend, Lord Monboddo, in 1781 :

' I do not foresee any issue of the War which can be productive of a happy settlement for this Country. . . . It is easy to trace back the *cause* of the American Rebellion, and of all subsequent wars with France, Spain and Holland, to an error in the present constitution of the British State, in which no change has yet been attempted, or even thought necessary . . . and the utmost success in War which the most sanguine imagination can suggest, would, in my opinion, rather increase than remove the original evil, which was, such an extent of Riches and Territory as, while it tended to corrupt the legislature, at the same time weakened the executive part of our Government. . . . A *Free Empire* is a phrase which nothing recorded in History has yet authorised, and by what I can see of the progress of things, the History of England is not likely to entitle it to a place in the Dictionary. . . . I will venture to foretell that in a little time the people of Britain must either part with that *factious thing* which it is the fashion to call by the name of Liberty, or part with their extended Dominion in all the four quarters of the Globe ; and with it probably their own political existence as an independent State.'

Ramsay was also the unflinching champion of efficient government at home. For this cause he crossed swords with so formidable an antagonist as Edmund Burke. On Feb. 11, 1780, Burke made a speech in the House of Commons which drew from Ramsay an 'open Letter,' in which he accuses the renowned political thinker and orator of not exhibiting 'that *spirit of business* which distinguishes great statesmen,' and which cannot be compensated for by 'the most lively metaphors or the most harmonious periods.' While sympathising with Burke in his denunciation of the 'errors and extravagances in the expenditure of the public money,' he regrets that he suggested no remedial measures.

' I see in every part of your Speech much diligence, much information, and much arrangement, and it is in this respect both entertaining and instructive . . . but I perceive, at the same time, that it is the arrangement of a merchant or manufacturer whose thoughts go no farther than to increase the

net profits of his trade, by lessening the expenses of it. . . . In all this long Speech . . . there does not appear one political idea to direct or limit your economy.'

All that Ramsay can find in Burke's oration is the 'recommendation of practices implying principles and views perfectly incompatible with one another. . . . If you could only tell us what you would be at, an obscure friend like me might be perhaps able to help you in reducing it to effect, or in convincing you that it was impracticable.' Burke's speech, in short, is 'mere sound and fury, signifying nothing.' Ramsay winds up his 'open Letter' (dated London, March 13, 1780, and subscribed, 'I am, with great personal regard, your friend and well-wisher, Steady') with counsel which reveals his conservative leanings. He realises these defects in 'the administration of our government,' and says that in attempting to remedy them, it is important that the 'venerable Constitution' should be approached with 'a fearful and trembling hand.'

The Gordon Riots of 1780 were the occasion of another public declaration from Ramsay's pen, though the communication was represented as emanating from 'A Dilettante in Law and Politics.' The Court-painter in all probability was a spectator of that extraordinary scene of lawlessness (portrayed by Dickens in 'Barnaby Rudge') when members of the House of Commons had to fight their way to their homes, and the mob fairly pillaged and set fire to London before the military were called out. This reign of terror convinced Ramsay that the Riot Act, as it then stood, was totally ineffective, and in a treatise of thirty odd pages, published in 1781, he advocates drastic amendment. The most serious defect was the Act's 'undistinguished use' of the words 'unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously assembled.' Ramsay suggests various alterations, the principal being the substitution of a military officer in place of a peace officer, which would be but 'a restoration of the Common Law and ancient practice of England.' Ramsay quite realised that there was something incongruous, if not ludicrous, in a portrait-painter setting up as an interpreter of legal formulæ. Yet his 'Observations on the Riot Act' found favour with Lord Monboddo, one of the acutest of Scots jurisconsults of the eighteenth century. We learn this fact from a

letter which Ramsay addressed to his Lordship, already quoted in part and dated London, March 20, 1781.

'The approbation you were pleased to express in your last letter, of my "Observations on the Riot Act," joined to the like sentiments from other persons of undoubted judgment here, has encouraged me to bring the subject—by the help of a Newspaper—still more within the notice of the public; hoping by that means to stimulate our legislators to take into their serious consideration, how little *legal* security we have for our lives and properties against tumultuous outrage and violence. . . . Though my writings should not produce any change in our Statute Book, I shall not think my time or pains in composing them altogether thrown away.'

His doubts were justified: Ramsay was not successful in bringing about an amendment of the Riot Act. But his services at any rate witnessed to the intensity of his public spirit, to the laudable desire that law-abiding people should at all times have the utmost protection.

Two other essays in the 'Investigator' deserve exposition and comment. That, treating of the naturalisation of foreigners (a ticklish subject at all times), reached a second edition in 1762. Ramsay elaborates his theme with a perspicacity and originality which, if not calculated to make converts, is certainly enlivening. A surprising feature is that he is favourable to foreigners and critical of those who grumble at their immigration. The complaint that 'foreigners are employed in England in great numbers to the prejudice of the natives,' he characterises as a 'particular vulgarity,' and he has no patience with those who urge that foreigners take the bread out of the mouths of Britons. 'I should be glad to know what sort of a figure this island would make, if it were to refund to the Continent all those whose names shew them to be of foreign extraction.' Indeed, Ramsay goes as far as to say that those who discountenance alien immigration are definitely those who owe part of their bread 'to the general wealth which the industry of foreigners has brought into this country.'

Liberal space has been devoted to Ramsay's writings on public affairs because they reveal a new side of his personality and considerably extend the range of his

achievement. Hitherto he has been regarded solely as a professional artist of conspicuous ability, but a fairer estimate comprehends him as an earnest, thoughtful, and usually practically-minded student of history and contemporary politics, likewise of constitutional theory and practice. Ramsay was a well-equipped publicist who rendered useful service in the interests of efficient government and the maintenance of a happy and contented commonwealth. Admittedly, he was handicapped by his lack of political experience, but he was a shrewd observer and frequently a sagacious counsellor.

And with a deep interest in public questions was combined a fervent love of letters and of scholarship generally. Ramsay had received a liberal education, the foundation of which was a sound knowledge of the ancient classics. That is why he profited so much by his travels in Italy. Ostensibly he went there to study the great masters of Italian painting, but his richly stored and cultivated mind was powerfully affected by the classical traditions of the country. He drank deeply at the springs of Helicon. No one can read his manuscript essay on Horace's villa among the Sabine Hills without perceiving his enthusiasm for Latin literature. Nor was his knowledge limited to the authors of antiquity. He had a knowledgeable acquaintance with English literature, particularly with the writers of his own time. His essay on *Ridicule* is interlarded with passages from Addison, Pope, Swift, and the author of '*Hudibras*.' Addison's papers on '*The Pleasures of the Imagination*' were amongst his favourite reading, though he taxed the '*Spectator*' with inconsistency because that periodical had not singled out 'a constant attachment to Truth' as the basic principle of every work of art. Ramsay, however, is on challengeable ground when he affirms that 'the greatest poet, whenever he mistakes the bounds of his art so much as to endeavour to represent to others what the eye hath not seen nor the ear heard . . . is monstrous and ridiculous.'

It goes almost without saying that a person who evinced such genuine literary interests as Ramsay was especially fond of the society of men of letters. Indeed, judging by the frequency with which Johnson, Boswell, and many others sat at his table, he relished their company more than that of artists. But intellectual society

of any kind was congenial, for the things of the mind were charged with a deep significance for Ramsay.

Finally, his strong and forceful character was softened by an all-embracing humanity. Apart from his quite uncommon attainments, he had many attractive qualities. While Ramsay did not suffer fools gladly and could on occasion exercise a sharp tongue, his normal attitude to his fellow-men was one of friendliness, even of benignity. He had that touch of nature which makes the whole world kin, a legacy from his father, though its manifestation was without a trace of the vulgarity so characteristic of the author of the 'Gentle Shepherd.' As was natural in a man of his breeding and education, Ramsay's social gifts were displayed to most advantage in a cultured atmosphere, but he sought relations with all sorts and conditions, and an unfailing sense of humour marked his dealings with men of humbler station. In short, Allan Ramsay the Younger was a great and leal Scotsman, who acquitted himself with masterly power in more spheres than one, and therefore is deserving of enduring homage.

W. FORBES GRAY.

Art. 7.—BURMA.

1. *Modern Burma*. By J. L. Christian. University of California Press, 1942.
2. *Retreat in the East*. By O. D. Gallagher. Harrap & Co., 1942.
3. *What Happened in Burma*. By M. Thein Pe. Kitabistan, Allahabad, 1943.
4. *Retreat with Stilwell*. By Jack Belden. Cassell & Co., 1943.
5. *Red Moon Rising*. By George Rodger. Cresset Press, 1943.
6. *A Million Died*. By A. Wagg. Nicholson and Watson, 1943.
7. *Burma Surgeon*. By Gordon S. Seagrave. W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., New York, 1943.

FIVE of the books mentioned above are by American authors. This is a curious commentary on the interest taken in the Empire by the British public, and these five include, in Mr Christian's 'Modern Burma,' the only comprehensive book on Burma which has been written for a generation.

'Modern Burma' is a storehouse of information on every aspect of the country, political, economic, social, and even historical, though the historical section is necessarily a brief summary. It is an invaluable book of reference, admirably documented, and with a very complete bibliography, but a book of this nature is necessarily a little too detailed for the general reader. The author's objectivity is praiseworthy, but one sometimes wishes that he had been a little less hesitant in giving expression to his own views, which his long residence in the country and his concentrated study fully qualified him to express. The book is unfortunately marred by a few errors, most of them trivial, but one at least of major importance. He states that, in July 1940, the Secretary of State for India announced in Parliament that on the termination of this war 'His Majesty's Government will grant Burma a constitution which will enable her to take at once her due place as a fully self-governing and equal member of any Commonwealth or Federation of free nations that may be established as a result of the war.' This was what the Burmese asked, not what His Majesty's Government promised; all that was promised was the ultimate goal of Dominion Status.

The other books are all either about the war or have at least been inspired by the war. Mr Gallagher, Mr Wagg, Mr Belden, and Mr Rodger are all journalists, the first British and the last three American. Mr Rodger has a world-wide reputation as a photographer, and the illustrations to his book, all taken by himself, are admirable. The other three give more detailed descriptions of the campaign of 1942, and it is unfortunate that Mr Gallagher and Mr Belden adopt such a hostile attitude both to the Burmans and to the British authorities, civil and military. The Burma Campaign is a sad story, but the hasty impressions of journalists, who had no previous experience of the country, and who, in a campaign extending over such a huge area, could only be eye-witnesses of a small

proportion of the events and could know little of what lay behind them, need more collating and checking than either of these authors appear to have attempted. Mr Wagg has taken much more trouble; he met most of the leading personalities after the campaign was over, and records their accounts in great detail. He is critical, as he is well entitled to be, but he does make an honest attempt to present both sides of the case. Unfortunately the other two books had obtained a wide circulation, one in this country and one in the U.S.A., before Mr Wagg's book appeared to give a more balanced account.

Maung Thein Pe's little pamphlet is the only thing which has been so far written by a Burman, and is for that reason interesting. He frankly admits that he was won over by Japanese agents before the invasion and threw in his lot with them, but he soon became disillusioned and escaped to India. His disillusionment may have been partly due to his services not obtaining from the Japanese as much recognition as he expected, and his story must be received with some caution, but there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of his account of the activity of Japanese agents and of its success among the extremist politicians.

Dr Seagrave is an American medical missionary who ran a hospital on the Chinese frontier of the Shan States with conspicuous success for some years before the war. His book deals mainly with the story of his hospital, and only the last part deals with the campaign, when he and his staff converted themselves into a mobile hospital unit attached to the army. Even in this there is little criticism. Nobody who reads the book can fail to be inspired by the indomitable spirit of the author, who, with a party of locally trained nurses went through all the horrors of the evacuation with amazing courage.

It is too early yet for an authoritative account of the invasion of Burma, or for a full discussion of the causes of our failure to hold the country. But now that it is hoped that before long the position will be reversed, it is possible to summarise some of the criticisms, and to consider how far they are based on fact.

The immediate cause of the loss of Burma was that the forces available to defend the country were completely inadequate for the task. To guard a land frontier of

1,000 miles, there were at no time during the campaign more than two weak divisions, and even these had very little training in jungle warfare. For fifty years the garrison of Burma had been reduced, and finally it stood at two battalions of British infantry, four of the Burma Rifles, hardly any of whom had seen any service, a company of sappers and miners, and a battery of mountain artillery. There was no air force and the few airfields were hardly fit for large planes.

Behind this was a frontier force of seven battalions, whose duties were partly to man the frontier outposts and partly to act as armed police in the interior. They had very few British officers, hardly any arms except rifles, and no opportunity for training in larger formations than a company.

In spite of the size of the country and the length of its frontiers, this small force seemed sufficient, and the only time it was necessary to call for reinforcements in the last fifty years was during the rebellion of 1931, when about two brigades had to be sent from India. Few countries in the world appeared more secure from external attack. To the north-west lay India, to the north Tibet, to the north-east China, and to the east and south-east French Indo-China and Siam. Much of the frontier ran along mountain ranges; not a single railway connected Burma with any of the neighbouring countries, and until the construction of the Burma Road, the only trans-frontier roads were very indifferent mule tracks. In addition to her apparent natural security, none of her neighbours were aggressive or seemed likely to become so. The idea of an invasion by land was never seriously contemplated, and no part of the frontier appeared more secure than the extreme south, where the mountains divide the Tenasserim Division of Burma from the tongue of Siam which runs down to Malaya. No troops had been stationed in this part of the country for forty years, and it is doubtful if even a military intelligence officer had visited this frontier more than two or three times in recent years. Even the civil officials knew little about the frontier tracts which were so sparsely inhabited that they provided no work and were seldom visited. It was here that the blow first fell.

How far could the defences of Burma have been

strengthened before the invasion took place? The first warning came with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, but there was little reason then to suppose that this would affect Burma. The frontier province of Yunnan was in the remotest corner of China, and even when the Japanese occupied the Pacific ports, there was still the railway from Hanoi in French Indo-China to Kunming, which was a shorter and easier route than from Rangoon. The Chinese, however, were not content to depend on this, and set to work to convert the old pack-road to Burma into a motor road, leading down to the rail-head at Lashio. The danger came closer in 1940 when France collapsed and Indo-China accepted the Vichy Government, and when, a few months later, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

The difficulties of reinforcing Burma were very great. Our own war effort, slow enough in starting, had been set back by our losses at Dunkirk; we were facing the imminent danger of invasion, and every man, every gun, and every plane was required to defend our own shores. Other theatres of war nearer home were clamouring for reinforcements and nothing could be spared from here. India, as slow in starting as Britain, had to look west as well as east, and could give little help. In Burma itself not much could be done. Defence was reserved to the Governor and was outside the control of the Legislature, but the Governor had to consult his Finance Minister, and any increase in the Defence Budget meant that less revenue was available for other more popular objects. One of the main arguments in favour of the separation of Burma from India, which had taken place in 1937, was that, as a province of India, Burma had contributed too much to the defence of India, the most important part of which was on the North-West Frontier, whose interest to Burma was very remote. Any large increase in expenditure on defence so soon after separation would have been very unpopular. It was not easy to increase the number of men in the armed forces, for the Burmese, who form three-quarters of the population of the country, do not take kindly to regular military service. Even if the men could be recruited, the necessary arms and equipment were almost unobtainable. Some steps were taken; recruitment was speeded up, airfields were constructed,

and the garrison was strengthened from India. But Malaya also was threatened, and Malaya with its great naval base of Singapore received preferential treatment. At the beginning this was no doubt right, for the military garrison of Malaya was almost more exiguous than that of Burma, but whether this preference should have been continued as long as it was is open to question. If the final reinforcements which reached Singapore only just in time to surrender had been diverted to Rangoon, it might have made the defence of Burma considerably easier.

No official account of the invasion has been published and the accounts which appeared in the Press at the time gave a very confusing picture of the campaign, which has not been made much clearer by the books which have since been written. Some of the criticisms are probably justified ; our forces, weak enough in any case, were made weaker by being scattered too far in small detachments, particularly in the south, where too much reliance was placed on the difficulties of the country. Of the detachments at Tavoy, Mergui, and Victoria Point, the first and largest was surrounded and captured almost without a fight, and the other two had to be evacuated, and we were rapidly driven back to defend Moulmein and the Salween River. Once Moulmein was lost those who knew Burma felt that there was little hope. The road to Rangoon was open, and even before Rangoon fell reinforcement had become almost impossible. The narrow approach up the river and the Rangoon harbour was only half an hour's flying time from Moulmein. The Japanese could bring in as many troops as they liked, and they had overwhelming air-superiority, and could afford to disregard the heavy losses which the R.A.F. and the A.V.G. inflicted on them in the opening stages of the campaign. The loss of most of our artillery and transport by the premature destruction of the Sittang bridge made the situation more hopeless, but probably made no difference to the final result. The rest of the story is that of a gallant retreat against heavy odds, through difficult country at the hottest time of the year. It is a pity that the retreat rather than the gallantry was the aspect which attracted the attention of most of the critics, who lost no chance of hunting for scapegoats.

The military have been taken to task not only for

dissipating their forces, but on other grounds. Poor intelligence, particularly of events across the Siamese frontier, and a lack of liaison officers and interpreters to make contact with the Burman population may have had some foundation, but a more serious charge is that of refusing offers of help from China until it was too late. That offers were made by China and were not immediately accepted has been admitted, the reason given being that the offers were contingent on our supplying food and transport which we were unable to guarantee. Such a guarantee could not have been given by the military without the support of the civil administration, and the Burmese Ministry did not welcome the idea of large Chinese armies entering the country. When the Chinese troops did come, they rendered one notable service at the Yenangyaung oil-fields on the Irrawaddy, where a British force was in imminent danger of being surrounded and extinguished. Unfortunately they failed to hold the Japanese in the south of the Shan States, and it was the rapid break-through past Taunggyi and up to Lashio and beyond which finished the campaign and forced the British columns to abandon any attempt to hold Upper Burma and to retreat across the mountains into Assam.

The civil administration has, in Burma as in Malaya, come in for even more severe criticism than the military. They are said to have failed to enlist the sympathy of the people against the aggressors, with the result that such of the population as were not merely apathetic were definitely pro-Japanese. They are accused of failure to organise Civil Defence measures, and it has been said that the administration broke down at an early stage of the campaign. The usual charges have also been brought against the British commercial community, who have been pictured in some quarters as whisky-swilling money-grubbers, who failed to realise that there was a war on at all.

Some of the stories which have been published have no foundation in fact; others may have some basis, but are far from typical. If there was a redeeming feature in Burma one would have thought it was the scorched earth policy, which was carried out with ruthless efficiency, mainly by the engineers of the commercial firms and the Port Trust, but even this was criticised in some quarters.

No doubt there were individual failures, and no doubt incorrect rumours were flying about ; the Government publicity organisation was not of the best, and cannot be absolved of all responsibility for allowing such stories to spread.

Civil Defence measures were admittedly inadequate, but the difficulties were formidable. In Rangoon underground shelters are impossible owing to the high water-level, and shelters of any kind made little appeal to a people who have always looked on escape to the jungle as their natural resource in time of danger. But the main trouble was the impossibility of coping with fires. Except for the centre of Rangoon, Burmese towns are built mainly of wood and bamboo, and in the hot weather a few loads of incendiaries are enough to reduce the place to ashes. Fire fighting appliances hardly existed and were unobtainable from other countries ; even if they could have been imported there were no adequate water-supply systems. As a result nearly every town in Burma was burnt to the ground in a few weeks.

The two first raids on Rangoon at Christmas started a gigantic exodus which brought the normal life of the city almost to a standstill. Enough people returned to resume work to a limited extent, but both Government and business activities were seriously restricted. The civil administration was disorganised, but it carried on. Local officers in the districts were given wide discretionary powers, and only left their posts under orders as the army retreated. The danger may not have been foreseen as clearly as it should have been, but when it came things moved so rapidly that little could be done.

The real truth is hard to ascertain in such a rapidly moving confused period, but a few conclusions are warranted. In the first place it may be candidly admitted that our rule was not beloved by the Burmans. They have a strong nationalist sentiment, and an ingrained dislike of all foreigners. Owing to their isolated geographical position and their distaste for emigration they know little of other races, except those who live in Burma of whom the Chinese, the Indians, and the British are the only ones of importance. Of these the Indians are the most unpopular, and the causes of this are natural enough. As long as Burma was a province of India, there was no

way of restricting Indian immigration, and over a million Indians were in the country, mostly permanent residents and the rest migrant labourers. Owing to their greater aptitude for business the bulk of the India-Burma commerce was in their hands, as well as much of the local trade. Owing to their powers of concentration and their earlier start in Western education they had acquired a dominating position in the professions. The Indian labouring classes until recent years did almost all the heavy work, such as dock-labour, railway and road construction, and also much of the harvesting for which the more prosperous Burmese were ready enough to hire them. Finally, the money-lending Chettyars had in the nineteenth century provided the finance necessary for the rapid expansion of cultivation in Lower Burma, and had become mortgagees of most of the land. The Chettyars were not land grabbers and had little wish to foreclose as long as they received their interest, but naturally a certain amount of land passed into their hands even in normal times, and this process was accelerated by the depression in the last decade. By 1937, it was estimated that a quarter of the land in Lower Burma had passed into the hands of the Chettyars, another quarter into the hands of other landlords, many of whom were Indians, and most of the remaining half was under mortgage. The agricultural debt was reckoned in 1930 at nearly 40% million.

The effect of this on a country which had consisted almost entirely of small owner-cultivators was catastrophic, and the British Government was widely blamed for allowing such a change in the social structure to come about, and it cannot altogether divest itself of responsibility. At the same time the rapid increase of population had led to the growth of a class of landless labourers who could no longer find unoccupied land as easily as their fathers and grandfathers had. When they looked for other work they found themselves faced by the competition of Indian labourers who were willing to work for lower wages and were often more efficient. It is not surprising that restriction of Indian immigration was one of the outstanding demands after separation.

The British and Chinese, who together with the Indians had nearly all the commerce and industry of Burma in their hands, were also targets for the usual

charge of 'exploitation.' The development of the country, the general rise in the standard of living, and the advantages of a settled administration were forgotten by the younger generation which had never experienced the chaos and oppression of the Burmese regime. The slogan 'Burma for the Burmese' had a great appeal, and the extreme nationalists fell an easy prey to Japanese agents. At the same time there is little reason to think that there was any general pro-Japanese feeling in the country. Dr Seagrave says, 'I doubt whether, of the Burmese themselves, more than 10 per cent. are Fifth Columnists, and certainly 10 per cent. are completely loyal,' and he is probably about right. Too much was made of the small Fifth Column element, which was no doubt recruited largely by extremist young politicians from the lawless class which takes so readily to rebellion in Burma. Unfortunately the idea spread among the troops that every Burman was a potential if not an actual enemy, which was not the case. It is sincerely to be hoped that this idea will not prevail when our troops re-enter the country. The friendship of the Burman can easily be won by those who know how to approach him, but if treated roughly or with suspicion he is very apt to become unhelpful or even actively hostile.

The recovery of Burma is essential for many reasons. Not only does it afford the easiest access to China from the west, but it is quite impossible to allow the Japanese to remain on the borders of India. Above all, the United Nations are sworn to put down aggression and the Burman must be liberated from the Japanese yoke as surely as the Dutch or the Norwegians from the Nazi yoke. The vital problem is what the future of Burma is to be after the Japanese have been driven out.

The Burmese have a proverb which says 'When two buffaloes fight the grass is trodden down,' and it must have been often in their minds during the last two years. It will be lamentable if they look on us as the second buffalo, instead of as the armed man come to destroy the wild beasts who have laid waste their once green and pleasant land. If we want them to take the latter view we must make their future destiny as clear as possible to them before we return.

At first there will have to be a period of military

occupation, but it is to be hoped that this will be as short as possible with due regard to security. The Burmans are not overfond of the military; they are still apt to think in the old-fashioned terms of 'the brutal and licentious soldiery,' and if Maung Thein Pe's accounts are to be believed, the Japanese occupation will have done little to eradicate this idea. The easy-going attitude to life of the Burman is not one to consort well with the pretty stiff discipline which a military occupation, even with the best intentions, must of necessity involve. Civil officers have already been appointed to assist the military authorities in administrative matters, but for everybody's benefit a return to civil administration as soon as possible is desirable.

The first tasks of the new administration will be to restore law and order and to rehabilitate the country. The restoration of law and order took five years after the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, when the Burmese army broke up into dacoit gangs. The same thing is likely to happen again, but the dacoits will this time have a considerable number of tommy-guns and other modern weapons, instead of antiquated muskets. Maung Thein Pe's story of the way the Burmans themselves dealt with dacoits after the invasion shows that the bulk of the people will be ready enough to help us to restore order. This is natural enough, for the Burman dacoit preys chiefly on his own fellow-countrymen. Even with cooperation from the law-abiding Burmans it will, however, be a difficult undertaking.

The task of rehabilitation will be even longer and much more expensive. Fortunately Burma is mainly an agricultural country, whose wealth lies in its paddy fields, which even total war cannot seriously damage. But its agriculture is a vast industry and the welfare of the people depends on their ability to market their surplus crop for export as much as on the actual operations of husbandry. The transport system of the country has been virtually destroyed, there is not likely to be much left of the Rangoon Port facilities or of the rice-mills, and shipping to take the rice to India where it is badly needed will be a difficulty. The forest industry will be equally affected; the trees will still be there, but it takes a minimum of three years, often extended to seven or even more,

for a standing teak tree to reach Rangoon and be converted into timber. The oil wells and refineries were completely demolished, and it will be some years before they can be working again at anything like the former rate of output.

Finally, nearly every town in Burma has been burnt to the ground. The vast majority of the houses were built of materials which are obtainable within a few miles, and the Burman is as accustomed to fires as the European used to be in the Middle Ages, but never before have fires been experienced on this country-wide scale, and state-assistance to rebuild will be essential. What the cost of all this reconstruction will be cannot be estimated with any approach to accuracy, but it may easily run to 100% million or more.

Another item which will have to be considered is the agrarian debt, which, as stated earlier, was estimated in 1930 at nearly 40% million. It is unthinkable that the Chettyars should be allowed to return and resume their hold over the peasantry of the country, and some means will have to be devised of paying them off and returning the land to the cultivators, presumably on a system of long-term loans.

To raise the money necessary to put Burma on her feet again will be quite beyond the means of the country, whose revenues amounted at the most to about 12% million. The Burmans are not likely to agree that it should be paid out of loans raised on the security of their revenues, even if the money-markets of the world would put up the money on this security. How much should be paid by this country, how much, ultimately, by Burma, and how much by the commercial interests concerned, will take a lot of hard thinking, which has indeed already commenced.

All this leads to the political future of Burma, and here something more definite than has been promised in the past will have to find a place in our programme, if cooperation by the Burmans is to be forthcoming, and without such cooperation the task will be infinitely more difficult. 'The ultimate goal of Dominion Status' is a phrase which has lost any attraction it may once have had. If we are going to help to reconstruct the country and pay a generous share of the cost, we have a right

to demand a reasonable period of control, but only a fixed period is likely to satisfy Burman aspirations. Also the commercial firms can hardly be expected to return to Burma and recommence operations without security of tenure, and it is no good thinking that the Burmans could reopen the large industries of the country within any reasonable time with their own resources.

How far Burma is fit for full self-government or what form of government will best suit her economic, social, and political conditions are questions which cannot be discussed in the limits of this article. She was promised that separation from India would not prejudice her prospects of constitutional advance, and that promise has to be implemented. Though Burma has not to face such difficulties as India has in the caste-system and the Hindu-Moslem problem, she has difficulties of her own. Between 20 and 25 per cent. of the indigenous inhabitants are non-Burmese, the Shans, the Karens, the Kachins, the Chins, and numerous other hill tribes, none of whom would welcome Burmese domination. Also the country has a very short experience of politics and administration, and there is a grave danger of the reins falling into the hands of political careerists who are not the best representatives of the people.

The Burman can hardly have gone through the trials of this war without realising a few hard and not very palatable facts. One of these is that a country of the size and nature of Burma cannot stand up against aggression by larger powers any more than Siam could in 1941. If the facts are properly presented it will be clear to every thinking Burman that the country must fall into the orbit of some great power, either the British Commonwealth of Nations, or China, or Japan, or, if India is going to assume independence, India. It is very doubtful if he would prefer any of the other three. Not a single Burman would wish to be dominated by India, and they have not much love for China, though the danger of an influx of Chinese cheap labour, which was used by some politicians as an argument against the Burma Road, was probably much exaggerated. They are not likely to have any illusions left about the Japanese.

Burma is to most of us a far-away and unimportant fragment of the Empire of which little was known. More

has been written about it in the last two years than in the previous half-century. But the spotlight which has been so suddenly turned on it is not going to be turned off immediately the Japanese are driven out. For one thing, China is likely to want a permanent approach through Rangoon. For another, the Government of the British Empire has ceased to be a matter which concerns only Britain, and Burma is likely to be made a test-case of British sincerity with regard to the future of what is often called, particularly in America, 'the British Colonial system.' Both Americans and Chinese fought with us to defend Burma, and are going to fight with us to recover it, and they are already asking what is going to be done with it after it is recovered. The future of Burma may be of real importance in securing the stability of the future world order.

F. BURTON LEACH.

Art. 8.—BRITAIN AT WAR.

FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS has rendered many a service to those causes for which the Allied nations are now at war since the far off days when he was an active, though always an honoured, enemy in the field against us ; but it is to be doubted whether he has ever rendered a greater than than he did at the Guildhall in late October in emphasising publicly so that every one might hear a truth that is of course well known to all students of history, both military and civil, but is often obscure to the generality of critics, namely, the fact that the importance of battles is to be found not in their size but in their results, their influence, strategic and political, upon the course of the conflict of which they formed a part. Zama and Senlac are examples ; or, in modern times, Waterloo, where the number of British engaged was about that of a single division of to-day and the battle lasted but one summer's day, yet it was quite definitely one of the really decisive battles of the world. And so it is just to bracket El Alamein with Stalingrad and name them as the glorious

pair of victories that marked, decisively, the turning of the huge tide of this global war.

Throughout this autumn of 1943, when the war entered upon its fifth year of desolation and slaughter, it has been specially helpful to have had this truth brought so authoritatively to mind. Tremendous as have been the events and decisive as has been the swing, it has not been, up at any rate to the date on which I now write (November 5), the British, and still less the Americans who have outwardly been the forerunners of victory. We have been, so it appears on the surface of events, plodding on dourly, steadily, slowly; the Russian armies, on the contrary, have been sweeping all before them in a continual crescendo of superlative onslaughts until words like 'rout' and 'disintegration' begin to make their grim appearance in the description of the plight of the German troops desperately endeavouring to stem the vast drives and, at all costs, keep the Russian avengers from the soil of Germany. 'At all costs'—so has, we read, the order frequently gone out from Hitler's Headquarters, whether from the new edition of the 'little corporal' himself or in his mythical name matters not: such and such a place is to be so held—and already each lies behind the line of the Russian advance.

In comparison with progress in Italy, that advance seems gigantic, and, measured in miles and masses, so it unquestionably is. That a sense of disappointment, of irritation, and almost of frustration should have made itself manifest amongst us is therefore not wholly surprising, and the abortive attempt to seize Cos has added to that.* It is some measure of the magnitude of Mr Churchill's hold over Parliament, the Press, and the people of this country—and of the United States also—that these senses of disappointment, irritation, and frustration have never developed into anything more than the traditional British grumble. It may well be that days, and perhaps even weeks, before 1944 breaks with its great glow upon the anxiously awaiting world we shall have outrun anticipation: we have done it before and we have not yet lost the art of being quite appreciably more efficient and less stupid than we sometimes seem; we

* And now (November 17) Leros also.

remain, as a race, one of the world's enigmas, which is both baffling and vexatious for our enemies. But, however that may be and whatever developments lie now uneasily in the womb of the immediate future, we can counter our comparisons between Russian progress in the Ukraine, the Crimea, and elsewhere along that tremendous Eastern front and British and American progress up from Naples and Termoli on that mined road to Rome of which General Alexander has drily spoken by a reference to Clough's 'Say not the struggle naught availeth.' There can be little doubt that—apart altogether from the direct results that must ensue as soon as we launch our offensives from Sardinia and Corsica upon the west and from the Adriatic coast upon the east—the Italian fighting has very materially assisted that Russian progress that has been the admiration and even astonishment of all beholders.

But over and above the war on land, by sea, and in the air, running parallel with those victories which are so surely bringing the defeat of the enemy within measurable contemplation—to put it no higher—we have seen with deeply appreciative minds, since I wrote last on August 10, a most marked and entirely welcome advance in those fields of international cooperation upon which, as soon as victory is secured, the temple of Peace must be raised. The advance is an integral part of the securing of victory, but without it no victory, however militarily complete, would be worth the depths of suffering, the degrees of sacrifice to which the human race is now exposed. It was not out of a mere whim that the Prime Minister spoke at Harvard on the subject of 'basic English,' thereby at once stimulating an agreeable, if slightly academic, acerbity amongst literary folk in general. His speech was all in accord with the spirit of the Fulbright resolution in the United States House of Representatives supporting by a surprisingly big majority the participation of that dominant democracy in international machinery for the maintenance of permanent peace. And this very day (November 5) that is more than confirmed by the passing of the Connally resolution in the Senate by 85 votes to 5. Cooperation between the Allies not merely now but hereafter is the basic spirit of the autumn of 1943.

Gone for ever is the last hope of the Axis—if indeed our enemies have any justification now for thinking of

themselves as an Axis : Germany and her 'honorary Aryans' of Japan can hardly make a tricycle now that the third wheel is no more than the egregious individual, Benito Mussolini. The one and only hope remaining for either Germany or Japan has been to sow dissension between the Allies, and that is desiccated even before germination. Anglo-American understanding was never more firmly rooted, and now we have had the Moscow Conference : there the leading countries, said Mr Cordell Hull succinctly, abandoned 'the hermit route to isolationism.'

The British, for all the glories of their poetry, have often been accused of lacking imagination : we have at least never suffered from a lack of common-sense. To us the outcome of the Moscow Conference was almost a matter of course : failure would have spelt a major disaster to the whole prosecution of the war and ruined the prosperity of peace, failure, therefore, could not be contemplated. But, as history has repeatedly proved, nations are not always governed by such straight-forward thoughts : and the 'tremendous success'—to quote President Roosevelt—of that Conference is, in truth, one of the greatest things that has ever happened in the history of the human race.

One of my favourite philosophic couplets is to be found in the third book of 'Paradise Regained' :—

'All things are best fulfilled in their due time,
And time there is for all things, Truth has said.'

This Conference and the agreement springing from it come in their due time, ripened slowly, it may be, but all the more surely for that slowness. What is almost a matter of course to the average citizen here, surveying as best he may the war as a whole and the prospects of peace thereafter, is not so obvious, or rather has not been so, universally. Here its success has fulfilled expectation, in America it has exceeded it. And had this Conference come earlier, it might either not have succeeded or might not have been, what it will now assuredly be proved to be, the corner-stone for the rebuilding of the world. It is in harmony with this general fulfilment in due time that shortly before the Conference took place peace again graced the relations between State and Church in Russia

and our Archbishop of York could make his adventurous and fruitful visit. In that connection let me interpolate a story that I have recently heard: a Bishop lay awake far into the small hours, worrying over the miseries of the warring world, until at last he felt he heard the voice of God saying to him, 'Now you go to sleep and I'll keep watch for the rest of the night.' Except only that the hour still calls on all not to sleep but to labour yet more resolutely to the end, we might indeed all do worse than adopt the faith of that sentence, as we give thanks for our salvation.

Indeed, even the heathen might feel that, beyond weak mortality, some mighty force has stirred on his behalf, as he thinks back over the great, grim pathway of the last four years. That we have stood up to the strain all observers generously acknowledge; but that it has required standing up to and is now producing its psychological results is not so fully admitted. It is, however, noticeable now how differently human beings react. Apart from the sporadic and intermittent outbreaks and threatenings of strikes, which are serious and indeed beyond justification, there is clearly discernible now what one might call a response to war conditions, and it is markedly diverse. Few people continue on that same even keel which was theirs in 1939: they are either much more cooperative or much less. Either, that is to say, a stranger will answer your question or request with every possible reaction of good-will, go out of his or her way to help, and reply with sympathy and humour—which is very frequently the case—or he or she will snap surlily, or (more annoying still) pretend not to hear, this last a favourite device of uncooperating tradespeople. There seems now to be few half-way houses, and it is a matter of congratulation and pride that the cheery folk who have added to their stocks of human kindness as a result of war experience outnumber—on the whole—those who, starting with little, now have less.

This is, perhaps, the more commendable because, undoubtedly, though our Government chiefs and staff have tried, and are trying, very hard and conscientiously, to mitigate the inevitable strain of these times, anomalies still remain—and amongst these that of our pension system seems to be prominent. I know of one case where an

elderly woman has to travel every week to a town fifteen miles away to draw her sick husband's money, surely a monstrous piece of red tape, especially as it entails seven miles of walking from cottage to nearest bus-stop. And it is still true that thrift is officially penalised: if, for instance, a couple, by years of carefulness, have saved enough to keep them from starvation, then they must live upon those savings until those are gone, after which they can receive State support. That may be logic and it is certainly fact; but it is in direct contradiction to the spirit of the exhortations of Lord Kindersley and his colleagues on the War Savings campaigns: better is it in such circumstances, would say any reasoner, to blow in all you earn and have a good time whilst you may, sure of ultimate State support to all, however undeserving. Only pride and patriotism prevail against such reasoning; and of both there is, happily, abundance.

It is, of course, at no time easy to follow the mental processes of others and in times of great upheavals it is harder than ever: pride and patriotism are not the prerogatives of the elderly; in no age, not even in 1914-18, have the young shown so much, and yet there is a very singular indifference—or at least an outward and apparent indifference—on the part of many of the young to the world-shaking drama in which they have to live. I have been in company with young people over and over again at 9 p.m., and seldom indeed have I seen any fail to pick up a book when the news begins, deliberately, it would appear, closing their minds to the strains and stresses, the sufferings—and the heroisms. No one could conceivably suppose them to be indifferent in reality: many have been in, or are about to be in, one or other of the Services whose endeavours and gallantry is being recorded. It must therefore be due to a sub-conscious kind of self-defence, a turning away, as far as that is allowable or possible, from the abnormality of war into those thoughts of quietude which are the true cradle of the spirit. And that, in reality, is an advantage, a preservation of the balance of mind which is needful now and will hereafter be more and more essential.

On the whole, by and large, as one of my American friends was so fond of saying, to counter-balance a little the enormous evils and losses of war, there has been

unlooked-for gain in hitherto little-regarded directions. Vast numbers of people, for instance, have learnt, perforce, the use of their hands in jobs that in more leisured and more moneyed times were done for them by others. One of the 'sayings of the week' recorded in one of our Sunday newspapers was the heart-felt 'I hate washing up!' of a very distinguished, and now retired, Service chief: it is an exclamation which endears by reason of its naturalness and yet it is philosophically wrong. Washing up is a perpetual necessity and so doubtless at times undesired and wearisome; but it is not, as once we were prone to think it, unskilled labour. Many who in the days of peace so thought it now recognise sorrowfully that they in attempting it have found that the pieces of crockery that 'came in two in their hands' were unduly numerous, and only by practice and care can smashes be avoided. Similarly, in many another task or chore, unattempted in the leisurely days, much more skill is recognised as required than was previously imagined. 'The older I grow,' remarked one of the two wisest women I know, 'the more I love taking pains': it is a philosophy of inestimable merit, and in these times it has come to many who have tackled their war-jobs, national and important or domestic and seemingly small, in the right spirit. In short, the pressure of war necessity has emphasised one of the oldest of truths, namely, that there are no little jobs, even as Browning declared in the last three lines of 'Pippa passes.' May we not forget it when peace returns to grace the travailing earth.

To many people this philosophy has been renewed in the Home Guard. That remarkable organisation may indeed be described as indigenous, the direct descendant of the Saxon fyrd: but in the changed social structure of to-day it has linked in a very real corporation men of entirely different peace-time occupations, and in rural districts it has certainly given to scores who dwelt in the country but either worked in towns or were leisured or retired a vastly increased knowledge of the life and work of the agriculturalist. It has proved to these scores what the farmer and others of his kind knew well enough but was not generally recognised, that the agricultural labourer, far from being unskilled, is the exponent of at least half a dozen skilled operations: in the rural Home

Guard battalions, as has been established, half the men are qualified, automatically as it were, to be regarded as efficient pioneers. Yet the organisation is remarkable, militarily also, and that more than ever now when it is fully matured and continues to go strong is fully recognised. It is not quite like anything else that has been before, even of its predecessors : it consists primarily of neighbours and friends, and, if that makes for understanding, it makes also for difficulties which could only be overcome, as overcome they have been, by good-will. Without good-will it would be quite impossible to command those with whom the commander is on terms of social intimacy, under whom, it sometimes is, he carries on his life as a civilian. It is of course true that the Home Guard is part of the Army and a recalcitrant can be punished—not by the military, be it noted, but by a prosecution in the civil courts, an anomaly peculiarly British. But the evoking of such a punishment is tantamount to an admission of failure—and how few of these, among the many hundreds of thousands, there have been !

No, the Home Guard has been a quite extraordinary example of the working of British democracy : as has been remarked, in no other country in the world—certainly not in such times of unrest and strain as the present—could all that great number of men which compose it be given arms, arms too which so many keep by their bedsides, without the slightest risk that these would be wrongly used or will not be freely surrendered when the tyranny of war be overpassed. Democracy has come in for hard knocks : it has even been described as ‘the election by the uneducated of the incompetent to legislate for the indifferent.’ Yet it has proved capable of enduring the strains even of this conflict, and of growing under them ; and occasionally we have very simple, and yet all-sufficing, proofs of its reality. One such seemed to come to me the other day when I chanced to notice our Deputy Prime Minister having lunch alone at a club ; no one bothered him, and he was able quietly to have his meal and read a book for recreation and go his way without ceremony, palaver, or fuss of any kind whatsoever. Not so are the Goerings and those having authority in the lands of totalitarianism.

We are far indeed from any surrender of our democratic

ways, no matter what degree of direction we allow to our rulers ; and in spite of the centripetal tendency of war and the vast increase of State control we still react vigorously in favour of individualism : the emphatic rejection by the British Medical Association of a State medical service by as many as 200 votes to 10 is a proof. We do not, and it is earnestly to be hoped we never will, accept as inevitably right the ukases of Governments ; and every now and again—just to show, perhaps, that they are human and therefore fallible, one or other of our principal leaders gives utterance to some statement which we all know will certainly not stand the test : I noted by way of example Mr Bevin's emphatic pronouncement to the Trades Union Congress on one of the most important aspects of demobilisation : ' we will not,' declared Mr Bevin, ' submit to the demand for key-men,' and added that the policy of the Government was ' first in, first out.' It was applauded, since it sounded sensible or at any rate fair—and no one is stronger on fairness than the Englishman ; and yet there can be no one who has any memories of the months immediately succeeding the Armistice of 1918 who will not feel assured that such a policy is quite impracticable : it is exactly on all fours with the decision of the War Cabinet of Mr Lloyd George in December 1918, to demobilise at one and the same moment the whole of what was then known as Class 43, consisting of ' students and teachers '—a purely political decision, it would seem, since Universities and Colleges wanted their teachers first and their students afterwards and viewed with dismay having both thrown back at them together. It sounded well ; but it worked very badly. Similarly, key-men—genuine key-men, that is, not faked—must come first or chaos inevitably must result. And now Mr Bevin has embarked upon the thorny path of securing fair conditions for domestic workers, as to which it is as yet too early to say much except that it is not quite clear who is going hereafter to afford any.

On another matter it is, I hope, permissible to be critical also of departmental regulation : earnestly, even vehemently are we all exhorted to follow the narrow pathway of strict economy and not least in the matter of clothes. Rigidly in what are curiously known as ' utility ' garments are turn-ups of trousers and double-breasted

coats eschewed : but the members of that very fine body, the W.R.N.S., have an issue of blouses with long sleeves coupled with a ruling that sleeves are to be worn rolled up—which sounds illogical and wasteful of many and many a yard of material. Moreover, white is hardly the most economical of colours in which to work, especially when work may consist of scrubbing floors.

All things, we know, change, and fashions quicker than most. In another article of dress economy has prevailed and, to save leather, there has lately been a change which has about it almost a ring of sadness, namely, the passing of the Sam Browne belt. With what pride up to now, in the last war and in this, was that shining and apparently intricate piece of leather surveyed, donned, and polished, the hall-mark of officerdom, and how many, in 1939 and onwards, have resumed their old belts, rescuing them from backs of cupboards or old chests and proudly strapped them on—often only to find that they would not meet by many inches ; alternatively, to draw them, almost with arrogance, to the very same hole as of yore ! And now they are no longer an essential part of an officer's equipment : how is the mighty fallen ! It is a decision not only in keeping with the need for economy in leather but with the new training for war. In 1914 and 1915 we became officers without previous knowledge of the arts and necessities of war : we learnt upon the *corpora vilia* of our platoons and—perhaps—upon the enemy. That was feasible in the static warfare of the trenches ; but it was in reality indefensible and gave way, inevitably, to the cadet system. Now training for a commission is far more prolonged, far more strenuous, far more professional, and so far more fitted to the terribly exigent demands of swiftly moving, mechanised war.

One of the greatest difficulties in writing any commentary upon anything so tremendous as the events of these times, even with the limitation of their effect upon Britain—which is in reality a limitation in name alone as long as British effort bestrides the globe—is to attain to any degree of consecutiveness. Change is everywhere, welcomed or regretted : but it is not a case of 'change and decay in all around we see,' but of change and new growth, the awakening, with and in all the terrible pangs of birth, of the new world, which is not to be confused in

any way with the 'New Order'—that, as we of the Allies recognise, is but old tyranny writ large. And I must swing away again from some of these internal changes and tendencies to some that have their bearing upon more than ourselves. First, I have recently had experience of three things, generosity, prosperity, and Anglo-American friendship all combined into one. As is known, in 1940, in the days when invasion of these islands was so imminent that it seemed specially desirable to remove children from the terror to come, many were sent overseas to generous foster-parents in the Dominions and United States of America, and neither to the latter nor to Canada could or can any sums beyond a very small monthly allowance be sent from these islands, for reasons of currency security. The Kinsmen Trust, to give after the war reciprocal benefits to the children or relatives of these foster-parents, has accordingly been instituted, and I have the honour of being its Chairman; in that capacity I recently wrote an article explaining its purposes and I immediately received from one old playmate what he called 'a small contribution' as a token of his belief in friendship between the two great democracies and in return for kindness and fair dealing shown him by Americans, the one condition of his gift being that it should be treated as anonymously given. Enclosed as the 'small contribution' was a cheque for 1,000/.

That the friendly feeling between us and the United States is a reality was most strongly attested to me by an arriving American officer: he told me that, though such arrival has long lost the stimulus of novelty, nevertheless hour after hour smiling, cheering children clustered to greet him and his compatriots—and he emphasised that these came solely to welcome and not in hope of receiving 'candy' or other luxuries: it impressed him, he said (and he was one who had known England well in peace) very deeply. Not to leave out other parts of the Commonwealth of Nations let me quote from a letter recently received from an American officer serving in New Guinea: 'our services,' he wrote, 'are usually combined with the Australians, a joint Episcopal, Church of England service. It makes for good fellowship and good-will,' and he added, 'The Archbishop of Canterbury has stood as a kind of Sir Galahad of Christianity. The longer this goes on the

more definitely pro-British I become.' Of the Australian troops he wrote, 'The fighting here is going to take a lot of learning on our part, from the Aussies. They have the knack of doing more with less than any group I have known.' And, generally, between those two great existences amusingly described by 'Life' as 'the interminable, low-roofed dinginess of London' and 'the fast, rootless, telephonic life of New York' links forged with hoops of steel are being grappled to both souls.

Common-sense again at work upon common interest: 'united we stand,' and we know it. And this knowledge is strong enough to be proof against the pin-pricks and the rubs. It is, we are well aware, in fact, for most of our long history we have been well aware, the fashion to disparage the British, and the English most of all. We do it ourselves: *ergo*, some of it must be true—and do we care? Undeniably it must be very irritating to others how little we are troubled by their criticisms: as one foreigner, exasperated into speech, is said to have exclaimed, 'We don't mind your being superior; but we do object to your being so superior you don't mind whether we mind your being superior or not!' Between our temperaments and those of Americans there is, in truth, so fundamental a difference that, with good-will, it makes for abiding interest and stimulating cooperation, and, without good-will, makes for jealousies and controversy. As the good-will is present, all is well: and the differences even override the unhelpful atmosphere of many an American film; I saw one the other day of the campaign in North Africa and gathered from what was represented on the screen that it was wholly planned in Washington and executed by none but Americans troops, whereat it was permissible to smile.

These things are but the immaterial bubbles upon the great brew of Allied effort—and the Moscow Conference, embracing not only the British Empire, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Republics but also the Republic of China, which is in some respects the most indomitable of the four of us, has shown to all the world what a drink that is, and, still more, will become. Towards the end of the summer no less distinguished a critic than Captain Liddell Hart published an article weighing up the chances of the months that then lay ahead and entitled it 'Decision

or Deadlock,' holding it as conceivable that if Hitler could contract his lines without actual disaster so as to present the Allies with unbroken armies defending the fortress of Central Europe we might dash our manhood to pieces in vain upon them. Events have already (November 5) moved far and fast beyond the reasonable possibility of any such position and will move much farther and much faster before we drop 1943 into the testing-tube of history. But even in mid-summer and before the gigantic impulse of the Russian offensive developed as we have since seen it one factor was in existence which made deadlock impossible, and that was air power. Month by month that has grown until it has become so great a blast as was never yet imagined in the story of mankind. 'What will happen,' asked one a little anxiously, 'if the Russians get to Berlin first?' 'Don't worry,' came the grim reply: 'there'll be no Berlin to get to.'

We are, beyond all question, witnessing something new in the art of war, the true coordination of the forces of land, sea, and air into one huge striking force. Having many months ago urged in these columns that the time had now come for the establishment of one Service, the King's Service embracing in new unity the three arms of land, sea, and air, it was with special interest that I read what 'The Times' described as 'an authoritative statement' from the three eminent Service chiefs, Lord Chatfield, Lord Milne, and Sir John Salmond, fortified by Lord Hankey and Lord Winster, headed 'Belligerent Power. Unity of All Arms for Total War.' In this statement the five whose authority and experience none can question wrote:

'Modern war forces a readjustment of ideas upon us. We must now consider war in terms of total war and not in terms of the activities of three individual fighting services, each acting singly in its own element.' They added, 'The three fighting services comprise in reality one service . . . there must be understanding that battles are no longer won in a single element.'

This is an extension, in fact, of the Commando principle, that is, the creation of the King's Service, and I repeat when told such a change cannot be made in the midst of a great war that it is only then that there will sufficient pressure to carry it into effect.

As a comment of a lighter kind which, incidentally, is also proof, perhaps, that for all the renewed frequency of air-raids by night upon the London area they cannot be considered as even remotely comparable to the threats and deeds of devastation of 1940 and 1941 I might mention the statement of an officer whose duties compelled him to work in London but whose home was in Surrey: he was, like others, on a roster of duty for fire-watching but was told, so he averred, that it would be quite in order if he duly reported himself within two hours of hearing the siren, long before which time, as he trustfully and often correctly opined, the 'All Clear' would have given him his release. I should add, however, that I have no idea at all as to his degree of truthfulness.

However such things be—and in such a war as this one can only assert with certainty that anything is possible, especially with the British, except, of course their giving in—the one thing that is emerging most clearly through the smoke of war is the air age. In every conceivable way its magnitude swells, more planes, more air-fields, larger and more terrible powers of destructiveness. Early in the autumn, as one instance, I read in the public press of the completion of yet another bomber aerodrome in the rapidly growing chain built in England by U.S. Army engineers: the description stated that 'one of the mile long run-ways was cut from what was once a heavily wooded park.' Shades of William Wordsworth—one impulse from a vernal wood' indeed—and, as it was fathered by American troops, it is allowable to add, 'and then some!' As I read and reflected, I could not but wonder what would be left of the beauty of this tiny island: 'England's green and pleasant land' may harbour a great heart, but its acreage is hardly unlimited. Yet I reflected, first, that necessity knows no law, or rather that preservation is above beauty and it is indubitably necessary to destroy Hitler and Hitlerism in order to enjoy anything whatsoever in the future, and, secondly, that every age, and most of all the present age, is one of transition, to be stagnant is to die, and just as England rose to greatness in the sea age by reason of her geographical position, so that huge cities grew where once had been small ports, so will she continue in, and expand in, greatness in the air age by reason also of her geographical

position—and for that continuance and expansion this chain of aerodromes, now for bombers and hereafter for the liners of the air, are essential. The 'heavily wooded park' must die that England may live—and can any, even the most devoted lover of trees, say that the exchange is a bad one?

In line with this inevitable development of this incalculable war is the decision of the big shipping companies to form a new company together for the future traffic of the air. And here comes into play that good-will between ourselves and the United States to which I referred above. There are wandering commentators and critics, political in their persuasion, who view with apprehension the development of the air-fields of the future world on British territory here and over the globe: these say, in effect, to parody the slogan of a well-known firm of theatre-ticket agents, 'You have the best seats: we want them.' To which need a British mind might reply, if he were inclined to be captious or fed upon a beverage of suspicion, 'You have the planes: we want *them*.' To both the average man of either nation may, and it is most earnestly to be hoped, will, say, 'that being so, the two of us must obviously get together and pool our respective resources for the benefit of both, if not of all.'

Common-sense again, the most valuable of all public qualities, sincerity alone excepted; fortunately common-sense is one that, with all their differing faults, both the British and the American nations value and possess. That and humour have carried us far and will be with us to the end: we need, however, to be specially resolved that neither will fail us when the end of conflict is reached and the new chapter of mankind awaits us. Travelling recently in one of our very crowded trains, I chanced to be in company with a number of naval ratings, in the carriages, in the corridors: the press was increasing uncomfortably when one of the indomitable men of the sea set us all to laughter by calling out loudly, 'Any war-workers here? War-workers, stand up!'

They do stand up: they continue into this fifth winter of total war to stand, their heads higher than ever and their hearts lightened to victory. Be the battle long or short, be its duration now numbered in weeks or months or even years—my pessimist friend has reduced his estimate now

from ten years more to only four, so, as I told him, he is decidedly hedging—whichever it be and whatever still lies ahead, light is breaking in everywhere. 'The war,' says 'Punch,' has now reached a stage when neutral countries are putting out war-feelers.' Many indeed are the truths spoken in jest: we have seen with cordiality the concession as to the use of the Azores, now freely yielded to us by one of the oldest of our friends, Portugal, whose neutrality up to this autumn had been, as every naval expert would agree, of inestimable value to us in the Battle of the Atlantic, a neutrality which, with the turning tide, has now served its purpose and has yielded accordingly to something more: now rumour is busy with another, though younger, friend, namely, Turkey. 'Time marches on,' and with it the Allies, irresistably: there must be something more than mere vague apprehension in Hitler's cold heart.

Our great Prime Minister is never unduly optimistic: therein lies one of the strongest of his holds upon Parliament and the nation, and he is particularly a master in that most English of all arts, the art of under-statement. 'It may well be,' he remarked in the House of Commons on October 28 at the close of his felicitous speech about the rebuilding of its place of assembly, 'that in a year's time our affairs may be in such a position that we shall be looking for jobs rather than for men.' With that extremely adroit, almost ironic turn of phrase, quite in the best Churchillian vein, let us leave—for the moment—this terrific, this triumphant year of 1943.

GORELL.

December 1. I am given the opportunity to add a page. There have been occasions when such an opportunity enabled me to add some words of comment on events of signal significance, when between the first writing of the article and the final passing of the proof some change of a momentous nature took place in the fortunes of the war. Such an occasion occurred two years ago, for instance, when Japan so treacherously, and for herself so fatally, struck at Pearl Harbour in the dawn of Dec. 7, 1941: has such an occasion occurred again? Much has happened in these days that lie immediately behind, but in many theatres of war less than the public at least were

led to expect or at least had been encouraged to hope—and the sense of frustration, to which I have made reference above, has undeniably deepened. That is perhaps natural: in the fifth year of this conflict it is impossible to expect that the strain should not produce impatience, and yet that impatience is in reality as little justified as the sense of frustration.

In Russia there has been vast progress, and of the kind that inevitably leads to more: we have seen the fall of Gomel and the inexorable pressure into two of the German armies. In the Pacific the capture of Sattelberg is some measure of the inevitability of the Japanese defeat. In Italy we are again upon the march to Rome, and there has never been anything in war comparable to our air-onslaught upon Germany: already the grim saying as to Berlin is coming true. All these things are portents, and still they do not satisfy: and as a consequence we have been experiencing what can only be attributed to strained nerves, a loss of proportion—temporarily only it is to be hoped—which has led to the filling of our newspapers with the matter of the birching, owing to slight legal irregularity, of some boys and an almost ludicrous outcry for unjudicial absence of humanity in dealing with Sir Oswald Mosley, a magnification of his importance out of all proportion to the facts and an un-English clamour based not upon justice but dislike, against which Mr Herbert Morrison has stoutly stood firm.

Happily those are no more than bubbles arising from the vast effervescence. We are in December to-day, the New Year is at hand. All the earth is tense with the knowledge of the terrific and terrible drama about to be: to 1944, its greatness and its glory, be all sober, all sure greeting!

POSTSCRIPT TO FRANCE, THE FUTURE, AND HER ALLIES (p. 16).

The Lebanon crisis of November last showed a disconcerting relapse in our relations with the French. The Lebanese, among the most turbulent of Levantines, tried to bounce the French by a *fait accompli* into surrendering

instantly something promised in due course. Similar tricks having been played on Great Britain in times past, we should have gauged the degree of sincerity in the cry of 'Tyrant!' raised against the French. Nevertheless we fell flatfooted into the trap, although, by refusing to the French National Committee the status of a Government, we had ourselves put beyond its reach the power to grant the immediate sovereignty for which the Lebanese clamoured.

Action by French officials may have been ill-considered, but they lacked normal, constant, and friendly contact with their allied mandatory power in Asia Minor, with whose representative in this neuralgic spot many Frenchmen from Marshal Foch onwards had been on terms the reverse of encouraging. Nor could we plead inexperience of such troubles as an excuse for our display of childish or interested spite against General de Gaulle and the French Committee. Even as Lebanese agitation boiled, Great Britain was compelled to repress a lively riot in Palestine, with serious loss of life. The principle of the mote and the beam applies in politics as well as morals.

We overlooked the fact that certain sponsors of the Lebanese hardly more than a year before had been preparing to shower roses on the awaited triumph of the German and Italian armies. We overlooked the background formed by German propaganda still busy in Syria, by lingering Turkish discontent at the French mandate, by Egyptian malice, and by American hopes of 'muscling in' on the Eastern oilfields. It was we, not the French, who to the dismay of the lesser Allies and the resounding joy of Goebbels's wireless, forgot the need for union in face of enemy intrigue. There were, too, other things we might have remembered with advantage. How, for instance, in the grim days of 1940 we stood with our backs to the wall; how few friends we found to stand with us; who those friends were. But truly nothing is so hard to forgive as help received from a friend.

J. P.

SOME RECENT BOOKS.

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| Travel in England. Thomas Burke. | The House of Macmillan, 1843-1943. Charles Morgan. |
| A Batsford Century. Edited by Hector Bolitho. | Carteret and Newcastle. Professor Basil Williams. |
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TRINITY men, and indeed all interested in Cambridge, can be grateful to the Master, Dr G. M. Trevelyan, for his 'Trinity College: An Historical Sketch' (Cambridge University Press) which in 120 pages gives an attractive survey both of the buildings and of many of the famous men of the College. Four names perhaps stand out specially in this book in the past Mastership; Neville in the early seventeenth century, Bentley in the first half of the eighteenth century, Whewell from 1841 to 1866, and Montagu Butler from 1886 to 1918. They form an interesting series of character studies ranging from the autocratic, dominant, and most unaccommodating Bentley to the almost exaggerated dignified courtesy of Butler—a courtesy accompanied by a strong and determined will. For entertainment we would gladly hear more of the great but tempestuous Bentley, but he was only an episode in the long and famous history of the College. Even though only a small number of the notable alumni can be mentioned in so small a book, the list is indeed one of which Trinity men may be rightly proud. Of real historical interest, too, is the story of the development of the original buildings of King's Hall into the many courts and architectural delights of the present College.

It is an odd-sounding and mixed compliment to pay to Mr S. P. B. Mais' latest work 'The Home Counties' (Batsford) to say that we wish that there was more of it while we also wish that it had never been written! In so far as the author takes us rambling so attractively through Middlesex, Surrey, Kent, Herts, Essex, and parts of Bucks, we could well do with more, but in so far as he sheds

the light of publicity on beautiful and still secluded places, whose only hope of salvation from the clutches of the estate developer of the future lies in remaining unknown, we could wish that the book had not been written. The Home Counties have suffered so fearfully from suburbanisation and 'bungaloid growth' that much of their beauty has been lost for ever, and much more will be lost unless they can be saved somehow from the builder. And yet under the skilled guidance of Mr Mais we are taken by green lanes and open commons, through ancient villages and unspoilt woodland, by lake and river, and over hills and dales. We visit old churches, old houses, old inns. Of the war there is hardly an echo and we revel in the England that once was, and we hope may be again. To say that the book is issued by Messrs Batsford is to guarantee the excellence and artistic value of the many and well-chosen illustrations. Here is a chance to forget the war and all its horrors and restrictions for a few hours and many readers should take it.

Another most interesting and excellently illustrated book coming from Messrs Batsford is 'Travel in England,' by Thomas Burke. We are shown the process of development from prehistoric man trudging along grassy tracks to the present-day Rolls Royce on the faultless tarmac. We are introduced to Roman roads, mediæval travel on tracks that only exaggerated compliment could possibly call roads; thence by the slowly improving conditions of Stuart and Georgian times to the great coaching days of the beginning of the nineteenth century. Then with the coming of the railways came the renewed decay of the roads till the motor arrived to give them new prominence and a technical perfection such as they never had before. The striking fact is that from the departure of the Romans the roads as a whole never again reached the Roman standard of quality till well on in the eighteenth century. Mr Burke wisely and effectually dissipates the atmosphere of romance shed round the 'good old coaching days.' Until a few years before the coming of the railways, travelling was icy in winter, dust-smothered in summer, uncertain, filthy, exhausting, and tedious, not to mention the danger of accidents and highwaymen. Some wayside inns were notably good—many more were notably bad. Mr Burke gives an excellent survey of his subject and

sums up the pains and pleasures of travel in the past with skilled judgment.

Still another book from the same firm is '**A Batsford Century**,' edited by Hector Bolitho. The title gives a feeling of comforting assurance that there will be other Batsford centuries to come and indeed we hope that it may be so, for the distinguished firm has won for itself a high and well-deserved place in the world of books. Mr Bolitho with his usual skill and enlivening touch has welded together narratives by the present directors of the firm and supplemented them to make a most attractive story. Bradley Batsford, the young and enterprising apprentice from Hertfordshire, founded the firm as a book-selling business in 1843, and in his long life of eighty-six years saw it firmly established. His two sons, Bradley the Second and Herbert, developed the publishing side and their notable work has been most successfully developed further by their nephew and successor, Harry Batsford, the present head of the firm. All lovers of the beautiful and the historic in our country are deeply indebted to 'Batsfords'—the expert for the lavishly produced and authoritative quartos and other books, chiefly on architecture and art, and the general reader for the ever popular 'British Heritage' and 'Face of Britain' series. The present reviewer, when depleting his shelves owing to the many and insistent demands for books for service, hospital, and other libraries in these days, has found it impossible to be otherwise than selfish and keep his shelf of treasured Batsford books untouched! There must be many others who feel the same.

Any contribution to Shakespearean scholarship from the pen of Professor Dover Wilson is assured of a welcome; and in '**The Fortunes of Falstaff**' (Cambridge University Press) he dissolves some of the mists and legends that have gathered round that Lord of Misrule. As always, the author bases his viewpoint firmly on the text, eschewing airy vapourings and romantic reconstructions. Falstaff is such an attractive creation that, as the author so pertinently reminds us, he too often distracts students from the main theme of the play, 'the growing-up of a madcap prince into an ideal king.' We are also reminded that Shakespeare knew very well what he was doing as a craftsman; therefore '**Henry IV**' is one play and is only divided

into two parts for convenience in playing. The famous scene in which the young Prince puts on his dying father's crown is put in right perspective, as is also the equally famous scene when Henry, newly crowned and consecrated, dismisses for ever his madcap youth with: 'I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers.' We know that 'Henry IV,' parts one and two, were written consecutively in 1597 and became instantly popular. Professor Wilson, amongst the most then-minded of contemporary critics, takes us amongst those who first saw Shakespeare's plays and makes their reactions almost as vivid to us as they were to themselves. This is constructive criticism of the highest order.

Dissatisfaction with the traditional statement of the dual nature of Jesus Christ, his perfect divinity, and his perfect humanity, has been gathering force of recent years among not a few theologians of established repute notwithstanding their conviction that the Church is but proclaiming the truth when it asserts that Christ is both God and man. Greek thought they hold is inherently incapable of adequately expressing this truth. In other words the Nicene formula is not necessarily the final word on the Christological problem, nor has patristic thought an indisputable claim to infallibility on this perennially baffling question. To the volume of this discontent respecting the Nicene definitions Canon H. G. England's '**The Revelation of the Word**' (John Murray) is a notable and formidable addition and one, we think, that is bound to compel the attention of theological students. In brief, the author's contention is that Christological thinking went wrong when it uncritically identified the Word, or Logos, of the Johannine Prologue with the Son rather than with the Holy Spirit, an assumption he argues which is scripturally very questionable. 'The warrant of Holy Scripture, no less than the warrant of reason, may therefore be claimed for a patient consideration of the alternative concept of the Eternal Procession of the Holy Spirit for that of the Eternal Generation of the Son.' Yet to deny the pre-existence of Jesus is by no means to repudiate his essential deity. Jesus, Canon England declares, was truly 'the only begotten Son of God,' but there was a time when he was not, a time that was literally B.C. The individual personality of Jesus, the Son of God, 'was begotten by the

Holy Spirit of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the fulness of time,' but though his birth was foreordained of God before the world was, yet the eternal purpose of God was not realised till late in the history of the world. Not till this birth did the Binity of the Godhead become a Trinity. Canon England is fully aware of the audacity of challenging a dogma which has the authority of the Oecumenical Councils behind it, but as he points out, history does not record that the view he sets forward was ever considered at any of these Councils, though in the ante-Nicene era it was not unknown.

Mr M. Philips Price, in his 'Russia through the Centuries' (Allen and Unwin), aims at showing that both Conservative opinion here, which considers that the Russian October Revolution completely broke with the past and destroyed all the good traditions and inheritances of Old Russia, and Left Wing opinion, which also thinks that the break with the past was complete but that everything in Old Russia was so bad that a clean sweep was made and that the new regime inherited nothing from the old, are wrong. The truth lies between the two and the author shows clearly how many present-day institutions are a normal though changed development of the past. From village communes and the Zemsky Sobor of the Middle Ages to Zemstvos in the nineteenth century the path has led straight to the Soviets of the present day. Even the present ruthless 'scorched earth' strategy in face of the enemy is but a repetition of what happened in earlier centuries against Tartar and other invasions. Mr Price gives the true essence of Russian history and character in very clear and concise form. His story is not overloaded with unnecessary detail, and indeed the reader might well ask for a few more dates. The varying effects of eastern and western influences in Russia, the outstanding reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine II, the dead weight of the privileged and idle landed aristocracy, the growth of autocracy and bureaucracy, the chronic land hunger of the peasant, the Bolshevik ascendancy and its methods, ruthless yet with a far-reaching and eminently practical aim, the policy of inciting world revolution, as favoured by Trotsky, gradually giving way to the saner and more hopeful Stalin policy of concentration on home interests and nation building—all are steps in the evolution

of Russia and are clearly explained in this most useful book.

Under the title 'Verses,' Mr E. H. Blakeney has given to his friends a collection of poems in which he has enshrined with grace and charm such thoughts, hopes, fears, and regrets as are common to us all. Obviously the result of a scholar's leisure, they attempt nothing beyond their author's powers. Perhaps too easily satisfied with the conventional phrase, the obvious rhyme, Mr Blakeney is at his best in that, in English, very difficult form—the translation or paraphrase from Latin or Greek. Inspired by a sentence from Manilius, 'Men of the Dunkirk Beaches' should find a place in the anthologies. This, from the Greek of Plato, is memorable :

My Star, that starward gazes, O to be
Yon heaven, with myriad eyes to look on thee !

A notable fact about this attractive little volume is that it was entirely set up and produced by the author himself at his private press in Winchester, and no professional printer could have done the work better.

Mr Charles Morgan in 'The House of Macmillan, 1843-1943' (Macmillans) tells, with his customary skill, a very interesting story and pays a graceful tribute to a firm of which the British book world may be proud. He tells how two young Scotsmen, Daniel and Alexander Macmillan, without capital and without influence but with abundant determination, ability, and faith, laid the keel so to speak of the great ship which has since carried books and the name of Macmillan to every continent. Daniel was cut off in early middle life but Alexander continued to a ripe old age and lived to see his firm well forward on the high road of success, a journey which the two succeeding generations of the family have continued with ever increasing renown. A publisher's life necessitates some intimate knowledge of printing, illustration, binding, and other material processes of book-production, but for the general public the interest must chiefly lie in the publisher's association with his authors—and that indeed can often be the crowning pleasure (and sometimes the bane) of his career. Tennyson, Hughes, Kingsley, Matthew Arnold, John Morley, Pater, Lewis Carroll, Henry James, Hardy, Kipling, Hugh Walpole, Chesterton, Leslie Stephen, Trollope, Rhoda Broughton, and Charlotte

M. Yonge—all authors of fame and distinction in their own line and all, and many more, in the Macmillian clientèle, not to mention any still alive. It is a fine list. With other firms Macmillans share the distinction (sorrowful or otherwise) of having declined the early work of Bernard Shaw. We wish them continued good fortune and prosperity in their second century now beginning.

The eighteenth century is a subject of unending interest—an age of the grossest worldliness often covered with a veneer of dignified and artistic culture, often with its materialism stark and undisguised. But what a wonderful gallery of studies it has presented to the painter in the past and still presents to the historian to-day—Walpole and Townshend, Pitt and Fox, Clive and North, and Burke and countless others. Professor Basil Williams in his *'Carteret and Newcastle'* (Cambridge University Press) has selected two interesting, famous, and well contrasted figures for his study and delineation. It might be said that Carteret was little in his greatness while Newcastle was great in his littleness. In political knowledge, oratory, scholarship, and his brilliant talents, Carteret deeply impressed his contemporaries, but his impracticability was fatal to successful statesmanship. He could neither form nor retain any party to give him consistent support, and his arrogant tactlessness offended those who could best have helped his career. Yet in knowledge of European politics he was outstanding, a province in which Newcastle's fumbling efforts could only bring disaster. On the other hand, in the minor science of party management, of bribery with honours and offices and money, of organising elections and oiling in devious manner the political machine, Newcastle was supreme. He always had his face towards the rising sun in political life. He was fussy and querulous, seldom satisfied that he was being treated with the respect and consideration which he thought he deserved, but his political power made him indispensable and for half a century, while others came and went, he remained solidly in high office. Professor Williams has given us a historical study of great value and of absorbing interest to all students of the period.

'When in 1916 Edward Lyttelton resigned the Head Mastership of Eton it was natural to assume that his

career had ended and had ended in something like failure . . . even [his friends] would hardly have dared to expect that the last quarter of a century of his life would be its happiest and not its least fruitful years ; or that he would so live them as to display to a wide and ever growing circle the essential qualities of a saint.' This, in the words of Dr Cyril Alington, Dean of Durham, is the keynote of his '**Edward Lyttelton: An Appreciation**' (Murray). It is a particularly sympathetic study of one who was a most lovable man, of outstanding character and great qualities. Much of a Head Master's work is necessarily taken up by administrative business and Edward Lyttelton confessedly hated that. That was the main cause of occasional failure, which was apparent more than real. Likewise it must be admitted that his enthusiasms (some called them fads) of the moment were inclined to overshadow his judgment and leave him in false positions. It has been said that if he was a saint he was certainly a very British one—a humourous, forthright, cricketing saint—and a man most lovable whose word could be trusted absolutely and whose kindness of heart and ready sympathy were beyond all question. His forthrightness and enthusiasms occasionally led him into incongruities which in a lesser man might and almost have seemed absurd, but with him it was 'just E. L.' and nothing more mattered. There is a delightful story told by Dr Alington of how, when E. L. was staying with the present Archbishop of Canterbury, he on coming to breakfast after morning prayers propounded the deep question : 'Have you got any solution to the problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom ?' On the next morning on the same occasion and with similar zeal he inquired : 'Have you got any solution of the problem how to have your cook at family prayers and still get breakfast hot ?' That was typical of him. Can it be wondered that he was a man with a vast number of very real friends ? To the '*Quarterly*' he was an occasional and much valued contributor and indeed what must have been about the last article that he ever wrote was published in our pages. Both those who had the privilege of knowing him in person and those who only knew of him are indebted to Dr Alington for a most charming and discerningly written tribute.

Lord Northcliffe is reported to have said that Thomas Barnes was the greatest editor of *The Times*, a distinction usually accorded to Delane, though perhaps undeservedly belittling more than one of his successors. Lord Northcliffe was not always right, except perhaps in his own opinion, but certainly Barnes was a great editor and well worthy of the biography '*Thomas Barnes of The Times*' (Cambridge University Press), which Mr Derek Hudson has written with historical skill and graceful literary style. The years of Barnes' editorial reign, 1817 to 1841, definitely saw the transition from the days when *The Times*, like other papers, was so to speak waiting on ministers' doorsteps in the hope of benefits, financial or otherwise, to the days when ministers were waiting on *The Times* doorstep in the hope of support. This was chiefly the result of Barnes' resolution and independence. It is curious to find Althorp in 1834 asking Brougham's advice about declaring open war on *The Times*—an earlier generation of statesmen would have thought it much simpler to bribe—but Barnes was not bribable. Barnes was a sound scholar and a trenchant—at times too trenchant—writer. After a reasonably sound academic, and somewhat alcoholic, youth he by chance got an opportunity of work on the staff of *The Times*, then a paper of but very moderate importance. From that date Barnes and *The Times* together went forward from strength to strength, certainly not without many a hard struggle and not a few passing setbacks, but Barnes, solidly backed by John Walter II, had his own conviction of what *The Times* should be and to a very large extent he had achieved that object when in 1841 he died and was succeeded by the great Delane, who brought *The Times* to a position of international influence which no paper had held before and probably none has held since. Mr Hudson has given us a well-drawn and vivid picture of a remarkable man and his character and achievements.

QUARTERLY REVIEW—100 YEARS AGO.

It may interest our readers to see the subjects with which the 'Quarterly' was dealing 100 years ago. In those days, all articles were anonymous, and in some cases it has been impossible to find the names of the authors since, though, in all cases where they have been identified, the names are added.

It will be seen with interest that one of the contributors was Mr Gladstone, who, indeed, was a regular contributor until later years when his views became very different from those of the 'Quarterly.'

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